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VOLUME 58 
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 
LAW REVIEW 
}UNE 1983 NUMBER 3 
PRESUMPTIVE AND PER SE TAKINGS: 
A DECISIONAL MODEL FOR 
THE TAKING ISSUE 
}OHN J. COSTONIS* 
Professor Costonis presents a decisional model for the iudicial management of compensation practice 
under the takings clause that comprehends both p hysical and regulatory incursions. The model contains four 
elements: a commitment to presumptions rather than per se rules to determine whether property has been 
taken; a due process-takings phase, in which conflicts between welfare and indemnification concerns are 
mediated through application of the ;ust share principle; a pure takings phase, in which a measure's fairnes  in 
operation is assessed; and a sliding scale to key government's burden of proof in ;ustifying a particular measure 
in light of the values implicated b y  the measure. Professor Coston is identifies ma;or developments in modern 
takings ;urisprudence that prefigure the model, a n d  he argues that the per se test adopted by the Supreme 
Court in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp. fails to accord with these trends. He concludes 
that the decisional model should replace both Loretto's per se test and the multifactor balancing test used to 
decide regulatory takings cases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
. The takings jurisprudence of any period is shaped by that 
period's 
attitudes towards privat e  property and the judiciary's fifth amend· 
ment-appointed role as custodian of that institution. In times of rela· 
tive stability, the tesserae composing the jurisprudential mosaic re· 
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main securely inlaid, forming fam iliar p atterns in their relations to 
one another . But in periods of transition the pieces tend to work loose 
rearranging themselves in novel p atterns reflective of emergent atti: 
tu des . 
Ours is a period of transition i n  which a variety of the elements 
that have shaped the mosaic throughout this century h ave been or , it 
can be anticipated, will shortly be pried loose and refashioned . Princi­
pal among these elements is the premise that the takings clause states a 
rule that a compensable taking invariably occurs when "property" is 
"taken." 1 This premise is yielding t o  an alternative one under which 
the clause states not a per se rule, but  a presumption that may be, and 
in fact usually is, rebuttable by the government. No l onger venerated, 
moreover , is a set of distinctions-those between property as "thing" 
and as "relation," between "direct" and "consequential" damages, 
between "permanent" and "temporary" invasions, and between "de­
struction" and " appropriation"-that once served to delimit the terms 
"property" and "taken ." 2 The distinctions remain useful as factors 
that properly bear on the takings determination, but they no longer 
enjoy their former status as self-sufficient predicates for that determi­
nation. 
Also suspect is the paradigm atic takings status conventionally 
assigned to "physical i nvasions," 3 as contrasted with "regulatory," 
i.e., nontrespassory, incursions. An extreme variant of the per se rule 
demands that takings be found on the basis of their "physical'' charac­
ter alone. Despite the United States Supreme Court's endorsement of 
this position in its 1982 opinion, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan 
1 See, e.g., United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 510 (1945); United 
States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377 (1945). A more recent illustration of the rule­
oriented construction of the takings clause appears in Justice Brennan's categorical statement 
that "[a]s soon as private property has been taken, whether through formal condemnation 
proceedings, occupancy, physical invasion, or regulation, the landowner has already suffered a 
constitutional violation, and . .. [the just compensation requirement) is triggered." San Diego 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 654 (1981) (dissenting opinion) (empha�is in 
original). For commentary exemplifying this construction, see, e.g., F. Bosselman, D. Calh� & 
J. Banta, The Taking Issue (1973); Rumbach, A Unifying Theory for the Just-Compensatwn 
Cases: Takings, Regulation and Public Use, 34 Rutgers L. Rev. 243 (1982); Stoebuck, Police 
Power, Takings and Due Process, 37 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1057 (1980) [hereinafter Police 
Power). 
2 See text accompanying notes 31-41, 249-372 infra. , . . . 
3 Representative of this interpretation of the United States Supreme Court s takings iuns­
prudence is Professor Michelman's summarization that "[t]he one incontestable case for com pen� 
sation (short of formal expropriation) seems to occur when the government deliberately brings 1 
about that its agents, or the public at large, 'regularly' use, or 'perm�ne.
�tly'. occupy• space �r va 
thing which theretofore was understood to be under private ownership. Michelm�n, _Prop
e t. ' 
Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation' �a
w& 80 
Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1184 (1967) (footnote o mitted); see also F. B osselman, D. Callies J. 
Banta, supra note 1, at 246-47; Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49
 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 165, 170-71 (1974); Rumbach, supra note l, at 252-53. 
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CATV Corp., 4 this variant should prove no more durable than the 
antecedents from which it derives; namely, the broader version of the 
per se rule and the distinctions-based parsing of the takings clause's 
operative terms. Concededly, physical invasions are more likely to be 
deemed takings than are regulatory incursions. But this is true only 
because policy considerations governing both physical invasions and 
regulatory incursions are more likely to be infringed by the former 
than by the latter, not because different considerations apply to the 
two types of interventions. 
The compartmentalization of the due process (or police power) 
and takings (or eminent domain power) inquiries in conventional 
analysis of fifth amendment controversies5 must also be rethought. 
While the two inquiries should not be collapsed into one, their inter­
action is more pronounced than compartmentalization supposes. The 
question whether a measure "goes too far," or works an unacceptable 
diminution in economic value, cannot be divorced so sharply from the 
judiciary's assessment of, first, the competing substantive values 
served by property's protection and by the proposed welfare measure 
and, second, the fairness in principle of the legislature's selection of 
this class of property (and property owners) to bear this burden. The 
piece that links these two inquiries is missing from the present mosaic. 
Consequently, the mosaic does not reveal how factors conventionally 
associated with due process analysis influence the result of the takings 
inquiry and, in a related vein, does not provide a basis for choosing 
among the various takings standards enumerated in the case law and 
literature. 6 
Finally, the mosaic's property piece is monochromatic, while the 
trend of Burger Court opinions indicates that it should be multi-hued 
or perhaps split into several separate pieces. Because the post-1930 
Court has classed the values safeguarded by property as economic, it 
has extended less protection to property rights than to interests pro­
tected by other provisions of the Bill of Rights and the f ourteenth 
amendment. 7 But opinions of the Burger Court have increasingly 
recognized that the notion of property may encompass what will here 
be te
.
rmed a "dominion interest" as well. 8 The logic of these decisions 
reqmres that the dual standard formerly applicable to "property" and 
to "civil" rights be reworked to insure that the protection afforded 
4 102 S .  Ct. 3164 (1982). 
: See text accompanying notes 54-80, 91-123 infra. 
See text accompanying notes 238-40 infra. 
7 See text accompanying notes 42-47 infra. 
8 See text accompanying notes 48-53 infra. 
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property rights is upgraded, at least where the values those rights shelter are noneconomic. 
Refashioning the j urisprudential m osaic in the foregoing respects 
leads to a four-element decisio n al model for the t akings issue. The 
model's dominant element is the proposition that a governmental 
incursion, physical or regulatory, under which property is taken is a 
presumptive, not a per se, taking. The remaining three elements 
address how a reviewing court sho uld evaluate government's efforts to 
overcome that presumption. The object of the m odel's second ele­
ment, terme d  here the "due p rocess-takings phase," is to determine 
whether government has established that the redistribution effected 
by the measure is fair in principle. Two questions are asked: What are 
the competing values advanced by the measure and by the property 
that it seeks to redistribute? Does the measure accommodate these 
values in a w ay that fairly mediates between the broader welfare and 
indemnity concerns embodied i n  these values? The central concern at 
this phase is whether government can establish a link between the use 
to which the affected property i s  devoted and the measure's purposes 
that qualifies the incursion as fair .  If the link is not established, 
analysis ends because a taking will be found. Otherwise, reasoning 
moves to the model's third element, termed here its "pure takings 
phase," which considers the measure's fairness in operation : Does the 
measure infringe more severely upon the p roperty t aken than is re­
quired to achieve its intended goals? Shaping the analysis under both 
the due process-takings phase and the p ure takings phase is the model's 
fourth element: the character o f  the showing that government must 
make to satisfy the inquiries posed in both these phases. The severity 
of this gradu ated burden depends principally upon the relative weight 
assigned to the specific welfare and indemnity values identified in the 
model's due proces�-takings phase. 
In my j udgment, the model constitutes a principled, coherent 
predicate for j udicial m anagement of compensation practice under 
the takings clause. I also believe that, despite occasional modern 
precedents t o  the contrary and evident differences i n  verb�l p�cka�­
ing, the model is reasonably descriptive of the general d1�ect101� 1� 
which the Supreme Court's takings j urisprudence is movmg. � lus 
Article undertakes t o  support these contentions through elaborat10n. 
negative example, and predictio n .  . 
The function of Part I is elaboration; it reviews the models 
antecedents i n  late nineteenth and twentieth century judicial history 
and fills in the foregoing sketches of the m odel's four ele1�ents: l�art �I 
takes up the negative example furnished by the Court s opmwn m 
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Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Co
rp.9 I n  that contro­
versy, the plaintiff successfully challenged New Yor
k Executive Law 
section 828, 10 which aut horizes cable television companie
s to locate 
their equipment on privately owned apartment buildings without 
compensating the owners. The litigation centered on Teleprompter's 
occupation of approximat ely one-eighth of a cubic foot on the roof of 
Mrs. Loretto's Manhattan apartment building ;  the space was required 
for the stringing of approximately 36 feet of one-half inch cable and 
the installation of two d irectional taps, each housed in a 4-inch by 4-
inch b y  4-inch metal box . 11 
Although the Court e ndorsed the presumption-oriented construc­
tion of the takings clause for other types of encroachments, 12 it flatly 
rejecte d  this construction i n  evaluating "perm anent physical occupa­
tions, ' '  13 the l abel it attached to the section 828 intrusion. "A perma­
nent p hysical occupation authorized by government," the Court 
stated categorically, "is a t aking w ithout regar d  to the public interests 
it may serve." 14 The vol u m e  of space occupied (whether or not "big­
ger than a breadbox" 15), the "type of property" 16 so occupied, the 
importance of the "public benefit" 17 served by the occupation, and 
the "minimal" character o f  the occupation's "economic impact on the 
9 102 S. Ct. 3164 ( 1 982). 
10 N . Y. Exec. Law§ 828 (McKin ney 1 982).  Section 828 provides, in relevant part: 
1. No landlord shall 
a. interfere with the installation of cable television facilities upon his property or 
premises, except that a landlord may require: 
i. that the installation of cable television facilities conform to such reasonable condi­
tions as are necessary to protect the safety, functioning and appearance of the 
. . 
premises, and the convenience and well-being of other t�nants; 
IL that the cable television company or the tenant or a combination thereof bear the 
entire cost of the installation, operation or removal of such facilities· and 
iii. that the cable television company agree to indemnify the landlord fo; any damage 
caused by the installation, operation or removal of such facilities. 
b. �emand or accept payment from any tenant, in any form, in exchange for permit· 
tmg cable television service on or within his property or premises, or from any 
Id. § 828(1). 
cable television · h h h th . . compa n y  m exc ange t erefor in excess of any amount whic 
e 
commission shall, by regulation, determine to be reasonable . . . . 
11 Loretto, 102 S. Ct. at 3169. 
12 Id. at 31 73-74. 
13 Id. at 3174 & n.9. 
14 Id. at 3171. 
1 5  Id. at 31 77 n.16. 
16 Id .  at  3178. 
17 Id. at 3176. 
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owner" 18 do not affect this conclusion, according to the Loretto 
Court. Moreover, whether the purposes of the challenged measure 
comport with the police power is a "separate question," 19 bearing no 
relation whatever to resolution of the takings claim. The Court also 
ruled out any consideration of facts that would be germane to the 
.. multifactor balancing test"20 that the Court claimed it employs when 
a measure authorizes a "temporary physical invasion,"21 compels the 
landowner himself to devote space on his land to fixtures that he 
neither owns nor installs, 22 or limits the use to which land may be 
devoted.23 
In short, permanent physical occupations are takings simply be­
cause of their physical character, according to the Loretto Court. 
Stated conversely, considerations integral to the decisional model's 
due process-takings phase are immaterial because these intrusions are 
per se, not presumptive, takings. In an extraordinarily overstated, if 
not flatly erroneous, litany, the Court concluded that "[ o ]ur constitu­
tional history confirms the (per se] rule, recent cases do not question 
it, and the purposes of the Takings Clause compel its retention."24 
Loretto is a splendid foil for this Article because the points of 
disagreement between the two are clearcut and fundamental. Among 
the points Part II addresses are Loretto 's categorical endorsement of 
the narrow variant of the per se rule, its resuscitation in full nine­
teenth century dress of the four distinctions allied to that rule, its 
equally retrograde divorce of due process and takings reasoning, and 
its skewed conception of the purposes of the takings clause. 
But Loretto is instructive affirmatively as well. It endorses the 
presumption-oriented construction for all governmental interventions 
is Id. 
•• Id. at 3171. 
2o The phrase is taken from Justice Blackmun's dissent in Loretto, id. at 318� (Blackmun, J .. 
dissenting). As described by the Loretto majority, the test is ··an ad hoc inquiry m which scver�l 
· · · · h · · t f th egulation the extent to winch 1t factors are particularly s1gmftcant-t e economic 1mpac o er , . .. 
· · d · d th h ter of the governmental action. interferes with mvestment-backe expectat10ns, an e c arac . 
Id. at 3174 (citation omitted). Some of the Court's recent decisions employing this test arc ci
ted 
in note 74 infra· the most elaborate expression of the test appears in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. \', 
:\cw York City:438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978). The test and its deficiencies are discussed fu
rther 111 
notes 238-40 and accompanying text infra. 
21 Loretto, 102 S .  Ct. at 3175. f 22 Id. at 3176 (physical invasion "is qualitatively more severe than a r�gulation of the use o 
property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner ) · 
" Id. 
2• Id. at 3171. 
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falling short of permanent physical occupations,25 that is to say, most 
governmental interventions. The Court's embrace of a per se rule for 
permanent physical occupations may flow less from its enthusiasm for 
that rule than from its conclusion that, faced with the multifactor 
balancing test as the alternative yardstick for section 828, the per se 
rule was the less unsatisfactory. 26 The multifactor balancing test aligns 
principally with the economic interest in property. 27 But section 828, 
as perceived by the Court, impinged upon the plaintiff landlord's 
dominion interest in her property. 28 So interpreted, Loretto suggests 
that the changes in current takings jurisprudence urged in this Article 
might best be effectuated by bringing the multifactor balancing test 
into line with the proposed decisional model. This possibility is also 
examined in Part II, which contrasts the Court's analysis of section 
828 with an analysis of that section as it would have proceeded under 
the model. 
The task of the Conclusion is prediction. Changes in the charac­
ter of the Court's takings jurisprudence that would likely follow upon 
a transition from the multifactor balancing approach to the decisional 
model are anticipated. An Appendix to the Article examines the dis­
tinctions allied to the rule-oriented construction of the takings clause. 
The Appendix reviews an 1872 New Hampshire decision, Eaton v. B. 
C. & M. R. R. ,29 which portrays the character and role of the distinc­
tions in the post-Civil War period, surveys post-Eaton trends in the 
Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence, and critiques the Court's use 
of the distinctions in Loretto in light of the foregoing review and 
survey. 
25 The Court recognized that its recent cases "state or imply that a physical invasion [other 
than a permanent physical occupation) is subject to a balancing process," id. at 3174, citing with 
approval Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (publicly imposed navigation 
servitude not a per se taking because not a "permanent occupation of land"), 102 S. Ct. at 3175; 
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (publicly imposed speech servitude 
not a per se taking because not a "permanent physical occupation"), 102 S. Ct. at 3175, and its 
labor opinions requiring employers to grant access to nonemployee union organizers, e.g., 
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S 539 (1972); 
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956), 102 S. Ct. at 3175 n.11. The Court noted 
that this balancing process is also applicable to obligations assuming the form of affirmative 
covenants (measures obligating property owners to perform certain acts on their premises), 102 
S. Ct. at 3178-79, and of negative easements (measures precluding property owners from 
performing acts on their premises that, but for the restriction, would otherwise be permissible), 
id. at 3179. 
26 See text accompanying notes 201-204 infra. 
27 See note 20 supra and text accompanying notes 44-47, 238-40 infra. 
28 See text accompanying notes 195-204 infra. 
29 51 N.H. 504 (1872). 
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I 
THE DECISIONAL MODEL 
A. Antecedents: Impediments to the Afodel a11d Their Erosion 
Emergence of a climate fa\·orable to acceptance of the decisional 
model has been gradual, continuing to this day. in which a variety of 
impediments have stuhbornly yi elded ground. Chief among these 
impediments have been a nineteenth cenlmy development ethic that 
employed the distinctions allied to the rule-oriented construction to 
rationalize forced subsidization of the costs of public improvements by 
affected landowners; a formalistic legal mentality that sustained these 
distinctions long after that ethic had disappeared; the post-1930 Su­
preme Court's enunciation of a dual standard affording less protection 
to property than to civil rights; and functional and assumed theoreti­
cal differences in government's employnwni of the police and eminent 
domain powers that endured throughout al least the first third of this 
century. The model's evolution and the Court's acceptance of at least 
its rudiments had to await the \vaning of the dcn�lopment ethic; the 
ascendancy of legal realism; the Burger Comt"s rv('ognition of a do­
minion interest in property entit led to 110 less and possibly greater 
protection than conventional civil liberties: amL most important of 
all, the evolution of the police and crninvnt domain powers into 
essentially interchangeable means for achi('' iii!.!; gm·ernment's ends. 
Exhaustive treatment of these trends is 11eitlll'1 !'''ssihle in this Article 
nor necessary for its purposes. But their brid dt·,_ 1·iption here provides 
indispensable background for the portrayal of tfH' model's four ele­
ments in the following section. 
1. Nineteenth Century Dei;dopmc11t Etliir·. H11h·-Orie11tcd 
Construction, and Allied Disti11ctio11s 
In the nineteenth century. thcrl' ''as \\·idcsprcad concern that 
equating the concept of property for takin!.!;s p11rp<>:"cs with the broad 
concept of property in real property la\,. "u11ld 1 1 npecle th� yo�ng 
Republic's development by increasing the cost ul :·an<�I,. 
i�avigatwn, 
railroad, and other works essential to its transport at 1rn1 .mf r.�st�ucture � 
"In an underdeveloped nation \\·ith little smpl11� ('ap1tal. . I rofesso. 
Horwitz has written, ··elimination or rcd11dio11 ol damage Jl1dgmen
ts 
f f l . t . 1 .1., hnclowners whose created a new source o orcec mn·s 11H 11 • '· ' 
. . . . 1 • . tion m effect were property values were impaired \\"It 1011t cornpl ns<1 
474 
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compelled to underwrite a portion of eco n�m
i� development." 3o 
A n g  the techniques used by early and m1d
-mneteenth century 
ju�;es was the introduction of a number of otherwi
se puzzling distinc­
tions into takings jurisprudence. 31 
The courts of the time, for example, often conceived of property 
as a physical thing, not as a relation between an owner and a re­
source. As a consequence, they denied "property" status to such recog­
nized noncorporeal real p roperty interests as easements32 and treated 
physical invasions as inherently .
more suspect tha� ?ther typ� of 
public encroachments . 33 I n  a.d�it10
n, th�:' deemed I?J�
.
ry to pnvate 
land noncompensable i f  the m1ury was consequential rather than 
"direct . " Compensation w as therefore denied for losses occasioned by 
public projects occurring o n  neighboring land, �hile � more genero�s 
rule was used for projects conducted on the claimant s own parcel. 4 
Similar results were recorded when government's intrusion was inter-
30 M .  Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, at 70 (1977). See gener­
ally J.W. Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century United States 
(1956); Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by Government: the 
United States, 1789-1910, 33 J. Econ. Hist. 232 (1973). Although other commentators have 
questioned whether eminent domain practice was as skewed in favor of development interests as 
suggested by the foregoing authors, see, e.g., Freyer, Reassessing the Impact of Eminent Domain 
in Early American Economic Development, 1981 Wis. L. Rev. 1 263, they do not contest either 
that the decisional rules based on the distinctions discussed in text accom panying notes 31-41 
infra contribute to that result or that the rules have undergone substantial erosion since the pre-
Civil War period. 
-
31 The distinctions are detailed in the Appendix to this essay through an examination of 
Eaton v. B. C. & M .  R.R., 51 N.H. 504 ( 1 872), an opinion written 25 years after the period 
described by Professor Horwitz and critical of the trend identified in text accompanying notes 
32-41 infra. 
The regressive thought that these distinctions have engendered continues to the present not 
only in such aberrational Supreme Court takings opinions as Loretto but in the otherwise 
sophisticated and incisive commentary of takings scholars such as Professor Stoebuck, see Police 
Power, supra note l; A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 Wash. L. Rev. 553 (1972) 
[hereinafter Eminent Domain]; and Professor Humbach, see Humbach, supra note l. Although 
takings commentary generally and m y  own thinking specifically have benefited substantially 
from the work of these scholars, their work suffers the grave defect shared by all rule-oriented 
approaches to the takings clause of attempting to address the takings issue within the confines of 
th� language of the clause alone. In consequence, Professor Stoebuck, whose principal concern is 
with the term "taken," is forced to credit the appropriation/destruction distinction in a manner 
that is 
.
both
. artificial and discordant with the actual evolution of the Court's takings jurispru­dence m this century. See note 9 1  infra. Professor Humbach who concentrates on the term 
"property," advances a view of the clause premised on a d�stinction between "rights" and 
"fr�oms" which, while fruitful on a number of levels, is so exception-ridden as to forfeit its 
clai� as the predicate for a "unifying theory" of takings jurisprudence. 
See text accompanying notes 260 266-68 infra 3J s , . ee text accompanying note 260 infra. J4 See text accompanying notes 261-63, 265-66 infra. 
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mittent, or "temporary," as opposed to continuing, or "permanent."35 
Likewise, courts invoked the distinction between "destruction" and 
"appropriation" to reduce the instances in which property could be 
said to have been taken. Destruction alone was insufficient; the claim­
ant also had to establish that government had affirmatively appropri­
ated the destroyed property to its own use. 36 
The cramped definitions of "property" and "taken" embodied in 
these distinctions were reinforced by the judiciary's rule-oriented con­
struction of the takings clause and its sister clauses in state constitu­
tions. Compensation practice would clearly have become exorbitant 
had the label "property" been assigned to public acts which would 
have merited that label if undertaken or required by another private 
property owner, and if the deprivations effected by these acts were 
viewed as instances in which that property was "taken." Regulations 
restricting the use of private land may be analogized to the negative 
easement of real property law; regulations obligating a landowner to 
perform some act on his land, to the affirmative covenant or servi­
tude; and regulations licensing the entry of third persons or their 
"things" onto that land, to the affirmative easement. 37 
Had the courts adopted the presumption-oriented alternative, 
they could have avoided a debilitating compensation practice without 
doing violence to the accepted or logical connotations of the terms 
"property" and "taken." That is, they could have conceded that prop­
erty was indeed taken, but, in appropriate cases, still have refused to 
declare that a compensable taking had occurred. This route, however, 
would have obligated them to move in a direction that they appar­
ently wished to avoid; namely, to look beyond these terms and, in­
deed, beyond the takings clause itself to determine when the presump­
tion of a taking was rebutted and when it was not. Having boxed 
themselves in by the rule-oriented construction, they dodged their 
self-created dilemma by artificially manipulating the definitions of 
the terms of the takings clause, principally through the same distinc­
tions that accorded so well with the nineteenth century development 
ethic. 
The erosion of this ethic prompted the courts to question the 
fairness of imposing the costs of public projects on those whose land 
35 See text accompanying notes 278-82 infra. 
36 See text accompanying notes 271-77 infra. 
37 This classification of less-than-fee real property interests on the basis of the legal conse­
quences for the holders of their benefits and burdens parallels that generally subscribed to in the 
real property field. See C. Berger, Land Ownership and Use 447-49, 470-73, 498-501 (2d ed. 
1975). For similar use of the classification in the takings field, see Humbach, supra note 1, at 
245-51; Michelman, supra note 3, at 1186-90 & n.45. 
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happened to lie in the projec�s' yat�s .  38 With t�ese .
doubts c�me a 
perceptible unravelin g  of the d1stmct�ons tha� rationalized. 
such impo­
sitions. 39 The emphasis of legal realism on mstrumentahst concerns 
rather than on verbal formalism further eroded the credibility of the 
distinctions . Not surprisingly, these distinctions and the unsatisfactory 
compensation practice they sheltered have been a recurring target of 
twentieth century realist judges40 and commentators. 4
1 Both develop­
ments are chronicled in the Appendix to this Article. 
2. The Dual Standard: «Property Rights" vs. "Civil Rights" 
Despite the inclusion of the takings clause in the Bill of Rights, 
the Court, as part of its reaction to Lochnerism, 42 has relegated prop­
erty rights to second-class status by classifying measures affecting 
them as economic legislation entitled to a close to insuperable pre­
sumption of constitutional validity. 43 In the context of modern takings 
litigation, the weak protection accorded property rights appears in the 
multifactor balancing test, under which the Court will decline to 
declare a measure a taking unless it precludes "economically viable"44 
or "reasonable beneficia l"45 use of land, and perhaps even in the face 
of such preclusion . 46 That test, therefore, has denied property the 
potent network of safegu ards extended to other values guaranteed by 
38 See Horwitz, supra note 30, at 66. Among the most comprehensive expressions of this 
turnabout in judicial attitudes is Eaton v. B. C. & M. R. R., 51 N.H. 504 (1872), discussed in text 
accompanying notes 251-82 infra. 
39 See text accompanying notes 251-355 infra. 
40 Illustrative are Justice Smith's majority opinion in Eaton v. B. C. & M. R.R., 51N.H.504 
(1872), anticipating the legal realist movement by a half-century, and Justice Harlan's dissenting 
opinion in United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 183-84 (1958) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
4 1 See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 3, at 1183-1201; Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 
Yale L.J. 36, 44-60 (1964). 
42 For a recent account of this oft-told tale including citations to pertinent Court decisions 
and literature, see Oakes, "Property Rights" in Constitutional Analysis Today, 56 Wash. L. Rev. 
583, 591-96 (1981). 
43 Illustrative of this relaxed standard of review in the land use field is the Court's landmark 
zoning opinion, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926): "[B]efore (a 
zon'.ng] ordinance can be declared unconstitutional . . . [it must be shown to be] clearly 
arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, 
or general welfare." Id. at 395; cf. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-31 (1963) (similar 
treatment for straightforward economic legislation); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 
U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (same); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537-38 (1934) (same). See 
gen�:ally L. !'ribe, American Constitutional Law§ 8-7, at 450-51 (1978). 
4
5 See Agms v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). 
46 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978). 
See text accompanying notes 125-26 and note 126 infra. 
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the Bill of Rights such as freedo m  of expression .47 A shift to the 
proposed decisional m odel is unlikely as long as the Court posits that 
the sole values comprehended by p roperty are economic in character . 
Prospects for the shift would i m p rove m arkedly were the Court to 
decide that property also comprehends noneconomic values on a par 
with values protected by other provisions of the Bill of Rights. A 
growing number of Burger Court opinions have asserted precisely this 
conclusion. In Lynch v. Household Finance Corp . , 48 for example, the 
Court assailed the "false" dichotom y  between "personal liberties .. and 
"property rights," protesting that ' · [p ]roperty does not have rights. 
People have rights . . . .  In fact , a fundamental interdependence exists 
between the personal right to liberty and the personal right in prop­
erty. Neither could h ave meaning without the other . That rights in 
property are basic civil rights h as long been recognized . . . 40 
A flood of decisions has followed Ly11ch , emphasizing the Court's 
solicitude for what I have termed the dominion i nterest- and others, 
the liberty interest-in propert y .  50 One commentator has described 
this trend as endorsing 
a different, tighter, more conservative dew of l i b<.·rty: l i ht'rty as 
security of private property; l iberty as freedom of ent reprc1wu rial 
skill; liberty from the impositions of gon·rnmenl and o f  t h i rd par­
ties from disposing of "one's own . . . Liberty,  in brief. more i n  th t' 
mode of John Locke and of Adam Smith and somewhat less in the 
mode of John Mill  (or of John Rawls) . 5 1  
Loretto illustrates how this trend can stand conn'ntional takings 
analysis on its head when a challenged measure impinges upon prop­
erty's dominion interest. Reasoning that section 828 did impinge prin-
'7 L. Trih(>, supra note 4:3. §* 1 2 - 1  t o  J :)-2 1 .  at :i7fi-!l!l0 ( d isC"11,si11g t i ll '  r igl th of 1 ·\pr 1 ·,_, io1 1 .  
political autonomy. religious fret•dom. and p r i,·acy) : Ely.  Fla).! D1°\l'('Ta t i n 1 1 :  :\ ( : aw Stmh i 1 1  t i lt' 
Rolps of Categorization and Bal an('ing i n  F i rst :\11 1 ! ' 11c l 1 1 l t ' 1 1 t  :\ nal 1 si,.  SS ! I a n . L. l\c -1  l -lS2 
( 187.i). 
" 40.5 U.S . .  538 ( 1 !!721 . 
'" Id.  at .552. 
'" Sep cases discussed in Dorsl'n & Cora. Fr<'<' Spt't'l'h . l'ropt•rt \- , and tlw llml!•·r < : " ' 1 r l : Old 
\'alul.'s. :\ew Ralanc<'s. 1 !!82 S1 1p .  Ct. Ht•\·. ! !)Ci: '.\1 1wak.  F11r('wmd: !·:\ a l 1 1 a l i 1 1 1! l l w  \\·or� o f  t l w  
\ew Libertari an Supa·m1· Court . 7 l l ast i nJ,!s Const . I . .Q .  2r;:j 1 l ' ISt l 1 :  Oak• ·' · " l l 'ra 1 1 1 1 1 1 ·  - 12 .  a l  
5!)6-98. 
'1  Va n Al.�tync. Thl' Hecrudt•s<·t·ncl' of l'ropt'rty H i !.!111' as t h1 ·  Fon·m•"t l ' r i nl ' ipl c · of  < : id! 
Li hertics: The First Dt>cad1· of thl' Burg1·r Court . 41 I .aw ti.. C :1 1 1 1 t t· 1 1 1 p .  l'r1 1h' . . S 1 1 11 1 1 1 wr 1 • 1s1 1 .  al 
fi6. 70 ( fo t notes omit t!'d ) .  This asses\llll'lll an·urat<·h- d1•,n i l w' t i l l '  B 1 1 r l!1 ·r Co1 1r(, • ·01 1v1·rn lnr 
thl' dominion int erest in property. Sl'l' dis<·11s.,ion of l.or<·t111  i n  1 1·\t ;1t·1·om11;1 1 1 1  i l l l! nol • ·' .'i2 . .  i:l .  
Hl5-204 infra. b11t on·rstatl's thl' Court's c<HJ('t'Tll f1 1r t ill' propl'rf\· o\\ 1wr·, 1·co11o1 1 1 i< ·  1 1 1 1 < -r i ·,1 . 
\I hich. the Co11rt\ land 1 1s1· opinions <'lll ph a., iZ<'. n·11 1aim \ 1 1 l 111·rahl1· t• • 1 ·\ t < · 1 " i 1  , . I!• '' 1 · rn 1 1 1 • · 1 1 1 a l  
n-st riction. St'!.' cast·s cited in notes 44- -Fi _, 1 1pra.  
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cipally upon that interest, 52 the Court invoked the per se rule to 
immunize landlords from interferences by cable companies in the 
form of permanent physical occupations. The Court thereby extended 
to landlords' dominion i nterest a degree of protection greater than 
that w hich it extends to speech and other civil liberties under its "strict 
scrutiny" or related standards . 53 While government's burden of satis­
fying these standards is demanding, it is not insuperable. The per se 
rule, on the other hand, denies government any opportunity to rebut 
the takings claim . 
3. The Police and Eminent Domain Powers: 
From Separation to Convergence 
The police and eminent domain powers are anchored in value 
premises, termed here the welfare and indemnity principles, that 
frequently function at cross purposes. Through the welfare principle, 
the police power deliberately envisages the redistribution of utility, 
often in the form of recognized i nterests in real property, as a means of 
furthering the community's "health, safety, m orals, or general wel­
fare . " 54 Substantively open-ended and therefore uncabinable by pre­
set standards, the power sweeps as widely as government's inherent 
legislative power. 55 The eminent domain power, through its indem­
nity principle, cuts the other way: its charge is protection of the 
individual, not the community, by making the individual whole in the 
wake of governmental acts that redistribute his or her property rights 
to others . 56 
These two powers condemn government to a permanent state of 
tension regarding their employment since, as Justice Holmes com­
mented in one takings opinion,  "[a ]11 rights tend to declare themselves 
absolute to their logical extreme."  57 What is called the "taking issue" 
is, in fact, simply another l abel for that tension. Each age must find its 
own solution to this problem, but it is striking that the nineteenth 
52 See text accompanying notes 1 95-204 infra. 
53 See commentary cited at note 47 supra . 
• 54 This phrase is most typically employed to define the scope of the police power. See, e.g., 
V1ll�ge of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. , 272 U . S .  365, 395 (1926) . 
See, e . g. '. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U . S .  394, 410 ( 1915) (the police power is "one of the most essential · · · [and] least !imitable" powers of government) · Mugler v. Kansas 123 U.S. 623, 659 ( 1887) (the police power "reaches everything within �he territory of a ' state not surrendered to t�e na
.
tional g�vernment"); see also Block v. Hirsh, 256 U . S .  135, 167 (1921) (Mc
5
�enna, J . ,  dissentmg) (pohce power "embraces power over everything under the sun"). See, e.g. , Cormack
.' Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, 4 1  Yale L.J. 221, 224-25 ��93 1) ;  Stoebuck, Emment Domain, supra note 31, at 583-88. 
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S.  349, 355 (1908). 
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century experienced far less difficulty in doing so than has the twenti­
eth . 58 The reason, I believe, is clear. In the nineteenth century, the 
two powers were instrumentally and theoretically divorced. In the 
twentieth century, the powers have been somewhat less divided theo­
retically and completely interchangeable instrumentally. 59 Hence the 
contradictory but, for their respective periods, entirely accurate asser­
tions of Massachusetts Chief Justice Shaw in his classic 1851 opinion in 
Commonwealth v .  Alger60 that the police and eminent domain 
powers are "very different,"61 and of Justice Holmes in his no less 
classic 1922 opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co.  v. Mahon62 that the 
separation of the two powers is only " a  question of degree ."63 
This reasoning also explains why there was no urgent need for the 
proposed decisional model in the nineteenth century, while it, or 
something much like it, has becom e  a virtual necessity in the twenti­
eth century . As long as the paths of the two powers (as both were 
actually employed by government) crossed infrequently or not at all, 
the tension between them could be m anaged with relative ease. 
Therefore, however fictional the conceptual superstructure of the 
rule-oriented construction of the takings clause and that construction's 
allied distinctions, they remained serviceable vehicles for differentiat­
ing between the powers. But government's employment of the two 
powers for similar or identical ends in this century has often made it 
difficult to distinguish which power is being or should be exercised in 
a given instance .64 In addition , Court decisions legitimating these 
58 See F. Bosselman, D. Callies & J. Banta, supra note 1 ,  at 5 1 .  
59 See text accompanying notes 7 1 -80 infra. 
60 61 Mass. (7 Cush .) 53 (1851 ) .  
61 Id. at 85. ' 
62 260 U.S. 393, 413 ( 1922) . The position advanced in this Article opposes that of commenta-
tors who view Pennsylvania Coal as an isolated and misconceived deviation from the Court's 
overall takings jurisprudence and insist that it should be overruled. I n  its place they urge the 
reinstatement of the Court's position in Mugler v. Kansas, 1 23 U.S .  623, 664-69 ( 1887) and 
Powell v. Pennsylvania, 1 27 U.S .  678, 683-87 ( 1888), that "regulations"-measures that do not 
authorize a physical invasion of private property-can never be takings because they "destroy" 
rather than "appropriate" property. See, e.g. , F. Bosselman, D. Callies & J. Banta. supra note l .  
at 124-38, 238-46; Stoebuck, Police Power, supra note l ,  at 1083-89, 1091-93. Sec generally J .  
Nowak, R .  Rotunda & J .  Young, Handbook on Constitutional Law 440-4i ( 1 9i8) . The argu­
ment of these commentators would force a return to the rule-oriented construction of the takings 
clause and to its allied distinctions, results that this Article and its Appendix portra\' as indefensi­
ble both on precedential and policy grounds. Pennsylvania Coal is classified more appropriately 
as a physical invasion than as a regulatory takings case. See note 291 infra. 
63 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S.  at 416.  
6' In Loretto, for example, Judge Meyer of the New York Court of Appeals had to engage in 
an elaborate analysis, subsequently rejected by the Supreme Court, to conclude that "the 
Legislature in enacting . . .  section 828 . . .  intended to act under the police power only . . . 5.1 
N. Y.2d 124, 138, 423 N .E .2d 320, 326, 440 N.Y .S .2d 843, 849 ( 198 1 ) :  see note I -t i  infra. 
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changes have caused the conceptual superstructure to totter65 and, in 
some respects, to topple altogether . 66 Today the powers are separated 
from one another principally by the antinomy between the welfare 
and indemnity principles upon which they are based . Hence, Justice 
Douglas' epigram that "[t]he law of eminent domain is fashioned out 
of the conflict between the people's [welfare J interest in public proj­
ects and the principle of indemnity to the landowner. "67 While the 
convergence of the police and eminent domain powers has been ad­
dressed more systematically elsewhere by this writer68 and others,69 it 
is useful to substantiate briefly the claim here before reviewing how 
the decisional model provides for the management of the conflict 
between the two powers. 70 
65 Consider, for example, the evolution of the harm/benefit test formulated by Professor 
Freund to distinguish between the police and eminent domain powers . Freund argued that 
government can employ the police power to prevent "harmful, "  i .e . , nuisance-like, uses, but 
must employ the eminent domain power when it wishes to compel benefits. See note 75 and text 
accompanying notes 75-76 infra. As recently as its decision in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New 
York City, 438 U.S.  104 (1978), the Court confirmed its commitment to the test but so broadened 
the concept of "harm" as to fundamentally change the test's content. Any land use is "harmful, "  
the Court reasoned, i f  i t  frustrates some legislatively declared public purpose. I d .  at 133 n.30. 
On this basis the Court concluded that even though the use to which Penn Central wished to 
devote the airspace over its landmark building was one generally permitted to other landowners 
in the pertinent zone, New York City could deny Penn Central that use because the use would 
impair the architectural characteristics of the landmark below. In short, government, under its 
police power, may compel a landmark owner to provide a community amenity-the landmark 
building-by precluding the owner from devoting his site to a use that can hardly be deemed 
nuisance-like insofar as all his nonlandmark owning neighbors are permitted that use. 
66 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.  26 (1954), discussed at text accompanying notes 79-80 
infra, in which the Court transformed the police and eminent domain powers into interchange­
able instruments to implement government's legislative purposes. 
67 United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S.  266, 280 (1943). 
68 See Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes for the 
Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 1021, 1033-37 (1975). 
69 See, e.g. , Beuscher, Some Tentative Notes on the Integration of Police Power and Em inent 
Domain by the Courts: So-Called Inverse or Reverse Condemnation, 1 968 Urban L. Ann. l :  
Note, Inverse Condemnation: Its Availability i n  Challenging the Validity o f  a Zoning Ordi­
nance, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1439 (1974) . 
10 I n  a n  earlier essay, I considered the effect o f  this trend upon the issue of the compensation 
due for regulatory takings, arguing that the "highest and best use" market value standard 
conventionally applicable under the "just compeu.sation" requirement of the takings clause 
should be replaced with a lower standard of "reasonable beneficial use" for certain types of 
onerous land use or environmental restrictions on private land. See Costonis, supra note 68, at 
1049-55. This Article reinforces that argument by claiming that the convergence of the police 
and eminent domain powers warrants similar flexibility in deciding whether a compensable 
taking has occurred when "property" is "taken. "  I would now observe that a comparable shift 
from a rule- to a presumption-oriented posture is evident in the Supreme Court's treatment of the 
market value standard in situations in which it concludes that a compensable taking has 
occurred. In its 1893 decision in Monongahela Navgn. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, for 
example, the Court adopted the categorical stance that "[tJhere can . . .  be no doubt that the 
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At the time Commonwealth v. Alger7 1 w as decided, government 
typically employed its eminent dom ain power to acquire a full fee 
interest in land. 72 There was less occasion then than now , therefore, to 
ruminate about the need to resort to that power in situations involving 
less-than-fee affirmative intrusions b y  government or negative restric­
tions on land use. Until well into the twentieth century, moreover, 
such restrictions were seldom comparable to modern environmental , 
zoning, or historic preservation controls, whose expansio n  of the ends 
pursued by government test the outer limits of substantive due proc­
ess73 and whose often severe economic impacts enliven the ongoing 
debate over regulatory takings. 74 In contrast, the purpose of nine­
teenth century restrictions on property was the limited and well-
UustJ compensation must be a full and perfect equivalent for the property taken." Id. at 326. A 
half-century later in United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943) , the Court added that "[t]he 
owner is to be put in as good position pecuniarily as he would have occupied if his property had 
not been taken."  Id. at 373 (footnote omitted). Despite this sweeping assertion, however, Miller, 
which dealt with the valuation of land whose worth increased as a result of the project 
occasioning its condemnation, demonstrates the extent of the shift in the Court's analysis. The 
Court in effect disavowed the assertion's implications, both in its concession a few paragraphs 
later that "strict adherence to the criterion of market value m ay involve inclusion of elements 
which, though they affect such value, must in fairness be eliminated in a condemnation 
case · · . ," id. at 375, and in its reasoning that enhancement in market value must be excluded 
because "[t]he owners ought not to gain by speculating on probable increase in value due to the 
Government's activities ."  Id. at 377. During this century, the presumption favoring market 
value as the measure of "just" compensation has yielded to alternative valuation standards in a 
variety of other situations as well. See, e.g. , United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. , 365 
U.S. 624, 635 (1961) (flowage easements lacking a market are to be valued by taking "the 
nonriparian value of the servient land discounted by the improbability of the easement's exer­
cise"); United States v. Commodities Trading Corp . ,  339 U . S .  121 ,  128 ( 1 950) (wartime price 
ceilings interfering with market forces are constitutionally permissible bases for compensation in 
the absence of special hardship); United States v. Cors, 337 U . S .  325, 333 (1 949) (during 
wartime emergency, "[i]t is not fair that the government be required to pay the enhanced price 
which its demand alone has created"); cf. United States v .  General Motors Corp . ,  323 U . S .  373, 
382 (1945) (just compensation for a taking of a portion of a long term lease is not the market 
rental value of the empty property leased on a long term basis, but is the rental value of the 
property leased by the long term tenant to the temporary occupant). The Court deviates from 
the market standard presumptively applicable in each of these cases "when market value has 
been too difficult to find, or when its application would result in manifest injustice to owner or 
public." United States v. Commodities Trading Corp . ,  339 U.S. 121,  1 23 ( 1 950) . 
71 61 Mass. (7 Cush. )  53 (1851) .  
72 Se e Cormack, supra note 56, at 225. 
73 For an analysis of that tension in the burgeoning field of aesthetics-inspired land use co_ntrol, see generally Costonis, Law and Aesthetics: A Critique and a Reformulation of the Di!��mas, 80 Mich. L. Rev. 355, 413- 18, 441-46 (1982) . 
See, e.g. , San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S.  621  (1981) (property purchased as site for nuclear power plant rezoned as open space) ; Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 
�-S. 255 (1980) (land purchased for residential development rezoned for low-density a�d o�en 
i�
ace)'. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U . S .  104 (1978) (landmark designatwn terdicted construction of skyscraper on top of Grand Central Terminal) ; cf. Andrus v · Allard. 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (ban on sale of eagle parts which were protected by federal legislation) · 
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accepted one of preventing uses that palpably threatened community 
health and safety. The prevalence of this pattern accounts for Profes­
sor Freund's classic formulation of the police power/eminent domain 
distinction : 
Under the police power, rights of property are impaired not be­
cause they become useful or necessary to the public, or because 
some public advanta ge can be gained by disregarding them, but 
because their free exercise is believed to be detrimental to public 
interests; it may be said that the state takes property by eminent 
domain because it is useful to the public, and under the police 
power because it is h armful . 75 
Many contemporary commentators have not accepted this formula­
tion. In their view, the police power's scope in the modern welfare 
state should not be limited to preventing "harmful," i .e. ,  nuisance­
like, land uses. The police power should extend as well to requiring 
landowners to use or to  refrain from using their land in ways that 
frustrate legislatively declared goals, the content and economic im­
pacts of which have expanded far beyond those prevalent when Pro­
fessor Freund wrote. 76 
In addition, courts once viewed eminent domain's "public use" 
limitation as decidedly m ore restrictive than the police power's "pub­
lic purpose" limitation . 77 The distance separating the two powers 
must h ave seemed length y  indeed to judges who believed, for exam­
ple, that property acquired u nder eminent domain literally had to be 
available for the general public's physical use. 78 In Berman v. 
Parker, 79 however, the S upreme Court took the dramatic step of 
transforming the two powers into interchangeable instruments for 
implementing government's generic legislative power, stating that 
"( o ]nee the object [of a challenged legislative program] is within the 
authority of Congress, the right to realize i t  through the exercise of 
eminent dom ain is clear . For the power of eminent domain is merely 
the means to the end." 80 
75 E .  Freund, The Police Power: Public Policy and Constitutional Rights § 511 at 546-47 (1904) . ' 
76 See, e.g. ' Michelman, supra note 3, at 1 199- 1200, 1235-36; Sax, supra note 41
, 
at 48-50; see also note 65 supra But o h A L · 58 
C 1 
· see un am, egal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 
0 �m .  L. Rev. 650, 663-69 (1958) (harm/benefit distinction reaffirmed) . 
. 
See generally Note, The Public Use Limitation on E minent Domain: An Advance Re-quiem , 58 Yale L.J.  599 (1949) . 
78 See id. at 603 . 
79 348 U.S. 26 ( 1954). 
80 Id.  at 33. 
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B. The Elements of the Model 
1 .  Presumptive Construction of the Takings Clause 
Aside from its predicate in sound compensation policy, the first of 
the model' s  four elements-recognition that a measure that takes 
property is not a per se taking-is supported by the recurrent logic of 
the Court's takings opinions. 8 1  If the Court subscribed literally to the 
81 Professor Michelman evidently would disagree with the presumption-oriented approach 
advocated in this Article.  He argues that identifying fairness as the purpose of the takings clause 
(which the decisional model does) 
effectively prevents courts from proceeding by use of categories and presumptions. [But it 
is) feasible . . .  for courts to identify those governmental acts which (for example) en­
croach on free expression, or invade a citizen's privacy, or deal unequally with classes of 
people, and to prevent such acts in the absence of special justification. 
Michelman, supra note 3, at 1247. But why should this be if, as Professor Michelman concedes, 
"there are . . .  powerful reasons supporting at least a distinct presumption in favor of compen­
sating to the limits of feasibility"? Id. at 1 1 80. His response is unsatisfactory, in m y  judgment. I n  
the areas of expression, privacy, and equal protection, h e  argues, the Constitution 
provides sufficiently specific guidance to support judicial invalidation of a measure because 
it is of a certain kind, without the court's having to ao;k ultimate questions about efficiency 
and fairness. But no such convenience is available in the just compensation sphere. The 
court cannot be expected to proceed by presuming that every governmental act perceptibly 
entailing a capricious redistribution is improper unless specially j ustified. But between that 
inquiry and the ultimate question there seems to be no satisfactory stopping place. 
Id. at 1247. 
Unlike Professor Michelman, I am unable to conclude from the Constitution's language or 
from the precedents of the Court that the Constitution provides any more "specific guidance" 
relating to the adjudication of governmental encroachments on equal protection, privacy, or 
speech interests than to the adjudication of encroachments on property. Given the Olympian 
perspective-combining jurisprudence, ethics, and political economy-that Professor 
Michelman uses to examine the takings clause, moreover, questions no less ··ultimate" involving 
values no more precise can be posed with regard to these interests than he poses with regard to 
property. Nor is it clear why the Court should not hold that ·'perceptibly . . .  capricious 
redistribution[s]" are "improper unleo;s specially justified." It seems to me, as much of Professor 
Michelman's essay confirms, that the purpose of judicial supervision pursuant to the takings 
clause is defined precisely by this responsibility. A partial response to this question may be found 
perhaps in Professor Michelman's distinction between two types of "capricious redistribution[s)":  
those resulting from the "capacity of some collective actions to [burden an individual) for no 
other apparent reason . . .  than that someone else's claim to satisfaction has been ranked as 
intrinsically superior to his own," id. at 1225, and those based on the certainty that "perfection is 
plainly unattainable" in the distribution of the "benefits and costs associated with each collective 
measure . "  Id.  If by the use of the qualifier "each" in the foregoing quotation Professor 
Michelman intends only that the second type of "capricious redistribution" need not be "specially 
justified,"  his position is unassailable: no serious student of the takings clause would insist that 
"perfection" is attainable in every case. One of the greatest strengths of Professor Michelman's 
essay, in fact , is its explanation of how t h e  underenforcement of the takings clause in this sense 
may nonetheless comport with either a fairness- or a utility-based conception of the clause's 
goals. 
But this is only a partial response because it leaves unaddressed the first type of "capricious 
redistribution" -ranking A's claim to satisfaction as "intrinsically superior" to B's claim. It is the 
first type that has received the far greater share of attention in the Court's precedents and in 
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rule-oriented construction, its efforts to determine whether property 
has been taken would focus upon whether the resource in question is a 
recognized real property interest, such as a fee or an easement, or 
some equivalent interest in personalty. The question asked would be 
whether the resource lacks property status either because it is not of a 
type that can found a property relationship or because some other 
condition to achievement of this status is lacking. Occasionally, the 
Court does pose the question in terms of one or the other of these 
alternatives. 82 Far more often, however, the Court effectively con­
cedes that the resource in question could be or is property and devotes 
its attention instead to determining whether incidents associated with 
this property, such as the right of exclusion, must yield without com­
pensation to countervailing governmental interests. 
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins 83 and Block v. Hirsh 84 are 
illustrative of the Court's opinions employing the presumptive ap­
proach. These cases merit special attention because the Court denied 
compensation in both even though each involved a "physical inva­
sion, "  the deprivation traditionally viewed as the strongest case for a 
taking. 85 In Prune Yard, the Court sustained a California Supreme 
commentary. Any intrusion on an established economic or dominion interest is potentially a 
result of a governmental choice that is capricious in this sense, and, of course, challenged 
intrusions are always so labelled by B, the aggrieved property owner. Unless we are to engage in 
wordplay by denying that ;ustijied redistributions of property are redistributions nonetheless, 
redistributions that are noncapricious are distinguished from those that are capricious in the first 
sense by government's showing that noncapricious redistributions are not takings precisely 
because they can be specially justified . The decisional model employs an identical premise as a 
basis for distinguishing presumptive from actual takings. 
82 Illustrative of the first alternative are United States ex rel. TV A v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 
276 (1943) (although property taken was potentially more valuable as part of a combination of 
properties that might be acquired by its owner by exercising a right of eminent domain granted 
by the state, the proper measure of compensation was the independent value of the separate 
parcel: "[t]he grant of the power of eminent domain [to a private delegate] is a mere revocable 
privilege for which a state cannot be required to make compensation"), and United States v. 
Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co. , 229 U.S .  53, 69 (1913) (despite riparian owner's interest in 
flow of navigable river, "that the running water in a great navigable stream is capable of private 
ownership is inconceivable") . Representative of the second alternative are decisions dealing with 
the so-called "new property," which encompasses entitlements arising from expectations gener­
ated by statutory or regulatory schemes. See Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964). 
In these cases, the Court acknowledges that the resource in issue, e.g. ,  welfare payments or 
employment, may be the subject of a property relationship, but questions whether the pertinent 
statutory law does in fact confer an entitlement amounting to property status. See, e.g. ,  Bishop 
v. Wood, 426 U.S .  341 ,  344-47 ( 1976) (termination of employment) ; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 
254, 261-62 (1970) (termination of welfare payments) . See generally Van Alstyne, Cracks in 
"The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 Cornell L.Q. 445 
( 1977) . 
83 447 U.S.  74 (1980). 
84 256 U.S .  135 (1921) .  
8 5  See note 3 and accompanying text supra. 
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Court opinion 86 holding that a shopping center owner was barred by 
the free speech provision of the state constitution from excluding 
political petitioners from the center . Consistent with the model's first 
element, the Court established the framework for its taking analysis 
by conceding that "here there has literally been a 'taking' of [the 
shopping center owner's] right [to exclude]," an i nterest it character­
ized as "one of the essential sticks in the bundle of property rights ." 87 
In Block , decided sixty years earlier, the exclusion-denying measure 
was even more drastic because it authorized former tenants to remain 
on their landlords' premises beyond the expiration of their lease­
holds. 88 I n  an action to regai n  possession of his premises, the landlord 
argued that the taking effected by the measure was aggravated by the 
physical character of the "property" encroached upon, the premises 
themselves. 89 But the Court, as  evidenced by Justice Holmes' opinion, 
was unmoved: 
The fact that tangible property is also visible tends to give a 
rigidity to our conception of our rights in it that we do not attach to 
others less concretely clothe d .  But the notion that the former are 
exempt from the legislative modification required from time to 
time in civilized life is contradicted not only by the doctrine of 
eminent dom ain, under which what is taken is paid for, but by that 
of the police power in its proper sense, under which property rights 
may be cut down, and to that extent taken, without pay.90 
2.  Due Process- Takings Inquiry 
The model's second element-its due process-takings inquiry-is 
the one most likely to cause confusion because earlier habits of 
thought dividing the police and eminent domain powers have caused 
us to assume that 'the due p rocess and takings analyses proceeding 
from those powers should be similarly compartmentalized . But the 
convergence of the two powers has undermined this assumption. 9 1  
86 Robins v. Prune Yard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 
(1979). 
87 PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 (1980). 
88 Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 153-54 (1921) .  
89 Id. at 142. 
90 Id. at 155. 
91 Judge Oakes has observed that the due process and takings clauses, along with the 
contracts clause, "ultimately address the same analytic problem : When does [a] legislative act 
. . .  constitute such a great degree of interference with the property right or rights affected as to 
be unfair o r  unreasonable, or to constitute a 'taking' and be unjust, and to require . . .  the 
payment of compensation . . .  ?" Oakes, supra note 42, at 621. His observation is confirmed by 
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Due process-takings reasoning bridges the two analyses by providing a 
basis upon which the competing demands of t�e we�fa�e and indem­
nity principles can be mediated through a third prmc1ple, often re­
ferred to as the "just share" principle, 92 to which the first two are 
subordinate. Under the j ust share principle, the taking determination 
the manner in which considerations pertinent to the due process and takings clauses are interwo­
ven in the Court's analysis of measures challenged as exceeding the scope of the police power, see, 
e.g., Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405 (1935); Delaware, 
Lackawanna & W. R.R. v. Morristown, 276 U.S. 182 ( 1 928) ;  Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 
(1887); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 1 1 3 ( 1876), and is indirectly suggested, at least, by the existence 
of a due process clause not only in the fourteenth amendment but also directly prior to the 
takings clause in the fifth amendment as well. If the .. same analytic problem·· is involved, it 
seems more useful to identify the manner in which due process and takings analyses are related 
than to continue with the fiction that the two are located on different planets. 
The Court's opinions in Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 
U.S. 623 (1887); and Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 11 3 (1876), are inexplicable under the segregated 
analysis approach. The Court rendered those decisions prior to its opinion in Chicago, 
Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), which made the fifth 
amendment's takings clause applicable to the states through the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment. It is not certain whether the earlier opinions involve "due process" 
reasoning because they arose under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment or 
"takings reasoning" because a takings challenge was explicitly rejected in each. 
Professor Stoebuck has premised his argument for compartmentalizing the two types of 
reasoning upon Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894) , in which the Court sustained a measure 
under the due process clause "preserving the fisheries of a State from extinction," id. at 139, by 
authorizing, inter alia, the summary destruction of fishing nets. In the course of its analysis, the 
Court stated that 
[t]o justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, 
first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular 
class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for 
the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 
Id. at 137. Seizing upon the phrase "unduly oppressive," Stoebuck insists that considerations 
bearing upon the gravity of a measure's impact on property should be confined to classic due 
process reasoning alone. See Stoebuck, Police Power, supra note l ,  at 1065-66; cf. F. Bosselman, 
D .  C
.allies & J. Banta, supra note 1 ,  at 238 (suggesting that balancing value of regulation against loss m va
.
lue to property owner is never appropriate in takings analysis) . This position is 
unpersuasive both because of the complications created by the fact that Lawton was decided 
prior to Chicago, Burlington and, more important, because of the post-Lawton developments in �he Court's takings jurisprudence, portrayed in this Article, in which the gravity of a measure's 
1m��ct does bear on the question whether property has been .. taken." 
Among the best-known formulations of the "just share" principle is that expres.w:I in 
Monongahela �avgn. Co. v. United States, 1 48 U.S. 312 ( 1893) : �The takmgs clause] prevents the public from loading up on one individual more than his 
1ust sh�re of the burdens of government, and says that when he surrenders to the public somethmg more and different from that which is exacted from other members of the public, a full and just equivalent shall be returned to him Id. at
. 
325
. Contemporary affirmations of the principle may 
.
be found in, e.g., PruneYard ���pp�ng Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-83 (1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York 
09
�S) .
3� U.S. l04, 123 (1�78); 
.
and �Jnited States v. Willow River Power Co. , 324 U.S. 499, 5�2 
d 
or 
.
a comprehensive d1scuss10n of the principle's historical antecedents and primacy in mo em takmgs theory St b k E . , see oe uc , mment Domain, supra note 31,  at 583-88. 
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depends upon whether a linkage exists between the purpose of a 
measure and the use of the affected property establishing that the 
proprietor has not been unfairly singled out to bear losses that should 
be distributed among the public generally.93 Absent special circum­
stances,94 burdens that are not "use-dependent" in this sense are com­
pensable takings because it is the use-dependency linkage that over­
comes the singling-out objection . 
As with all forms of mediation, this one requires trade-offs . The 
just share principle requires the welfare principle to yield its claim 
that all measures enacted in its name are noncompensable: those not 
predicated on the use-dependency connection are takings . But the 
same principle secures the noncompensability of measures featuring 
this linkage, even in the face of the concession that they take property. 
The converse applies to the indemnity principle which surrenders its 
former claim that a measure that takes property is a compensable 
taking, but compensable takings will still be found when government 
is unable to establish the linkage required by the j ust share principle. 
Government's obligation to do so arises more frequently under the 
presumption-oriented construction of the takings clause than under 
the rule-oriented construction because the terms "property" and 
"taken" are construed in a less cramped or artificial manner under the 
former than under the latter . 95 
93 The use-dependency test derives from the Court's classic statement in Munn v. Illinois, 94 
U.S. 113 (1876), that 
[p]roperty does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of 
public consequence, and affect the community at large. When, therefore, one devotes his 
property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an 
interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, 
to the extent of the interest he has thus created. He may withdraw his grant by discontinu­
ing the use; but, so long as he maintains the use, he must submit to the control. 
Id. at 126. As formulated, the difficulty with Munn's "clothed with a public interest" doctrine is 
that it justifies an indiscriminate range of uncompensated intrusions on private property. With 
the exception of commentators who dismiss the redistributional consequences of a measure as 
irrelevant to the takings equation, see note 99 infra, takings theorists s ince Munn have wrestled 
with the problem of determining whether particular "uses" so "affect" the "public interest" that 
uncompensated intervention is justified. 
94 Possible exceptions, which figure among the Court's most troublesome takings precedents 
because they lack a basis in principle, include interventions predicated not upon particular 
property's use-dependent characteristics but upon custom, see discussion of the navigation 
servitude doctrine in note 1 1 1  infra, or upon "necessity" or "emergency . "  See, e .g . ,  United States 
v. Caltex, Inc. , 344 U . S .  149 (1952) (compensation denied for property destroyed in wartime to 
prevent its capture and use by the enemy) ; Miller v .  Schoene, 276 U.S.  272 (1928) (compensation 
denied for trees ordered cut down to prevent the spreading of communicable disease); Bowditch 
v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16 ( 1879) (compensation denied for property destroyed to prevent the 
spreading of fire) . 
95 See text accompanying notes 37-38 supra. 
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This p hase of the model, therefore, m ay properly be associated 
with due process reasoning insofar as it obligates the reviewing court 
to identify a controversy's competing welfare and indemnity values 
and, more importantly ,  to choose between these sets of values on the 
basis of the relative weight the court assigns to them . At the same 
time, due process-takings reasoning must be distinguished from classic 
due process reasoning. The use-dependency test employed by due 
process-takings reasoning differs from the "reasonable relationship" 
test of conventional due process analysis. 96 Use-dependency addresses 
the connection between a m easure's goals a n d  the burdened property's 
use, whereas reasonable relationship focuses on the nexus between 
these goals and the means employed to achieve them . 97 The burden of 
use-dependency may o r  may not be superable by government, de­
pending upon the cha racter of the welfare and property values in 
question; the "reasonable relationship" test is a test in name only given 
the Court's disinclination to second-guess the substantive wisdom of 
legislation that does not implicate civil liberties. 98 The core value of 
use-dependency is fairness, whether a property owner has been sin­
gled out in a manner consistent with the just share principle; the core 
value of reasonable rela tionship is rationality or, perhaps, nominal 
efficiency, whether the m easure is reasonably designed to achieve its 
goals irrespective of its redistributional consequences. 99 Accordingly, 
96 See note 43 supra. 
97 See, e.g. , Nebbia v. New York, 291 U . S .  502, 525 (1934) (milk price regulation ) ("[T]he 
guaranty of due process . . .  demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or 
capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object 
sought to be attained .") ;  Village of Euclid v .  Ambler Realty Co. , 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) 
(zoning ordinance) ("[I]t must be said before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, 
that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable having no substantial relation to the 
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.").  See g�nerally J .  Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. 
You
9
�g, supra note 62, at 395-404 ;  L. Tribe, supra note 43, § 8-3, at 436-38. 
See note
. 
42 and text accompanying notes 43-47 supra . A measure of the standard's laxity 
�a�:
.
e found m the Court's decisions in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S.  726, 730 (1963), and 
y
e Ia v .  New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537-38 (1934). See generally J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. 
ou
9
�g, supra note 62, at 443·45; L .  Tribe, supra note 43, § 8-7, at 450·51 . 
�ee, e.g. '. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S.  394, 410 (1915) (ordinance outlawing the oper�tion of bnckyards within city limits) ("[The police power] may, indeed, seem harsh in its 
exercise, usually is on some ind· · d 1 b h · 
· 
I . . . 
1v1 ua , ut t e imperative necessity for its existence precludes any 
1m1tation upon it when t d b. · . . no exerte ar 1tranly . . . .  There m ust be progress and if in its mar
ch 
P
pnvate
l 
mt�rests are in the way they must yield to the good of the comm
,
unity.") · Powell v. ennsy vama 127 U S 678 686 ( 1888 
'
m · ) (':If II h
. · ' ) (statute prohibiting the manufacture and sale of oleo-
argarme a t at can be ·a f th· 1 . 1 . . . 
th . 
sai o Is eg1s atJon 1s that it is . . . unnecessarily oppressive to 
ose manufacturing or selling I . 
or to th b II b 
· · · 0 eomarganne · . . , their appeal must be to the legislature, 
supra n�te 
�
2
ot
at 
��
4
�;;
. 
t
L
o the _judiciary.") .  See generally J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, 
' ' · Tnbe, supra note 43, § 8-3, at 436-38. 
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the use-dependency test is more n arrowly focused and often is consid­
erably more demanding of government than is the reasonable rela­
tionship test. 
An example m ay aid in illustrating the differences between these 
two tests and, more broadly, in sortin g  out the questions posed at key 
points along a spectrum that i s  bounded by "pure" due process consid­
erations at one pole and by "pure" takings considerations at the other. 
Assume that State X's highest court h as held that the land use systems 
of each of the state's municipalities m ust attempt to facilitate the 
production of a fair s hare of its region's need for low and moderate 
income housing. 1 00 S hortly thereafter, the state legislature amends its 
zoning enabling act to require all municipalities to designate residen­
tial zones in which twenty percent of all units in new developments 
are set aside for, and priced at levels affordable by, low and moderate 
income families. J O '  The Town of Summit amends its land use ordi­
nance to include such a zone. Assume further that the economics of  
homebuilding are such that, a bsent subsidy, the cost of building low 
and moderate income housing is forty percent greater than the legisla­
tively fixed ceiling on the selling price of this housing; that this loss 
must be absorbed by the developer; and that, if prorated over the 
developer's entire project, the loss will substantially reduce the pro-
Predictably, commentators who favor broad public intervention in support of land use, 
environmental, or other goals downplay or ignore altogether the redistributional consequences of 
the intervention as a constraint on the police power. For them . t herefore, use-dependency 
considerations are irrelevant to the takings determination: reguliitory measures that satisfy the 
reasonable relationship test of classic due p rocess may not be invalidated as takings. In the words 
of one commentator: 
[C)ategorization of land that rationally promotes a legitimate state objective is a permissi­
ble means of regulating human conduct. Property interests in land, themselves legitimately 
subject to redefinition by the state, are affected only consequentially by such regulation� 
the extent to which those interests confer protected economic expectancies upon their 
owners also is a legislative, not a judicial, determination. 
Donaldson. Regulation of Conduct in Relation to Land-The Need to Purge Natural Law 
Constraints from the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 \Vm .  & Mary L .  Rev. 187, 213 (1974); see F. 
Bosselman, O. Callies & J .  Banta, supra note 1 ,  at 238-55. Nor is it surprising that their 
conception of compensation policy stresses the consequential/direct damage di�tinction, see id . ,  
the premise that all private land is held subject t o  the equivalent of a sweeping police power 
"servitude," see Donaldson, supra, at 200, and the appropriation/destruction distinction as a 
means of narrowing the scope of the fifth amendment's term ·'take n . "  See F. Bosselman, D.  
Callies & J .  Banta, supra note 1,  at 256-58; cf .  Stoebuek, Police Power, supra note 1 ,  at  1083-89 
(taking consists of a transfer of property from a landowner to an entity possessing the governmen­
tal power of eminent domain) . 
100 This hypothetical is modeled on the New Jersey Supreme Court case of Southern 
Burlington County N . A . A . C .P.  v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J.  1983) 
[hereinafter Mount Laurel II]. The facts h ave been modified for pur�oses of the example. . 
101 Cf. Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 446-50 (discussing and approving use of such mandatory 
set-asides). 
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·ect's profitability. 10
2 Lovitt B uilders, I nc . ,  a developer-owner of land 
�
ithin the zone, brin gs suit to challenge State X's zoning enabling act 
and Summit's ordinance on both conventional due process and takings 
grounds . 
The reviewing court will ask different questions under the due 
process and takings h eadings, and a decision sustaining the enactment 
will be m uch more l ikely under the former than under the latter. 
There are two due p ro cess questions : First, do state efforts to secure 
the production of low and moderate income housing serve a legitimate 
governmental end? Second, is the legislatively-selected system of the 
twenty percent housin g  set-aside "rationally related" to this end? As a 
m a tter of post-Lochner federal due process, 1 03 the likelihood of a 
negative response to either question is virtually nil . It is very unlikely 
that a court would actively scrutinize the legislature's judgment con­
cerning the scope of its police power or the rationality of the means 
chosen to implement t h at judgment. 1 04 
The court's evalu ation of the takings challenge would align with 
the four questions that correspond to the decisional model's four ele­
ments: 
1 .  PRESUMPTIVE TAKING INQUIRY: Has Lovitt 's "property " been 
"taken " by the mandatory set-aside provision? 
2 .  DuE PRocEss-T A KIN GS PHASE: Is the legislative decision to im­
pose the burden of providing low and moderate income housing on 
Lovitt (and o ther similarly situated developers) fair in principle? 
3 .  PuRE TAKINGS PHASE : Is the obligation, as actually imposed, 
unduly burdensome given the legislative end in question? 
4 .  BuRDEN OF PROOF: How exacting should the court's scrutiny of 
the challenged legislation under the due process-takings and pure 
takings inquiries be? 
The second question pertains most directly to this subsection's discus­
sion of the differences between the reasonable relationship and use­
dependency tests because the fairness-in-principle determination de­
pends upon whether the use-dependency test is satisfied. 
102 s h uc consequences are not implausible. See Ellickson, The Irony of "lnclusionary" Zoning, 
54 S. �al . L .  
_
R�v. 1 167, 1 184-91 ( 1981) ; Kleven, Inclusionary Ordinances-Policy and Legal 
���:81; 
(
��i�;�mg Private Developers to Build Low Cost Housing, 21 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1432, 
103 s t . ee ext accompanymg notes 42-47 96-99 10• S 'd 
, supra. 
ee 1 
· Other commentators agree. See Ellickson supra note 102 at 1212-13· Kleven, supra note 102 at 1 492 n 189 S b . 
' 
' 
' 
b h 
' 
· · u stanhve due process evaluations under state constitutions rnay 
S 
e
E
rr;,�c
BO
�o;;
1
�ri�t. se: Board of Supervisors v. DeGroff Enterprises, Inc. ,  214 Va. 235, 198 ·
t 
·
k. . 
(
h 
>
. 
(mvahdating set-asides as a form of proscribed "socio-economic" zoning and as a a mg wit out J ust compensation) . 
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If the reviewing court regards the mandatory set-aside require­
ment as taking Lovitt's property,  105 it will commence the due process­
takings analysis by examining the relationship between the goal of the 
enactment-provision of low and m oderate income housing-and the 
use to which Lovitt's property is devoted, construction of residential 
units for profit . More specifically, the court will ask whether, given 
this use, it is fair for government to single out Lovitt (and similarly 
situated developers) to bear the multiple burdens imposed by the 
requirement: the loss of freedom to select the m arket for which to 
build; the obligation to build and sell the set-aside units at a below­
cost price and to control their resale price indefinitely into the future; · 
and the disadvantages of m arketing the non-set-aside units at a price 
surcharged to mitigate losses i ncurred on the set-aside units, and to 
middle and upper income customers who may prove resistant to buy­
ing into an economically and perhaps racially integrated project. 
This question has been i dentified not to answer it, 106 but to 
demonstrate that it and resolution of the larger indemnity-welfare 
conflict which it implicates are different from , and markedly more 
troublesome than, the two "pure" due process questions preceding 
it.107 By interweaving the just share principle, the use-dependency 
test, and the due process-takings inquiry, the decisional model bridges 
the gap now dividing analysis of physical invasions and regulatory 
takings. Excepting those commentators who dismiss the redistribu­
tional consequences of public intervention as irrelevant to the takings 
equation, 108 the current debate over regulatory takings may be viewed 
largely as a debate over which types of use-dependent characteristics 
render such intervention fair.  In its singlemindedness, 109 however, 
105 Since the decisional model accords the plain meaning to the pertinent terms, see text 
accompanying notes 37-38, 95 supra, inclusionary ordinances would constitute presumptive 
takings under the model's first phase. 
106 For contrasting assessments of the question, compare Ellickson , supra note 1 02, at 1212- 13 
with Kleven, supra note 102, at 1499-1500. 
101 A major difference between my position and that of Professor Stoebuck merits reiteration 
here. Given the continued vitality he assigns to Lawton's "unduly oppressive" passage, see note 
91 supra, he would view the two inquiries I have isolated as "takings" ��estions �arising under 
the model's due process-takings and pure takings phases) as instead ra1smg claSS1c due process 
questions. 
108 See note 99 supra. 
· 
100 With the principal exceptions of the work of Professor Stoebuck, see, e .g. ,  Police Power, 
t 1 E · t D · pra note 31 an essay bv Professor Hum bach, see supra note l ,  supra no e ; mmen omam, su , . 
and portions of Professor Michelman's classic work, see supra note 3, at 1 184-90. 1226-29. 
11 d 'tself with the problem of regulaton· modem takings commentary has genera y concerne 1 . - . -
t k. I l h bl · · the context of land use and environmental regulations. a mgs arge y as t at pro em anses m 
S 
' 
II F B l D Call' & J Banta supra note l · Donaldson, supra note 99:
 
ee genera y . osse man, . 1es · • ' 
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that debate has tended to ignore the relation between use-dependent 
considerations and physical invasions . In m y  judgment these consider­
ations are no less pertinent to physical i nvasions than they are to 
regulatory takings. 
Physical invasions may be characterized as either location-contin­
gent or use-dependent.  Location-contingent invasions, which are ex­
plicable solely in terms of the location of the burdened land, are 
deemed takings 1 10 unless and perhaps even if a special doctrine such as 
the federal navigation servitude 1 1 1  may be invoked . 1 12 But use-depen­
dent invasions-those predicated on government's effort to control 
Dunham, supra note 76. In addition, commentators have adopted the paradigmatic takings 
status of physical invasions as their point of departure for evaluating whether the takings clause's 
coverage should be expanded beyond this indiscriminately defined category to include regulatory 
takings as well. The manner in  which Professor Berger commences his policy analysis of the 
taking issue is illustrative: 
The only utility of the physical invasion approach is not to decide when compensation 
should be denied but rather when it should be paid. It is universally agreed that the 
government must compensate for its physical taking of property. However the converse­
that where there has been no invasion there need be no compensation-is not, in general, 
the law, nor should it be. 
Berger, supra note 3, at 172 (emphasis added). 
1 10 See, e .g. , United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256 ( 1 946) (frequent flights immediately 
above landowner's property constitute a taking); United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917) 
(constant flooding deemed a permanent physical occupation, hence a taking). 
1 1 1  See generally Note, Determining the Parameters of the Navigation Servitude Doctrine, 34 
Vand. L. Rev. 461 (1981);  Note, The Navigational Servitude and the Fifth Amendment, 26 
Wayne L. Rev. 1505 (1980) . 
Physical invasions that government claims are noncom pensable under the navigation servi· 
tude doctrine are troublesome p recisely because they are location-contingent rather than use­
dependent. For a discussion of the doctrine's long history, see Humbach & Gale, Tidal Title and 
the Boundaries of the Bay: The Case of the Submerged "High Water" Mark, 4 Ford. Urb. L.J. 91 
(1975) , which contends that riparian owners can reasonably be expected to have envisaged the 
invasions the doctrine authorizes; it may be questioned whether these foreseeable invasions, too, 
should not be compensable takings. Also instructive in this regard is the comparison Professor 
Humbach has drawn between n avigation and avigation (overflight) servitudes. See Humbach, 
supra note 1 ,  at 248 n .24. The avigation servitude, he notes, "seems to be receiving narrower 
treatment.
. 
No� only are subjacent landowners' rights defined according to state law, . . .  but 
compensation is allowed for regular overflights within the avigation zone. "  Id. (citation omit­
ted): H� correctly argues that "avigation easements (should not] eventually achieve the status of 
nav
.
igabon easements" because, unlike navigation easements, they deprive "an owner of an 
ordm�ry advantage which he has every reason to expect to enjoy since there is no way of 
knowing m advance that an airport will become his neighbor."  Id. a t  264 n.93; cf. Baxter & 
Altree, Le�al Asp�cts of Airport Noise, 1 5  J . L. & Econ. l (1 972) (proposing a system requiring 
compensat10n for impairment f · · b F th . o pnor investment y subsequent airport development). or e view 
_
that the navigation servitude doctrine should be scrapped as unprincipled and exploitative of private property see B d Th N · · M ' ra y, e av1gation Easement and Unjust Compensation 15 J. ar. 
L
h
. Rev. 357 (1982) (" 'Just compensation,' as applied by the Court means the best i:assible deal t e government can get whe . · . h l 
' 
. n acqumng t e and of its citizens. It means the ability of govern· ment to ignore the value in th k l . .. 112 S 30 . 
e mar et P ace m order to protect national resources. ) .  ee  note 4 mfra. 
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legislatively-declared evils associated with the burdened land's use­
should not be categorized as takings 1 1 3  provided that government 
establishes a plausible con nection between the evil and the use of the 
land. In such instances, the p resence of any particular "physical" 
characteristic should not independently determine the invasion's sta­
tus. 114 A court might reasonably consider that characteristic, however, 
in fixing the burden of proof government must meet to overcome the 
takings presumption . 1 1 5 
A modification of the housing set-aside exam ple is illustrative. 
Suppose that for reasons unrelated to exclusionary zoning consider­
ations, State X's legislature authorizes its municipalities to require 
builders to convey to them interior subdivision streets and an amount 
of parkland for the recreation needs uniquely attributable to the 
subdivision in question . Summit adopts such requirements . Denied 
subdivision approval upon its refusal to dedicate in fee the required 
land, Lovitt asserts that the exactions work a taking of its property. Is 
this claim more likely to prevail than is Lovitt's assertion that the 
housing set-aside requirement constitutes a taking? 
Were the physical invasion variable to count as heavily as con­
ventional wisdom suggests, the answer would have to be yes . If taken 
seriously, moreover, Loretta's p er se rule for permanent physical occu­
pations would compel the holding that the street-parkland dedication 
is a taking, while relegating the non-trespassory housing set-aside 
requirement to the flaccid multifactor balancing test . But these results 
are contrary to commentary 1 16 a nd decisional law 1 1 7  in the subdivision 
exaction field and to our intuitive sense of fairness . While the constitu­
tionality of set-aside requirements has not yet been widely litigated, 1 1 8  
113 See, e.g. , PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); NLRB v. Babcock & 
Wilcox Co. ,  351 U . S .  105 ( 1 956); Block v .  Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (192 1 ) ;  cf. Marsh v. Alabama, 
326 U.S. 501 ( 1 946) (private property-a company town-devoted to uses that in all significant 
respects were equivalent to those of a municipality, is subject to first amendment speech 
servitude) . 
114 But see Loretto, 102 S. Ct. at 3175-76. 
115 See text accompanying notes 137-40, 236-37 infra. 
1 16  See, e.g. , Johnston, Constitutionality of Subdivision Control Exactions: The Quest for a 
Rationale, 52 Cornell L . Q .  871 ( 1967); Juergensmeyer & Blake, Impact Fees : An Answer to 
Local Governments' Capital Funding Dilemma, 9 Fla. St. U.L.  Rev. 4 1 5  ( 1 98 1 ) . 
1 17  For a discussion of representative cases see Johnston, supra note 1 16; Juergensmeyer & 
Blake, supra note 1 16, at 4 1 6  n.6.  . 5 198 S E 2d 600 1 1 8  Compare Board of Supervisors v. DeGroff E nterprises, Inc . ,  214 Va. 23 ' · · 
(1973) (sustaining takings challenge to set-aside ordinance) with In re Egg Harbor Assocs.
,  l85 
N.J. Super. 507 449 A . 2d 1324 (App. Div . ) ,  certif. granted, 91 N . J .  552, 453 A .2d 868 (�9
82) 
' 
· 
· 
· 
) S I M t Laurel /l's favorable d1scus-(rejecting takings challenge to set-aside p rov1s1on . ee a so oun 
sion of set-asides, 456 A . 2d at 446-50. 
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thoughtful commentators characterize. 
�h
.
e question as a close one 
because the relationship between subd1v1s10n develo
pment and com­
m u nity or regional need for low and moderate income housing is 
problem atic. 1 19 But because the nexus between s�ch de.
velopment and 
subdivision exactions for streets and par kl ands is straightforward, 
120 
the constitutionality of these exactions is widely, if not universally, 
conceded . 1 2 1  
These considerations indicate that the uncritical but prevalent 
assu mption that physical invasions are paradigmatic takings 
122 im-
i 19 Compare Ellickson, supra note 102, at 121 1 - 1 4  (arguing that set-asides arc takings) with 
Kleven, supra note 102, at 1 490- 1528 (arguing that set-asides do not constitute takings). 
1 20 See Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 380, 176 
N . E .2d 799, 802 ( 1961) (an exaction is pcrmis.�ible only when the need for the exaction is 
specifically and uniquely attributable to the activity of the subdivider) . For more liberal formu­
lations of the requisite nexus, see, e .g . ,  Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Inc. 1'. 
City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal . 3d 633, 640, 484 P.2d 606, 612, 94 Cal . Rptr. 630, 636 (1971) 
(upholding constitutionality of act that required that ''the amount and location of land or fees 
shall bear a reasonable relationship to the use of the facilities by the future inhabitants of the 
subdivision") ; Langridge Builders, Inc. v. Planning Rd. ,  52 N.J.  348, 3.50, 245 A.2d 336, 337 
(1 967) (per curiam) (assuming ordinance could apportion cost of off-site improvements to a 
subdivision, subdivider could b e  required to bear only that portion of cost that "bears a rational 
nexus to the needs created by, and benefits conferred upon,  the subdi\'ision"). 
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled upon the validity of such measures, it seemed 
improbable until Loretto that the Court would disturb these state holdings in view of the 
position it has taken in assessing police-power based, grade-separation financing schemes author­
izing government to require railroad companies to share the cost of realigning their tracks to 
accommodate highway development. The Court has held the.se impositions to be legitimate 
police power exercises if they "'bear some reasonable relation to the evils to be eradicated or the 
advantages to be secured." Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 429 
(1935); see Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 346 U.S. 346 (1953); 
cf. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co.  v. State Highway Comm'n, 294 U.S .  613, 622 (1935) (public 
order requiring pipeline company to absorb cost of moving its pipeline to accommodate new 
state highway invalid because pipeline did not constitute threat to public safety) . Loretto's 
distinction between measures o bligating a landowner to perform an act or incur an expense, 
which are not governed by a per se rule, 102 S. Ct. at 3 1 79 n. 19, and measures authorizing 
permanent occupation of the claimant's land, which are governed by a per se rule, id. at 3175-
76, 
.
cal�s these state court opinions into question. Subdivision statutes requiring mandatory 
dedication of land are an extreme form of the second type of measure while those requiring the 
payment of a fee in lieu of dedication are in form the first type but are functionally equivalent to 
the second. 
33
'.21 See Johnston, supra note 1 16, at 922-23; Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 1 16, at 421-
122 See, e.g. , Loretto, 102 S. Ct .  at 3 1 79;  Berger supra note 3 at 1 70-72· Rumbach supra 
note 1 ,  at 262-67 Th · · ' ' ' ' h h . 
. · .  e same error is committed by those who, like the Loretto Court, approach t e p ys1cal mvas1on problem f th . 
[ ] 
rom e perspective of Blackstone's classic assertion that 
s
h 
0
1
great i:iore�ver is the regard of the law for private property that it will not authorize t e east v1olat10n of it· t f h 
' . 
. , no,  no even or t e general good of the whole community. If a new road, for instance were t b d h · · ht 
h b . 
' o e ma e t rough the grounds of a private person, 1t m1g per aps e extensively ben f' · 1 t h b . 
to d th. . h 
e icia 0 t e pu he; but the law permits no man, or set of men, o is wit out consent of the owner of the land. 
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properly attributes to use-dependent invasions the constitutional de­
fects of most location-contin gent invasions . In addition, it ignores 
that, until Loretto , the physical invasions characteristically con­
demned as takings by the Court have been location-contingent. 123 The 
paradigmatic taking therefore  should be premised upon failure to 
satisfy the use-dependency test, not upon the physical or regulatory 
character of the intervention. 
3. Pure Takings Inquiry 
The model's third element is designated the "pure takings" phase 
because its purpose is to assess the permissible severity of a measure's 
impact on property . Although the takings analysis typically focuses 
upon this question, such an isolated focus is misconceived because the 
judgment that a measure "goes too far" may be predicated (1)  on due 
process-takings reasoning alone or (2) on a combination of due proc­
ess-takings and pure takings analyses . To illustrate the first possibility, 
suppose that Summit is unable t o  persuade the court that the housing 
set-aside requirements can be j ustified by Lovitt's use of its land. 
Under the model , Summit would be permitted to enforce the set-aside 
only once it compensates for Lovitt's loss, whether or not that loss falls 
short of denying Lovitt the reasonable beneficial use of its land . The 
example is problem atic not because of the magnitude of Lovitt's loss 
but because of the unfairness of  singling Lovitt out to bear the loss . 
When a combination of d ue process-takings and pure takings 
analyses is necessary to resolve a takings controversy, the model posits 
l W. Blackstone, Commentaries 139 (7th ed. Oxford 1775) (lst ed. Oxford 1 765) (emphasis 
added). Absent substantial qualification, Blackstone's categorical claim is an inaccurate descrip­
tion of past and present American compensation practice. Today, subdividers are required to 
dedicate in fee not only roads "through [their] grounds" but also land for parks, schools, and 
other community facilities. See note 1 16  supra. Mandatory dedications are consistently upheld 
against takings challenges if they satisfy the use-dependency test, that is, if the need for the 
exaction is attributable to the subdivision.  
In the late colonial period and the early days of the Republic when Blackstone's Commen­
taries were highly influential, see F. Bosselman, D. Callies &. J. Banta, supra note 1 , at 90, "the 
normal, if not universal, pattern was [for government] to pay only for [roads or other public 
improvements sited through] improved or enclosed land." Stoebuck, Eminent Domain, supra 
note 3l, at 582 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) ; see Parham v. Justices, 9 Ga. 341 ,  346-48, 
355 (1851) (recounting but disapproving of this practice) . Since denial of compensation for the 
taking of unenclosed or wild land may be justified on the basis of a special benefits rationale­
that is, that the enhancement in value accruing to the land not taken by virtue of the public 
improvement is greater than the value of the land taken-it is less germane to use�dep�ndency 
considerations than denial of compensation for subdivision exactions. Whatever their rationales, 
however, both examples (unenclosed land and subdivision exactions) undermine Blackstone's 
assertion as interpreted by the Court in Loretto. 
123 See cases cited in note l l O  supra. 
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that a measure "goes too jar "  if the burden it imposes is greater than 
necessary to implement legislative goals previously adjudged fair in 
principle under the due process-takings analysis . For example, a court 
might approve the concept of parkland exactions in principle, citing 
the nexus between s u bdivision development and the increased need 
for recreational open s pace, but might invalidate a particular exaction 
h d 1 2 4  c l . . . h as excessive in relation to t at nee . onverse y, 1mpos1t10ns t at 
severely reduce or even destroy the profitability of land may not be 
takings if they are n ecessary to effectuate measures deemed fair in 
principle. Suppose that a manufacturer acquires land and constructs a 
plant uniquely fitted t o  produce a chemical . It is subsequently discov­
ered that the chemical possesses the toxic p roperties of dioxin. Can it 
be seriously questioned that government m ay exercise its police power 
to ban further production even though that action will deny the 
manufacturer an economic return on its investment? 1 25 
These examples i llustrate that, of itself, a reduction in value 
caused by public intervention is no more determinative of the presence 
or absence of a taking t h an is the physical character of such interven­
tion . 126 Concededly, d r astic reduction in the economic utility of land 
124 Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 
(1961) . 
125 Cf. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.  623 (1887) (statute prohibiting manufacture of malt liquor 
does not take brewers' property even though the buildings and machinery are of "little value if 
not used for the purpose of manufacturing beer"). 
126 On its face, the proposition that a mere reduction in value of private property by govern· 
ment action is not determinative of the taking question would seem contrary to dicta in the 
Court's land use and environmental cases, see text accompanying notes 44-46 and note 74 supra, 
that a restriction denying a landowner an economically viable use of his property is a taking. But 
as both the dioxin hypothetical and the Court's decision in Mug/er exemplify, a taking will not be 
found even in light of a measure's economic effects if, on the basis of the use-dependency inquiry 
conducted in its due process-takings analysis, the Court concludes that the infringement is fair in 
principle. The Court's dicta simply reflect that it does not currently view welfare goals such as 
landmark or open space preservation as compelling enough to justify a measure that shifts the 
co�t of preserv
.
ing those resources to their owners as fair in principle if the consequences of that 
shift are as rumous as hypothesized. That interpretation falls well short of the absolutist claim 
that no welfare-indemnity clash can be envisaged in which, given the competing values and use­
de�n��ncy characteristics of the b urdened property in question, a shift of this nature can ever 
be JUS�ified. Indeed, the dioxin and Mugler examples seem to establish the contrary. Because the 
C�urt s pure takings analysis-does a measure go too far?-is so pervasively conditioned by its 
pno� due pr�ess-takings inquiry-is the imposition fair in principle given the competing welfare 
and mdemmty values and the d d h · · ? · · 
i . . . . 
use- epen ency c aractenshcs of the burdened property -1t JS 
�possibl� to fix with certainty the point at which reduction in the value of burdened property will constitute a taking if the taking claim is premised on the variable of diminution in value alone. Although the problematic character of such efforts has been widely noted among the commentators: see, e.g., Michelman, supra note 3, at 1190-93; Sax, supra note 41, at 50-60; Stoebuck, Pohce Power, supra note 1 ,  at 1062-65, they have overlooked that the problem is 
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or a permanent physical invasion is more likely to constitute a taking. 
Nonetheless, because the welfare-indemnity conflict implicates a 
broader array of considerations, it cannot be resolved by reference to 
these factors alone. 
rooted in the intimate connection between what this Article has termed the due process-takings 
and pure takings phases of takings analysis. 
Contrary to other commentators, see, e.g. , Sax, supra note 4 1 ,  at 4 1 ;  Stoebuck, Police 
Power, supra note 1, at 1062, I do not view the position that reduction in value of property is not 
determinative of the taking issue as incompatible with Justice Holmes' reasoning in Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U . S .  394 ( 1 922) . Concededly, there is language in the opinion suggest­
ing otherwise. Among the pertinent passages are Holmes' assertions that "when [diminution in 
value) reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of 
eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act," id.  at 4 13; that "[t]o make it commer­
cially impractical to mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes 
as appropriating or destroying it ," id.  at 414;  and that "the natural tendency of human nature is 
to extend the (police power) qualification more and more until at last private property disap­
pears. But that cannot be accomplished in this way under the Constitution of the United States ." 
Id.  at 415. But this language must be read in context. The structure of Holmes' analysis is 
precisely that envisaged for the decisional model's due process-takings phase, namely, identifica­
tion and weighing of the controversy's competing welfare and indemnity values. Hence, Holmes 
asserted that the "statute does not disclose a public interest sufficient to warrant so extensive a 
destruction of the [property owner's) constitutionally protected rights." Id. at 414.  In weighing 
the considerations that bear on the welfare and indemnity balance, Justice Holmes treated the 
"extent of diminution" as only "[o ]ne fact,"  id. at 413 (emphasis added), among others including, 
e.g. ,  the proscribed use's effect on personal safety, id . at 4 1 4 ,  the "private" nature of the seller­
buyer relationship controlled by the challenged measure, id. at 413-14, the capacity of these 
parties and of government to anticipate the problem addressed in the measure by acquiring 
subsurface as well as surface rights to the land in question, id.  at 415, and, in view of this 
capacity, the unfairness of imposing the costs of this omission on the proprietor, id. at 416.  One 
may disagree with the adequacy of Holmes' assessment of these additional considerations, but 
one cannot deny that, along with the diminution in value factor, he cited them as elements in an 
interlocking set of variables to be reviewed in light of the larger indemnity-welfare conflict posed 
by the challenged measure. An additional factor ignored by the commentators is that the 
objectionable measure in Pennsylvania Coal was not a "mere" regulation, but as asserted in note 
291 infra, a physical invasion that effectively preempted any rights that the proprietor may have 
had in the burdened property. 
Other takings opinions of Holmes confirm both the compatibility of his analyses with that of 
the decisional model and his recognition that the diminution in value factor must be evaluated 
within a context essentially equivalent to that afforded by the model. See, e .g . ,  Block v. Hirsh, 
256 U.S. 135 (1921) (discussed in text accompanying notes 88-90 supra) ; Erie R.R. v. Board of 
Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 254 U.S .  394 ( 1921); Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U . S .  104 (1911) ;  
Hudson County Water Co. v .  McCarter, 209 U.S .  349 (1908) . Erie, a railroad grade crossing 
case, is particularly germane in view of the proprietor-railroad's objection that the measure 
requiring it to bear a portion of mandated grade separation costs could bankrupt it. See Erie, �54 
U.S. at 409. Noting that the welfare and indemnity values implicated by the grade crossmg 
measure were public safety and the railroad's economic necessities, respectively, id. at 410, 
Holmes responded that "[g]enerically, the streets represent the more important interest of the 
two." Id. Stressing the powerful use-dependent basis for the challenged imposition, id. at 410-13, 
Holmes frontally dismissed the diminution in value objection: "If the burdens imposed are
. 
so 
great that the road cannot be run at a profit it can stop, whatever the misfortunes the stoppmg 
may produce," id. at 4 1 1 .  These words are hardly those of an analyst whose attachment �o the 
diminution in value test is so passionate as to preclude him from heeding the other factors m the 
decisional model's calculus. 
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Although their verbal packaging differs , numerous opinions of 
the Supreme Court m ay b e  readily explained by the due process­
takings/pure takings dichotomy. Particularly instructive are cases ad­
dressing police power-created access rights of political petitioners, 127 
tenants, 1 28 and non-employee labor organizers 
1 211 because in each case 
the governmental i ntervention was a .. physical invasion . "  The due 
process-takings question reflected in these cases is the same: Can a 
relationship be established between the purpose of the challenged 
measure and the use o f  the invaded land so that government may 
fairly require the landowner's exclusion rights to yield to a stranger's 
access r ights? 1 30 The pure takings question in these cases is also the 
same: Assuming that the m easure is fair i n  principle, does the access 
right created impose a greater burden on the landowner's economic or 
dom inion interests tha n  is necessary to effectuate the measure's pur­
pose? 13 1 
127 See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S.  74 ( HJ80). 
128 See Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 2f5fi U.S .  I iO ( 1 921) :  Block v. Hirsh. 256 U.S. 
135 ( 1 921) .  
129 See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. , 351 U.S .  105 ( 1 9.56). Elal>orating on Babcock are 
Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S.  539, 543-45 ( W72) and Hudgen.� v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 
507, 521-22 (1976) . In the Babcock line of cases, orders of the National Lal>or Relations Board, 
issued under § 8(a) (l) of the N ational Labor Relations Act. 29 V.S.C.  § 158(a)(l)(l976), were 
challenged by employers as ultra vires rather than on takings grounds. But the labor organization 
cases may here be grouped with the cases cited in notes 87-88 supra because they present the 
same functional issue-accommodation of the right of a proprietor to exclude with statutorily 
created access rights of third persons. Fifth amendment protection of an employer's property 
rights, moreover, was implicitly recognized by the Court in Babcock: .. Organization rights are 
granted to workers by the same authority, the National Government, that preserves property 
rights." 351 U.S.  at 1 12. Similarly, in Central Hardware. the Court stated: .. The Board and the 
courts have the duty to resolve conflicts between organization rights and property rights, and to 
seek a proper accommodation between the two . "  407 U.S.  at 543; see also Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 
437 U.S.  556, 580 (1978) (Rehnquist, J . ,  dissenting) ( .. From its earliest cases construing the 
National Labor Relations Act the Court has recognized the weight of an employer's property 
rights, rights which are explicitly protected from federal interference by the Fifth Amendment to 
the Constitution.") .  An employer's challenge to a Board order was framed in takings terms in 
NLRB v. Cities Serv. Oil Co. ,  122 F.2d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 194 1 )  ("It is not every interference with 
property rights that is within the Fifth Amendment and we see no basis for invoking the 
Constitution in the present situatio n . ") .  See also Fafnir Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 716, 722 
(2d �ir .
. 
1966) . Finally, in Loretto, 102 S. Ct. 3164 (1982) , the Court acknowledged the 
const1tut10nal relevance of the labor organization cases but characterized those intrusions as 
"temporary and limited" while the invasion authorized by § 828 was deemed "permanent." Id. 
at 3175 n. 1 1 .  
'. 30  See PruneYard Shopping Center v .  Robins, 447 U.S.  74, 87 (1980); NLRB v .  Babcock & W��ox Co. ,  351 U.S. 105, �13 ( 1956); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S .  135, 155-56 (1921). 
w·i 
See PruneYard Shoppmg Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980); NLRB v. Babcock & 1 co� Co. ,  351 U.S.  105, 1 13-1 4  (1956); Block v. Hirsh 256 U.S.  135 156-57 (1921). Subiect to the IT · d '  ' ' 
h. 
qua 1 icatwn 1Scussed in note 129 supra, Babcock illustrates the manner in w ich the Court has scrut· · d th l · h '  · · I . f . 
mize e re atlons 1p between legislative purpose and perm1S.S1b e m rmgement on a proprieto ' d · · · r s  om1mon mterest. In framing this inquiry, the Court stated: 
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4. Government's Burden of Proof 
The decisional model's fourth element is the burden of proof that 
government must meet to s atisfy inquiries under the due process­
takings and pure takings phases . This element's importance is manifest 
given the open-textured character of the respective fairness and sever­
ity standards of these two phases, yet it is also the element on which 
the Court's takings j urisprudence provides the least assistance. But if  
the Court's Bill of Rights jurisprudence is to be the guide-as I believe 
it should be-then one can expect, first, that the burden will be 
graduated and, second, that the level of scrutiny employed by the 
Court in p articular controversies will depend upon the identity of the 
competing welfare and indemnity values at issu e  and the precise 
manner in which government infringes on the indemnity values . 
The Court has not as yet enunciated a sliding scale of burdens for 
takings clause litigation akin to  that employed in other civil liberties 
litigation . Rather, it has oscil lated between the extremes of Loretta's 
demanding per se rule for permanent physical occupations and the 
deferential presumption of legislative validity for all other interven­
tions. If the Court's identification of a libertarian dimension in private 
property proves durable, this pattern will be refashioned, with the 
character of the competing values proving crucial in the burden's 
selection . Not all police power values are equal; neither are those 
relating to property. Thus the precise character of the property value 
or values implicated in a controversy must be clarified. Measures 
impinging upon economic valu es will continue to receive lesser protec­
tion; those affecting dominio n  values will be identified as such and 
receive greater protection, although not the absolute immunity from 
This is not a problem of always open or always closed doors for union organization on 
company property. Organization rights are granted to workers by the same authority, the 
National Government, that preserves property rights. Accommodation between the two 
must be obtained with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of 
the other. The employer may not affirmatively interefere with organization; the union 
may not always insist that the employer aid organization. But when the inaccessibili�y of 
employees makes ineffective the reasonable attempts by nonemployees to communicate 
with them through the usual channels, the right to exclude from property has �een 
required to yield to the extent needed to permit communication of information on the nght 
to organize. , 
351 U.S. at 1 1 2. The Court has repeatedly insisted that the burden on an employe� s �r?perty 
rights be related to the Act's legislative p urpose: "What is a 'proper accommodation m
 any 
situation may largely depend upon the content and the context of the § 7 rights being asser
ted. "  
Hudgens v. NLRB, 4 2 4  U . S .  507, 521 (1976) . As the Court explained, "[t]he locus
 of that 
accommodation . . .  may fall at differing points along the spectrum depending �n the na�ure 
and strength of the respective § 7 rights and private property rights asserted m an
y given 
context." Id. at 522. 
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infringement afforded them in Loretto . Go\'ernment's burden will be 
less stringent in conflicts bet\".:een public safety and a landowner's 
economic i nterest in p roperty, 1 32 for ex am ple, than in conflicts in 
which a less well-established police pmver goal is opposed to the 
proprietor's dominion interest. 1 33 The precise character of the prop­
erty value o r  values i mplicated in a contrO\·ersy must also be clari­
fied. 134 
The parallel between these prescriptions and those prevailing in 
conventional civil liberties litigation is evident . The Court's recent 
decisions in the first am endment area, for exam ple, have tended to 
gauge the depth of judicial scrutiny of a measure alleged to offend the 
freedom of speech to the type o f  expression in question. Commer­
cial 135 and, perhaps, p ornographic speech, 1 :111 for instance, receive l ess 
protection than other, more valued forms o f  expression. One m ight 
anticipate the emergence of a similar pattern for takings litigation, 
with a graduated burden depending upon the character of the values 
identified i n  the due process- takings phase. 
Finally, the form assumed by the intervention, i .e. ,  affirmative 
easement, affirm ative covenant or servitude, or negative easement, 
will also influence determination of the level of judicial scrutiny. 
Later discussion of Loretto concedes, for example, that measures such 
as section 828 which impose obligations akin to affirm ative easements 
132 See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S . .590, .594-90 ( 1 962) (balancing the danger 
posed to children by an open sand and gravel pit against the owner's right to exploit the site's 
mining potential) .  
1 33 Loretto, which pitted the public's interest in access to the embrvonic cable television 
medium against landlords' right to exclude those characterized by the Court a� .. strangers" to 
th�ir property, see text accompanying notes 1 95-204 infra, may be viewed as representative of 
thts type of conflict. 
1 34 !he task of clarifying the precise character of the property values implicated in a contro­
versy ts not exhausted simply by differentiating property's economic from its dominion interest .  
As later discussion of Loretto will illustrate, see text accompanying notes 214-18  infra, the 
dominion interest itself comprehends values that may be further subdivided on the basis of 
differences entitling them to greater or lesser protection. 
135 See, e . g. ,  Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv Comm'n 447 U S 557 562-
63 (1980) ("Th C · · . 
. • . . ' 
. e onshtuhon · . · accords a lesser protection to commercial speech [ traditionally s�b!ect to government regulation] than to other constitutionally guaranteed expr�ion."); Vir­
ginia Stat� Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 42.5 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) 
(commerc�al speech does not lack "all" protection); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S.  809, 821 (1975) 
(commercial advertising enjoys a "degree" of first amendment protection) . 
l 
136 See, e.g.,  FCC v. Pacifica Found. , 438 U . S .  726, 745-47 (1978) (sexual and excretory 
bec
anguage "not entitled to absolute constitutional protection under all circumstances " especially 
ause "bro d ast' · · l 
' 
I 427 U S
a c mg IS umque Y accessible to children"); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 
nc. ,  . . 50 70 (1976) (plurality op' · ) (" · • · · · l J · f h 1 '. 
imon society s mterest m protecting (erotic matena s 
IS o a w o ly different and less · d 
d b t ") 
' er, magmtu e than the interest in untrammeled political 
e a e . 
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are inherently troublesome. 1 37 To use terminology connoting the dis­
tinctions of an earlier day, these obligations invade corporeal rather 
than incorporeal property; the p roperty interest acquired is both lost 
(destroyed) to the owner and appropriated to government or its dele­
gate; and the injury is direct rather than consequential . If, in addi­
tion, the obligation is expressly premised on a particular use of the 
burdened property, it is likely to be of indefinite duration, and there­
fore to appear perm anent rather than temporary. Although this Arti­
cle138 and the unmistakable trend of the Court's modern takings juris­
prudence 139 deny that a takings determination should rest only on one 
or more of these distinctions, that position does not deny that the 
decisional model should consider the factors to which these distinc­
tions point . This can best be accomplished by assigning the factors a 
role parallel to that played by presumptively disfavored forms of 
government intervention in civil liberties litigation . Just as content­
based distinctions trigger more exacting scrutiny in first amendment 
litigation, 140 for example, the foregoin g  factors should do the same in 
takings litigation . 
II  
LORETTO v .  TELEPROMPTER MANHA TTAN CA TV CORP. 
The introduction to this Article premised the case for the pro­
posed decisional model on five b asic considerations . First, the broad 
per se rule (predicating takings o n  the finding that property has been 
taken) should yield to the model's presumptive approach because the 
per se rule is unsatisfactory on l inguistic, historical, and functional 
grounds. Second, the narrow per  se rule (predicating takings on an 
intrusion's physical character alone) should also yield; the same policy 
considerations should govern the evaluation of physical invasions as 
govern regulatory incursions. Third, however pertinent to these con­
siderations, the distinctions historically allied to both versions of the 
per se rule do not afford an independent foundation for takings deter­
minations . They are simply too crude to serve as vehicles for mediat-
137 See text accompanying notes 356-58 infra. 
138 See text accompanying notes 1-2 supra .  
139 See text accompanying notes 48-53 supra, 283-355 infra. 
1•0 See, e.g. , Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S .  490, 515 (1981) ("city may not 
choose the appropriate subjects for public discourse") ; Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 
(1972) (first amendment means that governm ent has "no power to restrict expression because of 
its message, its ideas, its subject m atter, or its content") . See generally L .  Tribe, supra note 43, § 
12-2, at 581; Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 Geo. 
L.J. 727, 729-30 (1980). 
502 NE W ronK U.\'l \1rns11T I.A \\ . R E \'/£ \\' (Vol. 58:465 
ing the welfare-indemnity conflict that underlies all takings contro­
versies . Fourth, the sharp division between due process and takings 
reasoning impedes j udicial efforts to assess both the fairness in princi­
ple and the permissible severity of measures challenged as takings. 
Finally, the Burger Court's emerging recognition of the dominion, or 
liberty, interest in property requires a more discerning standard of 
judicial scrutiny for takings litigation than is afforded either by the 
per se rule, which is  overly solicitous of that interest, or by the 
m ultifactor balancing test, which errs in the other direction. 
The Loretto Court ignored and exacerbated the problems inher­
ent in these considerations . In its analysis of the constitutional chal­
lenge to section 828, 1 4 1  the Loretto Court gleaned from its prior 
decisions fou r  categories of obligations cha llenged as takings: (1) those 
1 4 1  Adopted in 1973, § 828 limits t he landlord's right both to exclude and to impose charges on 
cable companies and tenants. Sec N. Y. Exec. Law § 828( I ) (a) -(b) (McKinney 1982). The former 
su bsection flatly bars landlords from interfering with the fadlit ies' installation. Id. § 828( l) (a) . 
The subsections concerning im position of charges are less straightforward. While they prevent 
landlords from receiving any payment from their tenants in exchange for permitting cable 
television services, id. § 828( l) (b),  they obligate cable companies and tenants to bear the "entire 
cost" of the facilities' installation ,  operation, and removal, id. § 828( l ) (a)(ii), and require the 
companies alone to ""indem nify" landlords for any damage c:alr.�ed by these actions, id. § 
828(l) (a) (iii) . Section 828 therefore imposes no out-of-pocket costs on landlord�; in addition, it 
assures them that the installations will conform to "such reasonable conditions as are necessary to 
protect the safety, functioning and appearance of (their J premises , and the convenience and 
well-being of other tenants ."  Id .  § 828 ( l ) (a) (i) . 
But § 828 also prohibits landlords from imposing charges for the use of their property on the 
companies "in excess of any amount which the (State Cable Television Commis.sion] shall, by 
regulation, determine to be reasonable." Id.  § 828( 1 )  (b) . Subsequent to § 828's passage, the State 
Cable Commission ruled that .. in the absence of a special showing of greater damages attribut­
able to the taking," landlords m ay demand no more than a one ti�e, one dollar fee from cable 
companies. In the Matter of Implementation of Section 828 of the Executive Law, N.Y. State 
Comm'n on Cable Television, Statement of General Policy 4 ( 1976). This determination was 
based on proceedings in which the Commission solicited comments from landlords, tenants, 
cable trade associations, and other interested groups, and reviewed ··condemnation-type ap­
praisal reports [on two buildings] which concluded that the value of the section 828 'easement' 
acquired on the respective apartm ent buildings was 'nominal . ·  ·· Id. at 3-4. The Commis.sion's 
presumption favoring the one dollar payment reflected its judgment that circumstances applica· 
ble to these two buildings were "typical" of the class generally. Id. at 4 .  
The New York legislature chose to regulate the relations of  landlords, tenants, and cable 
companies in this manner rather than to allow them to be determined by market forces because 
the marketplace alternative already had been tried and found wanting. Prior to passage of § 828, 
landlords had charged cable companies "onerous fees." Loretto, 53 N. Y.2d 124, 141 ,  423 N.E.2d 
320, .328, 440 N.Y.S.2d 843, 8 5 1  ( 1 98 1 )  (quoting testimony of Joseph C. Swidler, Chairman, �ubhc Serv. Comm'n, before the Joint Legislative Comm. considering § 828). These fees, often 
five percent of the gross operating revenues due a company from the tenants in a landlord's 
buildi�g,  see Loretto, 102 S. Ct . . at 3169, had been passed on by the companies to the tenant· 
subscribers. These charges and other obstacles to tenant cable access were so problematic, in 
fact, tha� the report initially proposing the legislation that includes § 828 advised that "[t]he most 
useful thmg government could do at this time is to assure that landlords do not impose obstacles 
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restricting the uses to which an owner's land m ay be devoted; 142 (2) 
those requiring him to perform acts on his land; 143 (3) those obligating 
him to suffer "temporary physical invasions" 144 of his land by govern­
ment or its delegates , and (4) those obligating him to suffer "perma-
to tenant subscription to CATV . .. Regulation of Cable Television by the State of New York, 
Report to the [State Public Service] C o m m ission by Commissioner William K. Jones 181-82 
(1970) [hereinafter Jones Report]. But tenants were not the sole beneficiaries of § 828. Since 
apartment buildings constitute an important component of cable television service grids, particu­
larly in the metropolitan New York area, tenant access difficulties were impeding the penetra­
tion of cable systems statewide as wel l .  J ones Report, supra, at 206. In its statement of findings 
the legislature recognized that unless the medium's "maximum penetration" was secured as 
"rapidly as economically and technically feasible," access to the "valuable educational and 
public services" promised by the developing medium would be restricted for New York citizens, 
municipalities, and public and business groups a� well. N . Y .  Exec. Law § 8ll (McKinney 1982) . 
Section 828 was challenged by Mrs. Loretto on behalf of herself and similarly situated 
landlords as an "uncompensated trespass and condemnation of property that constitute a 'taking' 
without due process. "  Lorello, 98 Misc. 2d 944, 945, 4 1 5  N.Y.S. 2d 1 80,  181 (S.  Ct. 1979). The 
summary dism issal by a New York trial j udge of her claim that the section effected a "taking" 
entitling her to the ··5 % of Teleprom pter's gross revenues that was customarily paid to landlords 
before the adoption of the Statute," id. , was affirmed by an intermediate court, 73 A.D.2d 849, 
422 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1979), and by the New York Court of Appeals, 53 N . Y . 2d 1 24 423 N . E.2d 
320, 440 N.  Y . S . 2d 843 (198 1 ) .  In light of § 828's provision for compensation, see § 828(l)(b), and 
the State Cable Com m ission's ruling with respect to that provision, see In the Matter o f  
Implementation o f  Section 828 of the Executive Law, N . Y .  State Comm'n on Cable Television, 
Statement of General Policy 4 ( 1976) , Teleprompter argued that § 828 could be sustained 
alternatively as a valid exercise of police power, see Brief for Respondents at 19-59, or eminent 
domain power. See id . at 60-i4: Lorello, 53 N . Y . 2d at 127-28, 132-33, 136-37, 423 N.E .2d at 
323, 325-26, 440 N . Y . S . 2d at 846, 848 ( 1 98 1 ) .  But the New York Court of Appeals majority 
interpreted § 828 in a manner that elim inated the eminent domain prong of Teleprompter's 
position. In its view § 828's imposition of ··an upper limit upon the amount that may be 
demanded . . .  rather than a requirement that such a company pay compensation" established 
that the legislature ""intended to act under the police power only." 53 N . Y. 2d at 1 38, 423 N.E.2d 
at 326, 440 N .  Y . S . 2d at 849 (emphasis in original) (citation and footnote omitted) ; cf. 53 N. Y . 2d 
124, 155, 423 N . E . 2d 320, 336, 440 N . Y .S .2d 843, 859 ( 1981) ( Gabrielli, J . ,  concurring) 
(upholding § 828 a� valid legislative exercise of eminent domain power because of provision for 
just compensation through payment of a mount set by Commission plus indemnification for any 
actual damages) . Given this interpretation of the statute by a majority of the state's highest 
court, the Supreme Court had no choice but to view the controversy as one that squar�ly 
presented the issue of whether § 828 was a taking because it exceeded the bounds of the pohce 
power. 
m See Loretto, 102 S. Ct. at 3 1 7 1 .  Representative cases include, e.g. , Agins v. City of 
Tiburon, 440 U.S .  255 ( 1 980) (limitation on number of units to be built on land zoned for open 
space/low density use);  Penn Cent. Transp . Co. v .  New York City, 438 U . S .  178 ( 1978) (ban 
against building above a landmark) . 
143 See Loretto, 102 S. Ct. at 3178-79. 
144 Id. at 3 1 72.  Illustrative cases include, e .g . , PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 
U.S. 74 (1980) (private property subject to speech servitude favoring politi:al petition:rs); Kaiser 
Aetna v. United States, 444 U . S .  164 (1979) (private navigable waters sub1ect to pubhc easement 
of passage). 
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nent physical occupa tions" 1 45 by either. 1 40 According to the Court, 
m easures imposing the first three obligations are presumptive takings 
which therefore must be evaluated under the m ultifactor balancing 
test, 147 necessitating a n  inquiry into whether the challenged measure 
"achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic 
impact on the owner . " 1 48 "Permanent physical occupation[s)," on the 
us See Loretto, 102 S. Ct. at 3171 -73. Representath·e case.� include. e.g. ,  United States v. 
Lynah,  1 88 U . S .  445 (1903) ; St. Louis v. Western Union Tel . Co . .  1 48 U.S. 92 ( 1893): Pumpelly 
v. Green Bay Co. , 80 U.S. (13 Wall . )  166 ( 1 871) .  
ue Loretto, 102 S. Ct. at  3 1 7 1 -76. What the Court actually did was to as.�mble a series of 
decisions that relied on the above-outlined distinctions in deciding whether a taking had oc­
curred. The most pertinent cases are vintage material dating roughly from the late nineteenth to 
the first third of the twentieth century. Many involved government-authorized navigation 
improvements that flooded a claimant's land. Within this category. the Court confined its 
discussion to two century-old cases, Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co. , 80 U.S.  (13 Wall.) 166 (1871) 
(construction under state authority of a dam that permanently flooded plaintiffs property 
constituted a taking) (discussed i n  102 S. Ct. at 3171-72). and Northern Transp. Co . v. City of 
Chicago, 99 U . S .  635, 642 (1878) (construction of a temporary dam was not a taking because the 
obstruction impaired only the use of the property even though it denied plaintiffs access to their 
property) (discussed in 102 S. Ct. at 3 1 72) . The Court relegated subsequent cases of this type, 
most of them dating from 1903 to 1 924, to a string cite. See 102 S. Ct. at 3172. 
Two other cases cited by the Court addressed a telegraph utility's obligation to compensate 
owners for the placement of its telephone poles on their property. Western Union Tel. Co. v. 
Pennsylvania R . R . ,  195 U.S. 540 ( 1904) (poles located along railroad's right of way) (discussed in 
102 S. Ct. at 3173); St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co. ,  148 U . S .  92 (1893) (poles located along 
city streets) (discussed in 102 S. C t .  at 31 72-73) . 
More recent cases referred to by the Court can be divided into two categories. The first 
includes regulatory takings cases containing dicta acknowledging that physical invasions are 
more likely than regulatory incursions to constitute takings. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New 
York City, 438 U.S.  104 (1978) (discussed in 1 02 S. Ct. at 3 1 7 1 ,  3174); Andrus v. Allard, 441 
U.S.  51 ( 1979) (discussed in 102 S .  Ct. at 3 1 73 n . 6) .  The second category consists of physical 
invasion cases in which the "invaders" were not objects but persons holding the benefit of 
government-authorized affirmative easements intended to advance such interests as worker self­
organization, see Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972) (discussed in 102 S. Ct. 
at 3175 n. 1 1) ;  NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. , 351 U.S.  1 05 (1 956) (same), state-protected 
expression, see Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S.  74 (1980) (discussed in 102 S. Ct. 
at 3175) , or transit in the nation's navigable waters or airspace, see Kaiser Aetna v. United 
States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (discussed in 102 S. Ct. at 31 75); Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 
U.S. 84 (1962) (cited in 102 S. Ct. a t  3174); United States v .  Causby, 328 U.S. 256 ( 1946) 
(discussed in 102 S. Ct. at 3173). These more recent physical invasion cases obviously gave the 
most trouble to the Court because they had been resolved under the presumptive approach even 
though the easements involved were comparable to the one imposed by § 828 in all respects but 
the trespass-�y-person �ersus trespass-by-object distinction. Causby and Griggs involved tres­
passes by obiect (overflights by airplanes) , but these invasions were intermittent rather than 
continuing and, although found to be takings, were not "permanent physical occupations." See text accompanying notes 298-301 infra. Curiously, the Court nonetheless treated these cases as though they substantiated its per se rule. See 102 S. Ct. at 3175-76. 
147 Loretto, 102 S .  Ct. at 3174. 
148 Id. at 3176. 
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other hand, are takings "without regard to other factors that a court 
might ordinarily examine" 149 and hence are per se takings . 
In view of the sharp line drawn by the Court between the first 
three and the fourth of these obligations, it would appear that the 
Court, while rejecting the broad per se rule, endorses the narrower 
version of the rule for permanent physical occupations, contrary to the 
decisional model . I n  the case of the first three obligations at least, the 
Court's stance presumably reflects both its skepticism of the distinc­
tions' resolutive force in takin gs litigation and its willingness to enter­
tain due process-takings considerations through the crude medium of 
the multifactor balancing test . But Loretto suggests that rigid adher­
ence to the distinctions and to compartmentalization of due process 
and takings reasoning remain the order of the day for permanent 
physical occupations . The Court's identification of a dominion inter­
est in property and its views concerning the degree of protection to 
which that interest is entitled cannot be determined from the forego­
ing categorization and are discussed separately below . 150 
The question to be addressed in this section is why permanent 
physical occupations, more usefully described as continuing trespasses 
by object, 1 5 1 should be governed by a per se rule while a presumptive 
approach applies to other incursions. In practical effect, other inva­
sions may impinge more severely on property than do permanent 
physical occupations . Consider, for example, the effect on an employ­
er's dominion or economic i nterest of repeated trespasses onto its 
workplace 1 52 by union organizers or, similarly, the effect on the inter� 
ests of a shopping center owner suffering repeated trespasses at its 
shopping center by political activists . 153 Depending upon the circum­
stances, these invasions are surely as disruptive as the occupation by 
cable equipment of a minute portion of a landlord's apartment build­
ing roof. Public actions obligating a landowner to suffer t respasses by 
government engineers to destroy his petroleum terminal, 154 by fire­
fighters to raze his building, 1 55 or by state entomologists to cut down 
his cedar trees l56 m ay have been similarly disruptive. None of these 
149 Id. at 3174 .  
150 See text accompanying notes 195-204 infra. 
151 See notes 179-86, 347-55 infra. 
152 See cases cited in note 129 supra. 
153 See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S.  74 (1980) . 
134 See United States v. Caltex, Inc. ,  344 U.S.  149, 155-56 (1952) (no compensation due for 
property destroyed to prevent its use by the enemy) . . . 
155 See Bowditch v. City of Boston, 101 U .S .  16, 19 (1879) (no compensation due for buildings 
destroyed to prevent spread of conflagration) · . f 
1511 See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S .  272, 279-80 ( 1928) (no compensation due fo
r destruction � 
cedar trees infected with rust fungus which, while harmless to cedar trees, ravages
 apple trees · 
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measures was deemed a per se taking when litigated, however, and 
most were not held to be takings at all . 
The following section critiques the Courfs attempt to justify the 
narrow per se rule o n  the basis of the Court's appeal to the purposes of 
the takings clause, its  use of the distinctions allied to the clause's rule­
o riented construction, its implicit reliance on due process-takings con­
siderations in  the face of i ts disavowal of their relevance, and its 
assessment of section 828's relative impact on landlords' dominion and 
economic interests i n  their property. The next section then formulates 
Loretta's issues as they would have been formulated had the Court 
employed the decisional model . 
The purpose of Part I I  is not to argue that section 828 is a valid 
police power enactment; the Court's decision to the contrary is by no 
means absurd .  Rather, Part I I  is intended first to demonstrate that, 
viewed against the body of the Court's better- reasoned takings prece­
dents, Loretta's per se rule is aberrational , and second to illustrate the 
decisional model's functioning by contrasting the Court's per se analy­
sis with a simulated analysis u nder the m odel . 
A .  Loretto: Description and Critique 
1. Appeal to the Purposes of the Takings Clause 
The C ourt's argument that section 828 subverts the purposes of 
the takings clause posits that the clause's principal goal 157 is to safe­
guard the proprietor's entitlements of exclusion, use, and disposition 
with respect to any portion whatever of its property. 158 To substanti-
157 In conjunction with this property-protective goal, the Court stressed the ease of adminis­
tering a per se rule. 102 S. Ct. at 3 1 76-77. That rule. it noted, "avoids otherwise difficult line 
drawing problems" because it treats all occupations as takings, whatever the "size of the area 
permanently occupied," id. , and "presents relatively few problems of proof' because "[t]he 
placement of a fixed structure on land or real property is an obvious fact that will rarely be 
subject to dispute," id. at 3177. This reasoning is difficult to credit. Per se rules are designed to 
encou�a�e effi�ie�cy; but they are not invoked until the underlying conduct, examined in light of 
the �mdmg prmc1ples of the laws which govern it, is found to be so egregious as to render future 
co'.15i�eration of particular instances of that conduct unnecessary to a determination that these 
pr
.mc1ples have bee_
n v!olated. It can hardly be predicted that all permanent physical occupations �ill �ubve
.rt the prmc1ples underpinning the takings clause as they have been defined elsewhere m thIS Article and by the Court. See text accompanying notes 9 1-99 supra, 166-67 infra. Loretta's narrow per se rule ought therefore to be rejected lest the efficiency it promises is purchased in derogation of fairness. 
158• 102 S. Ct. at 3176-77. Elsewhere in the opinion the Court emphasized that permanent �hysical occupations are takings "to the extent of the occupation " id. at 3175-76 and that whether the [§ 828] 
· t 11 t "  · k" 
' 
' · 
. . . 
ms a a ion is a ta mg does not depend on whether the volume of space it occupies is bigger than a bread box," id. at 3178 n. 1 6. 
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ate this extravagant conception of the clause's property-protective 
purpose and its application to section 828, the Court turned to United 
States v. General Motors Corporation, 159 in which it had identified 
"property" as the right to "possess, use, and dispose of it . "  160 Of these 
incidents, the right to possess, or to exclude, predominated in its 
reasoning in Loretto , explaining its evident distaste for the "special 
kind of injury [incurred] when a stranger directly invades or occupies 
the owner's property" 161 and its plaint that "to require . . .  the owner 
to permit another to exercise complete dominion literally adds insult 
to injury. "  162 To like effect is the Court's explanation of why a stan­
dard more lenient on government applies in the case of obligations 
other than permanent physical occupations. Although it candidly 
acknowledged that other impositions may impose far graver economic 
harm than do permanent physical occupations, 163 it nonetheless por­
trayed the latter as "qualitatively more severe . . .  since the owner 
may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the inva­
sion ." 164 Given this characterization of the clause's overriding pur­
pose, the Court's separate determination that the "property" infringed 
upon by section 828 was coextensive with the "property" "taken," i .e. , 
the cable-occupied space, 165 led inexorably to the conclusion that 
section 828 indeed effected a compensable taking. 
Perhaps the most charitable characterization of the Court's pur­
poses analysis is to call it straine d .  The gravest defect of the analysis is 
that of the opinion as a whole: its failure to acknowledge that fairness 
is the taking clause's dominant goal 166 and, hence, its failure to ad­
dress explicitly the issue of section 828's fairness to government and the 
classes benefited by section 828 as well as to landlords . It  is no re­
sponse that the C ourt impliedly acknowledged this value by denying 
government the power to encroach upon landlords' rights of exclusion, 
use, and disposition. All takings controversies feature governmentally­
authorized incursions on one o r  more of these interests. In m any, the 
Court has declined to find a taking under circumstances far more 
prejudicial to the proprietor than were those present in Loretto . Given 
159 323 U.S.  373 (1945). 
160 Id. at 378 (discussed in 102 S. Ct. at 3 1 76). 
161 102 S. Ct. at 3176 (emphasis in original). 
162 Id. 
193 Id. 
ie; Id. 
165 Id. at 3177. 
166 See, e.g. , cases cited in note 92 supra. The policy underpinnings for this position are 
persuasively recounted in Professor Michelman's classic essay, supra note 3. 
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the opinion's characterization of the takings clause's purposes, how­
ever, the takings determination was m ade to turn only upon the fact 
of the i ncursion, not upon the presence or absence of a ;ustification for 
i t . 167 
Even i f  section 828's effects are .. qualitati\'ely more se\'ere" than 
those of interventions assuming different forms, the question remains 
whether the appropriate j udicial response is the absolute ban of a per 
se rule or the less drastic, but  still dem anding, requirement that 
government satisfy a proportionately greater bu rden in justifying 
these effects . 168 Adjustmen ts of the latter type are commonplace in 
conventional civil liberties l itigation . 1 fi11 Lol'l'ffo offers no clue \\:hy a 
similar response would be i n appropriate in takings l i tigation . Nor do I 
thin k  that the rejection of this response can seriously be defended 
given the implausibility of the claim that all permanent physical 
occupations are necessa rily unfair, as that term is defined in the 
decisional model's due process- takings and pure takings analyses . 
Another unexplained deviation from the Court's prior jurispru­
dence is Loretto's definition of the plainti ffs ··property" as her ' '[ca­
ble-]occupied" space alone, not as the aggregate of her fee rights in 
her parcel and its improvements . 1 70 In prior decisions addressing frac­
tional takings such as t h at involved in Loretto, the Court has equated 
the p roperty burdened with that aggregate, and has evaluated the 
severity of less-than-fee encroachments against this aggregate rather 
than against the property taken . 1 71 Equating the two types of prop­
erty, of course, rendered the taking total , not fractional, and enabled 
167 See 102 S.  Ct. at 3175-76. 
168 See text accompanying notes 132-40 supra. 
169 See authorities cited in note 4 7 ;  text accompanying note 53 supra. 
1 10 See text accompanying note 1 65 supra. 
171 In Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.  New York City. 438 U . S .  104 ( 1 978), for example, the Court 
sustained a ban on the construction of a 50-story building in the airspace above a landmark 
despite its owner's i nsistence that this discrete block of unoccupied space, the .. property taken," 
should be considered as "property" separate and apart from the land and building below, the 
"property burdened ."  Id. at 130. But that argument fell before the Court's response that 
"[t]aking" 
_
jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt 
to �e�ermme whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In 
dec1dmg whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court 
focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the ��terference with rights in the p arcel as a whole-here, the city tax block designated as the 
landmark site." 
Id. �t 
_
130-3 1 .  Accord Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S.  51 , 65-66 ( 1979) (refusing to evaluate a 
restnchon on an own�r's right to sell personalty separately from his other rights in the "bundle" 
of personalty ownership); cf. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon 260 U S  393 (1922) (characteriz-
ing th I · t' ff' · ' 
. . 
b 
e 
.
c �iman s a
. 
irmative easement to mine coal as the "property" both burdened and taken Y a  mmmg ban) discussed in note 2 9 1  infra. 
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the Court to reason that section 828 required Mrs . Loretto to suffer 
the "insult" of "having to permit another to exercise complete domin­
ion" over her "property ." 172 It is difficult to imagine a more outcome­
determinative formulation of Loretta's issue. 
2. Argument from Precedent: Reliance on the Rule-Oriented 
Distinctions 
The Court's attempt to j ustify the narrow per se rule pursuant to 
the traditional distinctions is n o  more persuasive than its appeal to the 
purposes of the takings clause. The distinctions' evolution, present 
status, and relation to section 828 are exhaustively detailed in this 
Article's Appendix. That investigation's conclusions may be summed 
up in three propositions. First, section 828 clearly falls on the wrong 
side of the direct/consequential damages, 173 appropriation/destruc­
tion, 174 and property as thing/as relation pairings, 175 a fact that might 
172 102 S. Ct.  at 3176 (emphasis added) . 
173 The Court stressed that the damage inflicted by § 828 was direct rather than consequential 
because it resulted from § 828-authorized activities conducted on the landlord's land and 
building rather than on a neighboring parcel. Id. at 3172. The Court contrasted the § 828 
intrusion with that addressed in its 1878 decision in Northern Transp. C o .  v. City of Chicago, 99 
U.S. 635 (1878) , which entailed noncompensable "consequential damages" because the interven­
tion took the form of the denial of a landowner's access to an adioining river and road by a public 
project that also contributed to his building's collapse. I n  explaining a result that seems egregious 
now, but was commonplace in the last century, the Court stated that "acts done in the proper 
exercise of governmental powers, and not directly encroaching ·upon private property, though 
their consequences may impair its use, are universally held not to be a taking within the meaning 
of the [takings clause]." Id.  at 642; see text accompanying notes 261-70, 286-309 infra. 
174 102 S. Ct. at 3174. Section 828 was vulnerable under the appropriation/destruction 
distinction since the statute transferred control of the landlord's cable-occupied space to Tele­
prompter and its subscribers, enabling them to enjoy the benefits of providing or receiving cable 
television service. Important to the Court's discussion of this distinction was United States v. 
Central Eureka Mining Co. , 357 U.S.  155 (1958), in which it had employed the distinction to 
reject a takings challenge to a war order obligating nonessential gold m ines to cease operations in 
order to conserve manpower for use in mines the government deemed more essential to the war 
effort. Summarizing Central Eureka in Loretto, the Court observed: 
Over dissenting Justice Harlan's complaint that "as a practical matter the Order led to 
consequences no different from those that would have followed the temporary acquisition 
of physical possession of these mines by the United States," . . .  the Court reasoned that 
"the Government did not occupy, use, or in any manner take physical possession of the 
gold mines or the equipment connected with them . "  
102 S .  Ct. a t  3174; see text accompanying notes 271-77, 310-21 infra. 
1 75 The Court's physical conception of property appeared at two levels in Loretto. It defined 
the "property" taken as the cable-occupied space only, not as a fractional interest in the 
landlord's fee (its land and buildings considered as the collective physical resource in which the 
fee was held) . 102 S .  Ct.  at 3177-78; see text accompanying notes 170-72 supra. Also influencing, 
if not preordaining, Loretta's outcome was the Court's hostility to the entitlement granted 
Teleprompter by § 828 to exercise "complete dominion," id. at 31 76, over the landlord's 
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well have sealed its fate in an earlier day. Second, its status under the 
permanent/temporary pairing is problem atic: the C�urt's decisions 
over the last century ascribe no less than fou r  connotations, each with 
different juridical consequences to the distinction, 1 76 and Loretto fails 
to indicate which one or group of these connotations it intends in 
applying the distinction to section 828 . 177 Of greatest import, how­
ever, is the final conclusion : whether section 828 ran afoul of three or 
all four of the distinctions is largely beside the point today. Whatever 
force they might once have had to control the takings outcome on a 
per se basis is now spent . 1 78 
It is useful to differentiate between the first three distinctions and 
the fourth . A group o f  the Cou rt's modern opinions, w hich Loretto 
endorses, 1 79 categorically establish that intrusions "violating" the 
former distinctions are n ot per se takings .  The intrusions litigated in 
these cases, however, featured repeated entries by persons 180 who did 
not also deposit their p roperty on the burdened owner's property as 
did the cable company in Loretto. Thus I have characterized the 
section 828 intrusion as a continuing (rather than intermittent) tres­
pass by object (rather than person) . 18 1  Ultim ately, therefore, Loretto 
resolves itself into what m ight be called the "bread box" issue: 182 
whether a continuing, but minor, trespass by object should be gov­
erned by a per se rule. 
"property" by locating its own "property''-again physically characterized a� Teleprompter's 
cable equipment-on that property. See text accompa nyin� notes 193-204 infra: see also text 
accompanying notes 258-60, 280-304 infra . 
176 See text accompanying notes 278-82, 321 -55 infra. 
177 The only generalization I dare venture from the Court's indiscriminate use of the labels 
"permanent" and "temporary" is that an intrusion is "permanent" for Lorefto's purposes if it is of 
�ndefinite duration, redistributes some interest in real property, and takes the form of a continu­
mg trespass by object. Policy- and precedent-based anomalies posed by this generalization are 
recounted in text accompanying notes 366-72 infra. 
1 78 See text accompanying notes 356-72 infra. 
17� Representative opinions from this group include, e.g. , PruneYard Shopping Center v. 
�obms, 447 u._s. 74 (1980) (conflict between access rights of political petitioners and exclusion 
�ights of shoppmg center o':"ner) (discussed in 102 S.  Ct. at 3175) ; Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 
44 U.� . 1 64 (1�79) (conflict between public access rights under navigation servitude doctrine 
and private manna developer's exclusion rights) (discussed in 102 S.  Ct. at 3175); Hudgens v. 
NLRB, 4�4 U.S. �07 �1976) (conflict between nonemployee union organizers' access rights and 
employers exclusion nghts) (noted i n  102 S. Ct. at 31 75 n. 1 1) 180 See note 179 supra. 
· 
181 See text accompanying notes 347-55 infra 182 The term deriv fr h 
' 
. 
· 
.. 
d d 
es om t e Court s assertion that whether the installation is a taking does 
���
t
�1:n
3 1 
�� :�:�her the volume of space it occupies is bigger than a bread box." Loretto, 102 
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Contrary to the Court's indiscriminate claims 183 regarding the 
protection afforded by its precedents to such de minimis interferences 
with property, there are no precedents directly on point: Loretto is a 
case of first impression . 1 84 But the Court's precedents that are closest 
in point, including virtually all of those cited in Loretto , undermine 
the bread box rule because each entails a continuing trespass by an 
object working a significant interference with the land so burdened. 185 
Rejection of the bread box rule is compelled by the thesis of this 
Article that a taking should not be declared unless an intervention is 
unfair in principle or, if fair, is unduly intrusive in relation to the 
legislative purpose in question . 1 86 A decisional standard such as the 
bread box rule which ignores an intervention's purposes and impacts 
to concentrate instead on its "physical" form alone provides no assur­
ance that either prong of this prescription will be satisfied . 
3. Due Process Considerations in Loretto: Denied Yet Applied 
Loretto's treatment of due process considerations is decidedly 
ambivalent . Their relevance is flatly denied, then seemingly con­
ceded, but ultimately rejected by reasoning which, paradoxically, is 
due process-takings based. As to the flat denial , the Court asserted 
that the statute's validity under the due process clause is a "separate 
question" from its validity under the takings clause 187 and refused to 
"address [the landlord's] contention that section 828 deprives her of 
property without due process of law . " 1 88 In addition, the Court 
spurned Teleprompter's claim that the linkage between section 828's 
goals and the use of the burdened property for rental purposes satis­
fied the use-dependency test 1 89 by asserting, "[ w ]e fail to see . . .  why 
a physical occupation of one type of property but not another type is 
any less a physical occupation ,"  190 a reply fully consistent with its 
foregoing statements . If takings are to be predicated solely on the basis 
of a physical invasion's character, such a nexus is indeed irrelevant: all 
183 Illustrative of these claims is the Court's statement that "[ w ]hen faced with a constitutional 
challenge to a permanent physical occupation of real property, this Court has invariably found a 
taking." Id. at 3171 .  
184 See text accompanying notes 350-55 infra. 
185 See id. 
186 See text accompanying notes 91-123 supra. 
187 Loretto, 102 S. Ct . at 3171 .  
188 Id. at 3179 n.20. 
189 Id. at 3178 & n . 17 . 
190 Id. at 3178. 
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"permanent physical occupations" m ust fall before the per se rule, 
however forceful their justification u nder the use-dependency test. 
But the Court's other objections to the test bring in due process 
considerations through a side door. The test. says the Court, "proves 
too m uch" because it would allow .. the government to require a 
l andlord to devote a su bstantial portion o f  his building to vending and 
washing m achines ( owned by strangers]": "it would even allow the 
government to requisition a certain n u m ber of apartments as perma­
nent government offices . ., 1 91 More broadly, the Court objected that 
the test would authorize government to restructure the common law 
allocation of property rights between landlords and tenants. "[G]ov­
ernment,"  the Court warned, .. docs not have unlimited power to 
redefine property rights . " rn2 
One m ay concede the Court's concl usions under both objections 
but deny its premise that the use-dependency test is the culprit. On the 
contrary, the Court's parade of horribles establishes the test's indis­
pensability as a principled means of averting these results. The ques­
tion the Court failed to ask in i ts only foray into what is, in fact, due 
process-takings reasoning is why our sense of justice would be shocked 
if government were to claim that, without compensation, it may 
requisition apartments at  will , or, more generally, engage in bound­
less m odification of property rights. Implicit in the Court's selection of 
hypotheticals is the sense, which I share, that, if it indiscriminately 
approved such claims, government could single out property owners 
for losses that they should not be required to bear. 
The singling out objection is forceful, however, because the prop­
erty in question may n o t  be devoted to uses that would justify an 
imposition of the type hypothesized, not because that imposition takes 
the form of a permanent physical occupation . The truly difficult issue 
posed by the section 828 i ntrusion is whether the landowner's devotion 
of her property to rental uses (and the concomitant relationships 
among herself as landlord, her tenants, and the cable television com­
pany) affords a fair basis for singling out Mrs .  Loretto (and other 
similarly situated landowners) to bear the intrusion on an uncompen­
sated basis . 193 The Court's failure to appreciate the centrality of the 
191 Id. at 3178 n. 17. 
192 Id. at 3178 (citing Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980)); see note 210 infra. 
• 193• Under the decisional model this issue would be addressed in the due process-takings mqmry. See text accompanying notes 208-20 infra. The issue of the relative intrusiveness of the § 828 imposition would ar15' e unde th d l' k' · · · . r e mo e s pure ta mgs inquiry. See text accompanymg notes 221-27 mfra As between th t · · · h · · e wo mqumes, t e view offered presently is that the due process-
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use-dependency inquiry to this issue, 1 94 or expressly to engage the 
fairness-in-principle issue that it  so starkly poses, is as distressing as the 
Court's related failure to credi t  fairness as the overriding concern of 
the takings clause. 
4. Property as Dominion 
In my judgment these omissions can best be explained by the 
Burger Court's apparent tendency to elevate property's dominion in­
terest to a status coequal with,  or even superior to, that of conven­
tional civil liberties interests . That section 828's inroads on landlords' 
dominion interest worried the Court more than the statute's restric­
tions on their economic interest is undeniable. As already noted, 195 the 
Court stressed section 828's exclusion-denying consequences over those 
relating to limitations on use and disposition. A similar emphasis is 
apparent in the Court's attitude toward the statute's exclusion-deny­
ing subsections as contrasted with its rate-regulation subsections196 
and, relatedly, in the Court's stringent posture toward measures au­
thorizing the presence of "strangers" on one's land as contrasted with 
its decidedly more tolerant attitude toward measures allocating eco­
nomic gains and losses in pursuit of valid police power goals . 197 Fi-
takings inquiry is clearly more problematic than the pure takings inquiry. See text accompanying 
notes 208-27 infra. 
1"' The Court's consideration of Teleprom pter's use-dependency contention, which the Court 
referred to as the .. broad ·use-dependency' argument," 102 S. Ct. at 3 1 78 n . 1 7, is lim ited to a 
single footnote and its accompanying paragraph in text, id. at 3178 & n . 1 7 .  
195 See text accompanying notes 161-64 supra. In stressing the dominion interest's primacy in 
Loretto, I do not mean to suggest that the Court denied that § 828 also intruded upon the 
landlord's economic interest. To the contrary, the Court explicitly cited as one basis for its 
decision the "historically-rooted expectation of compensation," 102 S. Ct. at 3 1 79, and com­
mented as well that "the right to use and obtain profit from property . . .  is clearly relevant," 
albeit not "independently sufficient to establish a taking," id. at 3176. Nor did it ignore that the 
landlord's motivation in bringing suit was to vindicate her right to charge Teleprompter an entry 
fee for the cable-occupied space atop her roof. Id. at 3170, 3177 n . 15 (landlord's testimony that 
she would be able to obtain higher selling price for building without the i nstallation);  id. at 3179 
(pre-1973 fee not necessarily a proper measure of the value of the property taken) .  
"" See 102 S .  Ct. at 3169-70. It is noteworthy that nowhere in its opinion does the Court 
object to the rent control aspect of § 828, i . e . ,  the statute's prohibition against a landlord 
charging its tenants for access to cable television. 
197 Illustrative is the Court's unreceptiveness to the claim that, as drafted, § 828 was less 
objectionable than if it had required landlords at their ow n  expense to provide cable television 
hook-ups for their tenants. See Brief for Respondents at 20, Loretto, 102 S .  Ct. 3 164 (1982). In 
the Court's judgment, this alternative would have presented a "different question . . .  since the 
landlord would own the installation. Ownership would give the landlord the rights to the 
placement, manner, use, and possibly the disposition of the installation." 102 S. Ct. at 3179 
n.19. Conceding that the landlord would be worse off economically under this alternative, the 
Court confirmed its greater solicitude for the dominion than for the economic interest by 
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nally, there is the Court's pronounced displeasure with the entitle­
ment section 828 granted to strangers to place their property (the 
cable equipment) indefinitely on the property (the cable-occupied 
space) of unconsenting landlords. 198 
Loretta's omissions and excesses also seem to be the product of the 
psychological attraction exerted by tangible property, a factor which 
has not gone unnoticed in the takings field. To Justice Holmes' earlier­
quoted observation that the visibility of  "tangible property . . .  tends 
to give a rigidity to our conception of  our rights in it that we do not 
attach to others less concretely clothed, "  199 might be added Professor 
Michelman's more recent counsel that the "psychological shock, the 
emotional protest, the symbolic threat to all property and security, 
may be expected to reach their highest pitch" in the face of the "stark 
spectacle of an alien, uninvited presence in one's territory, especially 
government . " 200 
Loretto renders the Holmes-Michelman counsel apocryphal. 
Loretta's phrase "permanent physical occupation," its absolutist per se 
reasoning and indiscriminate bread box rule, its identification of the 
property burdened by section 828 with the property taken by it, its 
anachronistic use of once vital but now tottering distinctions, its 
unwillingness to entertain seriously Teleprompter's use-dependency 
argument, and, most shocking of  all, its omission of a fairness analysis 
are only som e  of the manifestations of tangible property's mesmerizing 
powers. 
In the C ourt's view there were only two alternatives for resolving 
Loretto : the narrow per se rule and the multifactor balancing test. 
Because the Court conceived that section 828 infringed principally 
upon landlords' dominion interest, its choice of the rule was inevita­
ble: the m ultifactor balancing test is ill- attuned to dominion-related 
values . 201 At the level of principle at least, Loretto was not a simple 
case . The Court's response was dictated in part by the doctrinal 
poverty that presented it with a Robson's Choice between standards 
that either overshot (per se rule) or undershot (multifactor balancing 
test) the m ark. Within limits, m oreover, the psychological attraction 
of tangible property should not be ignored in takings determina-
asserting that "'[t)his Court has consistently affirmed that States have broad power to regulate 
housing conditions in general and the landlord-tenant relationship in particular without paying 
compensation for all economic injuries that such regulation entails." Id. at 3178. 198 102 S. Ct. at 3178-79 & n. 19. 
1 9 9  Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921); see text accompanying note 90 supra. 200 Michelman, supra note 3, at 1228. 201 See text accompanying notes 42-53 supra. 
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tions. 202 But the Court's takings jurisprudence deserves better, and the Court has �emonstrated that it can do better. The proposed decisional 
�odel den:es l a�gel� from the Court's better-reasoned takings opin­ions, as th�s Article s footnotes testify . I n  addition, the Court has largely av01ded overreacting to reasonable legislative limitations upo tangible property,203 thereby remaining faithful to Justice Holme; corrective admonition that such property, no less than intangible property, is not "exempt from the legislative modifications required from time to time i n  civilized life ."  204 
B. Loretto: Alternative Analysis Under the Decisional Model 
This section explores the territory between the per se rule and the 
multifactor balancing test by examining how Loretta's taking chal­
lenge would be evaluated under the decisional model . Its purposes are 
both negative and affirmative. Negatively, it undertakes to correct the 
Court's misconceptions of the model's use-dependency component as 
condoning government's uncompensated seizure of private office 
space205 or, more lurid still, government's boundless reconfiguration 
of property rights. 206 Affirmatively, it seeks to further illuminate the 
model's elements in a context in which the model's virtues and draw­
backs readily lend themselves to comparison with the per se rule and 
the multifactor balancing test . 
1 .  Taking Presumption 
Analysis under the model would begin with the premise that the 
principal goal of the takings clause is to insure that costs associa.ted with public projects that redistribute property rights not b� u�fa1rly 
imposed on a few for the benefit of the many, absent equa�1zat10n of 
the position of the few through compensation . A presumpt�on would 
operate that compensation is due when, from the standpom� of real 
(or personal) property law and ordinary language, property is tak�n .  
That presumption would be triggered by section 828, un
.
?er which 
affirmative easements ("property") are transferred (' "taken · ) to cable 
. I . . ''t f' for its failure to distinguish between 202 While generally critical of the physica mvaswn � . 
· 
p f . .  M ·chclman s ugaests t · om1c interest ro cs.�or ' 1 · " severe and trifling encroachments on proper Y 5 econ . 1 . k
. 
t ti .. l'!)"" of sccurit\' [ thev . ·t ts "specia ns s o 1t• � � · · · that utilitarians might approve 1t because 1 preven · · 
· h] " M' h J supra note 3 at 1 185, 1229.
 
w1s to inculcate . . . . 1c e man, • 
203 See, e .g. ,  cases cited in notes 127-29 supra. 
204 Block v. Hirsh, 256 U . S .  135 , 1 55 (1921) . 
205 See text accompanying note 1 9 1  supra. 
206 See id. 
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companies and ten a nts at the expense of landlords. Whether govern­
ment can overcom e  this presumption depends upon the answers to 
three questions: Is the redistribution fair in principle? If so, is the 
required yielding o f  the landlords' property rights greater than neces­
sary to achieve the purposes of section 828? How forceful must gov­
ernment's showing be on both counts? These inquiries correspond to 
t hose conducted, respectively,  under the model's due process-takings, 
p ure takings, and burden of proof analyses. 207 
2. Due Process- Takings Analysis 
The due process-takings inquiry would identify section 828's wel­
fare goals; its impact on landlords' economic and dominion interests, 
a n d  the values those i nterests protect; the type and use of the property 
burdened, and the legal relationships among the classes-landlords, 
tenants , and cable companies- having an interest in that property; 
a n d  the character of the property interest taken . As discussed below, 
t hese elements also enter into the determ ination of the government's 
burden of proof. 
The purpose of this abbreviated discussion is to contrast analysis 
under the decisional m o del with analysis under the Court's per se rule, 
not to draft a revised opinion for Loretto . Thus the way an inquiry 
under the decisional m o del would have w orked i n  Loretto will not be 
addressed i n  detail here. Nonetheless, it seems appropriate to observe 
that these elements present a very different picture of Loretta's indem­
nity and welfare value clash than that portrayed by the Court and to 
consider how these differences m ight affect an evaluation of section 
828 under the decisional  model . 
a. Welfare Values. In the Court's view, Loretto was a simple 
two-class affair which pitted the right of l andlords to exclude (con­
ceived of lar gely in term s  of the dominion i nterest) against the right of 
"strangers, "  the cable companies, to enter and place their "property" 
for p rofit upon landlords' "property. " 208 The due process-takings in­
quiry would suggest i nstead that section 828 benefited two other 
classes-tenants and cable service subscribers generally209-and that 
the New York legislature intentionally subordinated the interests of 
cable companies to those of tenants and cable subscribers. The statute 
regulates landlord-tena n t  rel ations by preventing landlords from ob-
207 See text accompanying notes 9 1 -140 supra 208 • See text accompanying notes 1 95-204 supra � s  . ee note 141 supra (recounting legislative history of § 828). 
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structing tenants' receipt of c able television and thereby facilitates the 
development of a medium which promises important communications 
and education benefits to tenants and to other cable subscribers state­
wide. 210 While obviously essential to this scheme, the access rights that 
section 828 grants to cable companies are but a m eans to these ends ' not ends in themselves. 
Moreover, contrary to the Court's portrayal, the class of "prop­
erty" burdened is apartment b uildings, not cable-occupied space. 2 1 1 
This class of property is unique in two ways: the manner in which 
rights, including the right to exclude outsiders, are held in it, and the 
legal relationship between the owners and occupants of the building. 
As to the first, rights of exclusion are already divided between land­
lords and tenants . Tenants hold both exclusive possessory rights to 
their apartments (which generally make up most of the building's 
interior) and nonexclusive easements to m any of the building's interior 
and exterior common spaces . Section 828 simply enlarged the non­
exclusive easements of tenants to include cable-occupied space as an 
additional appurtenance to the leaseholds of the tenants . 2 12 To charac­
terize the cable companies as "strangers" to the landlords' "property,"  
therefore, is to misunderstand the three-cornered relationship among 
landlords, tenants, and cable companies envisaged by the legislature. 
210 Id. Reinforcing this reading of the purposes and legislative history of § 828 is the explicit 
holding of Judge Meyer for the New York Court of Appeals: 
[T]he State may proscribe a trespass action by landlords generally against a cable TV 
company which places a cable and other fixtures on the roof of any landlord's building, in 
order to protect the right of tenants of rental property, who will ultimately have to pay any 
charge a landlord is permitted to collect from the cable TV company, to obtain cable TV 
service in their respeptive apartments. The bases upon which the Legislature may do so are 
its power to regulate landlord-tenant relationships and its power to encourage develop­
ment of an educational medium. 
Loretto, 53 N.Y.2d at 153, 423 N.E.2d at 335, 440 N . Y.S.2d at 858. The Supreme Court's 
invalidation of Judge Meyer's conclusion that § 828 was not enacted u�der the le�islature's 
eminent domain power in no way impeaches the authoritativeness of his mterpretahon of the 
purposes of § 828. 
211 See Loretto, 102 S. Ct. at 3176-77; see also text accompanying notes 1 70-72 supra. 
212 For applications of the appurtenance doctrine in New York, see, e.g. , Newport Assocs . ,  
Inc. v. Solow, 30 N . Y . 2d 263, 266-68, 283 N .E . 2d 600, 602, 332 N .Y.� .2d 6 1_7
,  620-21 (197�) 
(long-term lessee holding neighboring property in fee entitled, under zomng ordmance, to exploit 
and thus to destroy air space rights of leased premises), cert. denied, 4 1 0  U.S.  931 (1973); Lyon 
Beth! h E • c 253 N y  1 1 1  1 13-1 4  1 70 N.E.  512, 513 (1930) (unless lease v. e em ng g orp . ,  · · ' ' 
d · expressly provides otherwise tenant acquires right to place advertising signs on roof an exterior 
walls of building as appurte�ance to leasehold); Stahl & J aeger v · Sat�nste'.n, �3 N · Y · 196, 197' 
135 N .E. 242, 242 (1922) (Cardozo, J . )  (lease of an entire floor carnes with 1t the appurtenant 
right to exclude advertising signs from the exterior walls of that floor) . See generally 1 M
.  
F 'ed F · d L § 3 2 ( 1974)· 1 J Rasch New York Landlord & Tenant n man ne man on eases . , · ' 
lncluding
,
Summary Proceedings §§ 138-142 (2d ed. 1971 & Supp. 1983). 
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Under the legislative scheme, cable companies were acting as tenants' 
business i nvitees; 2 1 3  their access rights to the cable-occupied space 
were derivative of and subordinate to the tenants' access to this same 
space. 
b. Indemnity Values. Contrary to the Court's apparent assump· 
tion a landowner's dominion interest is not monolithic but rests on a ' 
variety of values, from those touching on privacy, personality, and 
autonomy concerns 2 14  to those closely allied to economic interests in 
p roperty. 21s Identifyin g  the values protected by the dominion interest 
that a particular taki n g  allegedly violates is crucial for the decisional 
model . Otherwise, the model cannot i ntelligibly establish how the 
dominion interest should be weighted in the indemnity-welfare bal­
a nce. Nor could the model determine how heavy the government's 
b urden of proof should be in attemptin g  to overcome the triggered 
presumption of a takin g .  
For example, t h e  dominion interest o f  a structure's owner might 
import the values suggested in William Pitt's declaration that 
[t]he poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the force of 
the Crown. It may be frail- its roof may shake, the wind may 
21 3 The entitlement of a tenant's business invitee to piggyback his access rights on those of the 
tenant is well-established in landlord-tenant law. See, e .g . ,  Federal Waste Paper Corp. v. 
Garment Center Capital, Inc . ,  268 A.D. 230, 232-33, 51  N.Y.S .2d 26, 28 (1944) (waste paper 
collectors may use freight elevators to remove waste paper at tenants• request), affd mem., 294 
N .  Y .  714, 61 N.E.2d 451 ( 1945); Eagle Spring Water Co. v. Webb & Knapp, Inc., 236 N.Y.S.2d 
266, 279-80 (Sup. Ct. 1962) ( absent lease provisions to the contrary, landlord could not prohibit 
suppliers of bottled drinking water from entering building to supply tenants). See generally l J. 
Rasch, supra note 212, § 448; 49 Am . Jur. 2d Landlord & Tenant § 200 (1970). Concededly, 
cable companies differ from typical business invitees insofar as the appurtenance to which they 
have access rights and their status as invitees are initially founded in statute, not in a private 
ordering relationship between themselves and tenants over which landlords retain significant 
veto powers. But, in modern times, virtually all facets of the landlord-tenant relationship have 
been controlled by legislatures and courts with respect to both increasing tenants' entitlements 
vis-a-vis landlords and denyin g  such veto power as landlords may have had at common law over 
these entitlements. See generally R .  Schoshinsky, American Law of Landlord and Tenant (1980). 
If anything, therefore, the statutory basis of the business invitee argument advanced on behalf of 
Teleprompter in text strengthens that argument rather than weakens it. 
214 The notion of property as safeguarding a spectrum of values that are noneconomic has 
been
_ 
i�creasin�ly recognized. In  addition to commentary on the Burger Court's solicitude for the 
dominion or liberty interest in property, see authorities cited in notes 50-51 supra, thoughtful 
t�eatment of the topic from varying perspectives includes, e .g . ,  Dunham, Property, City Plan­
ning, and Liberty, i n  Law and Land 28 (C. Haar ed. 1964) ; Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 
Stan. L .  Re;. 957 (1982) ; Reich, supra note 82; Rodgers, Bringing People Back: Toward a Com
_
prehens1v� Theory of Taking in Natural Resources Law, 10 Ecol. L.Q.  205 (1982); Note, �����. Use, Pnvate Use, and Judicial Review in Eminent Domain, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 409 
21 5  Illustrative is a value presently termed the landlord's "management interest." See text accompanying note 217 infra. 
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enter, the rain may enter-but the King of England cannot enter­
all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement .2 16  
519 
If so, then the decisional model would accord substantial weight to 
dominion interest and assign a correspondingly greater burden of 
proof to the government. 
But the values comprehe nded by the dominion interest of Pitt's 
"poorest man" in his "ruined tenement" would seem to be worlds 
apart from those involved in the dominion interest of a Manhattan 
landlord, whose apartments are rented for profit to the general public 
and, when rented , are the subject of their tenants' exclusive posses­
sion . The precise property values affected by sectio n  828, therefore, 
approach those on the economic interest side of the spectrum . In 
conventional landlord-tenant law, such values are grouped under the 
rubric of the landlord's "management interest" : the right to be free of 
undue interference from tenants or invitees of tenants in conducting 
the commercial ventures to which her building is devoted. 2 17 Just as 
Loretto showed lesser solicitude for economic interests in property, 2 18 
so the decisional model would assign such values a lesser weight and 
would ease the government's burden of proof. 
Section 828 admittedly impinges on landlords' management in­
terest by transforming cable-occupied space into a leasehold appurte­
nance and cable companies into business invitees . Furthermore, sec­
tion 828 clearly redistributes p roperty rights from landlords to tenants 
because prior to the statute's adoption landlords were able to license 
use of their property to cable companies at a significant profit.  Under 
the model's use-dependency test, section 828's status would turn prin­
cipally on the use of the landlo rds' "property" for rental purposes . The 
fairness of these consequences must thus be assessed in light of the 
legal relationship between landlords and tenants . In that regard, it 
must be noted that few relationships in this century have been subject 
to such extensive legal modifications and regulations as that between 
landlord and tenant. 219 How m uch that consideration and the policies 
upon which it is based should have influenced the Loretto Court is 
open to debate. Shockingly, the Court neglected t o  consider it at all , 
instead dismissing it with the ipse dixit that "government does not 
have unlimited power to redefine property rights ." 220 
216 15 Hansard, Parliamentary History of England (1753-1765) 1307 (1 st ed. London 1813) . 
217 See cases and authorities cited in note 213 supra. 
218 See text accompanying notes 195-204 supra. 
219 See generally R. Schoshinsky, supra note 213.  
220 102 S. Ct. at 3178. As authority for this proposition, the Loretto Court cited Webb's 
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S .  155, 164 (1980) (asserting that "a state by ipse 
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3.  Pure Takings Analysis 
If section 828 were found to be fair  in principle, 221 would the 
statute satisfy the model's pure takings analysis? The inquiry would 
ask how severely the statute encroaches upon landlords' property 
interest in view of the alternative means, if any, by which the pur­
poses of the statute could have been effectu ated. If, relative to those 
purposes, the encroachment were unduly onerous, section 828 would 
constitute a taking despite its fairness in principle; if the encroach­
ment were not unduly onerous, there would be no taking. 
The New York l egislature's assessment of the relationship be­
tween the encroachment and its purposes is reflected in a study under-
dixit may not transform private property into public property without compensation") , a case 
clearly inapposite to Loretto. The Webb Court explicitly acknowk--dged that the challenged 
measure-a statute crediting a county with the interest accruing on an interpleader fund 
deposited in its court registry, even though the county also deducted from the fund a separate 
charge for the services of the court clerk, id. at 164-65- failed to survive scrutiny under classic 
due process reasoning, let alone under takings rea�oning. The Webb Court emphasized that 
"[n]o police power ;ustification is offered for the deprivation, "  and that ''[n)either the statute nor 
[the county) suggest (sic) any reasonable basis to sustain the taking of the interest earned by the 
interpleader fund. "  Id. at 163 (emphasis added) . 
More pertinent to Loretto is PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 ( 1980), 
which addressed the validity o f  an intrusion in the form of an affirmative easement in the 
challenger's shopping center. Writing for the Prune Yard Court, Justice Rehnquist stressed that 
the fifth amendment gave the states broad latitude to "define 'property' in the first instance." Id. 
at 84. The concurring opinion of Justice Marshall, id. at 89, is difficult to square with the views 
he expressed as author of the majority opinion in Loretto. In PruneYard, Justice Marshall 
rejected the claimant's property rights-based argument, stating that his "approach would freeze 
the common law as it has been construed by the courts, perhaps at its 19th-century state of 
development . "  Id.  at 93. Justice Marshall's concern is by no means novel, having been �rted 
by the Court, as he acknowledged in Prune Yard, almost a century earlier in Munn v. Illinois, 94 
U.S. 1 13 (1887) : 
A person has no property, n o  vested interest, in any rule of the common law . . . .  Rights of 
property which have been created by the common law cannot be taken away without due 
process; but the law itself, as a rule of conduct, may be changed at the will . . .  of the 
legislature, unless prevented by constitutional limitations. Indeed, the great office of 
statutes is to remedy defects i n  the common law as they are developed, and to adapt it to 
the changes of time and circumstances. 
Id. at 1 34 .  The Court's assertion of the narrow per se rule in Loretto, therefore, clashes with its 
g
_
enera
_
I willingness to accord the legislative branch substantial latitude to refashion property 
rights m response to social and technological change. 
221 Had
_ 
the Court employed the decisional model rather than making a fetish out of "perma­
ne�t �hysical occupations," it m a y  well have found § 828 fair in principle. For example, the 
maionty opini�n states: "[O)ur holding . . .  in no way alters the analysis governing the State's po':er to require landlords to comply with building codes and provide utility connections, mailboxes, smoke detectors, fire extinguishers, and the like i n  the common area of a building." 102 �-
_
Ct.  �t 3179. The opinion also stresses that "[s)tates have broad power to regulate housing co�ditmns m general and the landlord-tenant relationship in particular without paying compen­sation for all economic injuries that such regulation entails . "  Id. at 3178.  
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taken on its behalf prior to the statute's adoption. 222 The study recom­
mended that 
legislation should make clear that landlords have no standing to 
impede the delivery of CA TV services to their tenants. Landlords 
may insist that the CATV operator (or tenant) bear the entire cost 
of the installation; that the installation conform to such reasonable 
requirements as the landlord may impose to protect the safety, 
operation or appearance of his building; and that the CA TV opera­
tor (or tenant) agree to indemnify the landlord for any damage 
incurred by the installation. Beyond this, the landlord has no legiti­
mate interest . The tenant, o n  the other hand, has as much interest 
in receiving CA TV service as he has in receiving mail, telephone 
communications, or over-the-air television signals. And landlord 
impediments to the extension of CA TV service is disadvantageous 
not only to the personal interests of tenants, but to the development 
of the CATV interest industry. 223 
Comparison of section 828 with the study's recommendations suggests 
that the study accurately represents the New York legislature's intent . 
But the legislature went beyond the study's recommendations. In 
addition to requiring that l andlords be indemnified "for any damage 
caused by the [cable equipment's] installation, operation or re­
moval," 224 the legislature provided that landlords would be entitled to 
such payments from cable companies "in exchange for permitting 
cable television service on or within [ their] property or premises" as 
the State Cable Commission "shall, by regulation, determine to be 
reasonable. "225 
On its face, section 828 would appear to be carefully tailored to 
afford maximum protection to landlords' property interest. And, 
given the Court's assessment of the encroachment-purposes relation­
ship in opinions sustaining other kinds of physical invasions, section 
828 would appear to be constitutional. 226 Nevertheless, the Court 
curtly d ismissed section 828's system of safeguards, characterizing 
222 See Jones Report, supra note 1 4 1 , at  207. 
223 Id. at 206. 
224 N.Y. Exec. Law § 828(l)(a)(iii) (McKinney 1982) . 
225 Id. § 828(l)(b).  
226 In Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U . S .  74 (1980), for example, t.he .Court 
sustained a state's decision to favor political petitioners' access rights over a landowner s
 n�ht to 
exclude. The Court was satisfied that the intrusion was not unduly onerous because [ t]�e 
d · · f th Cal 'f · s reme Court makes it clear that the PruneYard may re.�tnct ec1S10n o e 1 orma up . . . . · · I cl ner regulations that will min1m1ze any expressive activity by adopting time, P ace, an man 
. .  cl 
· · f · " 'd t 83 nd that the appellees were orderly, an mterference with its commercial unctions, 1 • a , a .. . 
· · · · · f the shopping center id. at 83-84 . they limited theu activity to the common areas o ' 
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them as "somewhat limited . " 227 I n  m y  judgment, that response masks 
the Court's fundamental position that the taking presumption is irre­
buttable in the case of permanent physical occupation, or, more 
accurately, that the takings clause states a rule i n  such instances, not a 
pres umption. 
4. Burden of Proof 
As earlier discussion indicated, the decisional model provides for 
a graduated burden of proof, keyed to the welfare and indemnity 
interests implicated by the challenged intervention and the form that 
the intervention assumes. 228 Property interests divide between eco­
nomic and dominion interests, and the dom inion interest may be 
further subdivided as ill ustrated by my contrast between Pitt's "poor 
m an" in his "ruined tenem ent'' (personality, privacy, and autonomy 
values) and the Manhattan landlord (m anagement values) .229 
As applied to section 828 , these criteria point to rejection of both 
the per se rule's i nsuperable burden and the multifactor balancing 
test's p resumption of validity in favor of an intermediate level of 
scrutiny similar to that employed in gender discrimination cases230 
and in controversies pitting first amendment values against zoning 
values . 23 1  The per s e  rule, by rendering the presumption of a taking 
irrebuttable, condemned out of hand a measure that advances power­
ful welfare values while imposing burdens that are no more onerous 
than those the Court has deemed fair in other takings contexts. Con­
trary to Loretta's reasoning, moreover, these values are not exclu­
sively, nor even prim arily, associated with securing an entrepreneur­
i al advantage for cable companies at the expense of landlords.232 
Rather,  section 828's principal beneficiaries are tenants and cable 
s ubscribers statewide:  233 the welfare values served are regulation of 
227 102 S. Ct. at 3179 n . 1 9 .  
228 See text accompanying notes 1 32-40 supra. 
229 See text accompanying notes 214-18 supra. 
230 See, e.g. , Craig v. Boren, 429 U . S .  190 (1976) ; Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 4 1 1  U.S.  677 (1 973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.  71 (1971). See generally 
Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth 
Amend�ent, 9 1  Harv. L. Rev. 1 ,  53-55 (1977) ; Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal 
�r;;��IOn Clause, and The Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 Va. L. Rev. 945, 950-53 
231 S� Schad v. Mt. Ephraim ,  452 U . S .  61 , 68-71 (1981) (requiring a "narrowly drawn" regulation furthe 
· 
"
 ff' 
· tl rmg a su 1c1en Y substantial governmental (interest]")· Costonis supra note 73, at 447-58. ' ' 
::: See text accompanying notes 1 95-204 supra. See text accompanying notes 208-1 2  supra. 
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the landlord-tenant relationship (by removing landlord impediments 
to tenant cable television access) and, more broadly, the promotion of 
a novel educational-communications medium .234 Finally,  the domin­
ion interest values affected by section 828-values associated with 
landlords' management interest and not with privacy and personality 
concerns-fell sufficiently close to the economic side of the property 
values spectrum to justify a lesser burden of proof. 23s 
At the same time section 828 warrants a level of scrutiny more 
demanding than the multifactor balancing test affords . While the 
statute did not seriously infringe upon dominion i nterests, it did impli­
cate the landlords' "psychological" interest in their tangible property .  
I have already referred to Holmes' and Michelman's delineation of 
this interest . 236 If  we are to believe social scientists, the Holmes­
Michelman observation confirms a perception of property that is  
widely and tenaciously held in our society and others . 237 Requiring 
government to make a more than minimally plausible case for the 
fairness of measures that interfere with this psychological interest is a 
proper judicial function, I believe, at least where the protection given 
to this interest is constitutionally based . 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that the Court should abandon its current 
reliance on the per se rule for "permanent physical occupations" and 
the multifactor balancing test for all other types of encroachments, 
and should rely instead on a model similar to that used to evaluate 
infringements on expression and other civil liberties. The per se rule is 
indiscriminate . In treating all encroachments alike, it overreacts to 
tangible property's psychological attraction by invalidating even triv­
ial threats to values that may relate tenuously to the core concerns of  
the dominion interest-privacy, personality, and autonomy. The 
multifactor balancing test, on the other hand, falls short of the prom­
ise represented by what Professor Michelman rightly describes as the 
"redeeming qualities" and "cores of valid insight" of the standards it  
comprehends. 238 
234 See note 210 supra. 
235 See text accompanying notes 214- 1 8  supra. 
236 See text accompanying notes 199-200 supra. 
237 See generally R. Ardrey, The Territorial Imperative: A Personal Inquiry Into the Animal 
Origins of Property and Nations (1966) (synthesizing the results of research by psychologists, 
sociologists, anthropologists, and other social scientists that substantiate the linkage asserted by 
Holmes and Michelman between tangible property and the entitlement to exclusive possession). 
238 Michelman, supra note 3, at 184. 
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I t  seems naive to me, however, to criticize the test for failing to 
predict the outcome of p articular controversies or, what might be the 
same thing, for leaving substantial play for judicial value judgments 
i n  determining these outcomes. These results are inevitable and, as 
argued above, 239 even healthy incidents to any system that, like ours, 
comm its the management of the takings issue to j udges. But litigants, 
professional observers, and society as a whole deserve assurance that 
whatever value j u d gments are ultimately necessary to transform a 
debate i nto a decision p roceed from a coherent framework. This 
framework should identify and categorize the competing values; iden­
tify the preferred val ues to resolve the fairness in principle (due proc­
ess-takings) and permissible severity (pure takings) inquiries; and, to 
the extent that ultim ate val ue judgments are capable of defense on 
logical and policy grounds, set forth that defense. The integrity of 
i ndividual takings decisions, in short, depends less on the actual out­
comes as such than o n  the consistent, even-handed application of a 
coherent decisional approach over time. As presently constituted, the 
m ultifactor balancin g  test cannot provide this assurance.240 
239 The entire decisional model assumes the importance of and necessity for judicial value 
choices. See text accompanying notes 8 1 - 1 40 supra. 
240 At base, the multifactor balancing test is no test at all but an amalgam of standards serving 
differing, often conflicting priorities. As described by Professor Michelman, these standards 
derive from a set of further .. tests": (1)  the physical invasion test, which in its earliest version 
maintained that a broad array of physical invasions created compensable takings and which 
remains highly important as a likely index to one kind of taking, Michelman, supra note 3, at 
1 184-90; (2) the diminution of value test, which measures th� severity of a private owner's 
economic loss, id. at 1190-93; (3) the social gain/private loss test, which balances the public good 
promoted by a governmental regulation against the individual harm it causes, id. at I I93-96; (4) 
the private fault/public benefit test, which asks whether a regulation merely restrains harmful 
private conduct or expropriates private property for positive public enrichment, id. at 1196-
1 201; and (5) the enterprise/arbitration test, which contrasts noncompensable regulation of 
p�operty by government as arbiter i n  conflicts over the constant redefinition of property rights 
with compensable takings of property by government as public entrepreneur and participant in 
commerce, id. at 1200-01 . See the Court's subsequent explanation of these tests in Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co_ v. New York City, 438 U,S_  1 04 (1978). There the Court identified the following 
f�ct�rs � elei:nents of a balancin.g test to determine whether a "taking" has occurred: 0! 
a 
P ysical mvas10n by government, id. at 124; (2) severe economic impact by governmental action 
on the ;alue of the claimant's property, id. at 125; (3) the relation between the social value of 3 
re�ulation and the private losses it imposes, id. at 125-26; and (4) the acquisition of resources for 
umquely public functions, id. at 128. 
Th� diminution in value standard, however, may function at cross purposes with the social 
good/private loss and private fault/public benefit standards because the latter two apparently 
would permit government to · · · · h impose serious economic damage on property owners despite t e su
h
pp�sed. pro�ibition of the former standard. Likewise, as Loretto pointedly ill�strates, the P ys1cal mvas10n standard ma b t dds · h h · · · · all 
f t h  
Y e a 0 wit t e d1mmution m value standard. Moreover, 0 
d
ese 
.
tests may clash with the enterprise/ arbitration standard which in the view of its leading aca emic proponent a 
' 
h 
_ ' pproves as noncompensable exercises of the police power both regulatory measures t at strip land of 'ts . I 1 economic va ue, Sax, supra note 4 1 ,  at 63, and physical intrusions, 
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Tr�nsition to the proposed decisional model will require changes 
of termmology and of substance in the Court's takings j urisprudence. 
Although the Court has already poured great quantities of the model's 
new wine into the vintage bottles of that jurisprudence, a variety of 
issues await original development or further clarification. The Court 
should examine, for example, the relationship between use-depen­
dency considerations and what might be called the expectation factor, 
that is, the assumption that, independent of their use-dependent char­
acteristics, particular classes of property will be liable to uncompen­
sated intervention in the future because they have been subject to such 
intervention in the past. If presented as an original question, for 
example, it is dubious whether the compensation immunity govern­
ment enjoys under the navigation servitude doctrine should be sus­
tained i nsofar as that doctrin e  proceeds solely on the basis of burdened 
land's location-contingent rather than its use-dependent characteris­
tics. 241 Should a takings jurisprudence relying on the proposed deci­
sional model abruptly termi n ate, whittle away at, or grandfather in,  
that immunity? 242 
The model's burden of proof element should be aligned with its 
counterpart in civil liberties litigation generally. Due allowance must 
be made in that effort for the bifurcation between property's eco­
nomic and dominion interest as well as for other considerations 
unique to takings litigation . Further refinement of the analysis of the 
dominion interest is needed ,  moreover, to avoid Loretta's error of 
confusing the dominion interest's personal autonomy values with its 
entrepreneurial autonomy values . 
Bifurcation of property's economic and dominion interests also 
necessitates reevaluation of the premise that (mo netary) "compensa­
tion" will always be "just" for takings injuries . Precisely how does 
government compensate for the loss in personal autonomy suffered by 
Pitt's "poor man," or, for t h at m atter, the loss of entrepreneurial 
autonomy suffered by Mrs. Loretto? The plaint of the first, as pre-
id. at 67. Moreover, these difficulties do not disappear when these criteria are combined under 
the rubric "multifactor balancing test . "  Yet the Court took precisely that path in Penn Central, 
its most elaborate effort to date to explain  the multifactor balancing test. Indeed, the Court cited 
both Michelman and Sax, see 438 U.S. at 128, without acknowledging the fundamental conflicts 
dividing these authors. 
241 See note 1 1 1  and text accompanying notes 1 10- 13 supra. 
242 The abrupt termination option is advocated by Brady, supra note 1 1 1 ;  the whittling away 
option is employed by Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 ( 1 979) (discussed in note 304 
infra) ; and the grandfathering-in option is exemplified by United States v. Rands, 398 U.S. 121 
(1967) (holding that value attributable to location of riparian land m ay be disregarded in fixing 
condemnation award). 
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sented by Pitt,  and of the second, as characterized by the Loretto 
Court, is not that they can no longer charge the King or cable com. 
panies an entry fee .  It is that these .. intruders" have "physically in­
vaded" the autonomous domains of their victims, inflicting an injury 
more akin to the forced quartering of troops than to deprivation of the 
opportunity to sell tickets to the domain within .  Should the Court 
respond by borrowing the Calabresi-Melamed distinction between 
property and liability rules, 243 sanctioning the first injury by prohibit­
ing the intervention even if govern m e11t ;ustifies it as an eminent 
domain exercise, while reserving for the second injury the lesser sanc­
tion of payment i n  the form of .. just compensation"? Or is the domin­
ion interest sufficiently protected if the Court threatens to force gov­
ernment to pursue the eminent domain route more frequently by 
intensifying judicial scrutiny of measures infringing on that inter­
est? 244 
Finally, doctrinal elaboration of the use-dependency standard 
will remain a central concern of takings jurisprudence. But my expec­
tation that a permanent or definitive form ulation of the standard will 
be found is of a m ore modest and pluralistic order than that of 
commentators who suggest that the takings issue can be resolved by 
some "comprehensive view" or unifying substantive standard.245 Con-
243 See Calabresi and Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules. and Inalienability: One View 
of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1 089, 1092 ( l  972) (suggesting that property rules apply when 
the holder of an entitlement must be paid in a voluntary transaction to transfer the entitlement, 
and that liability rules apply when someone may destroy the entitlement if he is willing to pay an 
objectively determined value for it) . 
244 The effectiveness of this threat should not be underestimated. Consider, for example, the 
quandary presented for Teleprompter and cable television companies generally by the Court's 
determination that § 828 effected a taking. Machinery must now be developed and back· 
compensation payments provided for literally thousands of apartment building owners. The 
period covered by the payments will probably have to encompass at least that between enact­
ment of § 828 in 1974 and the date of the Supreme Court's decision in Loretto. Cf. San Diego 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S .  621 ,  653 (1981) (Brennan, ] . ,  dissenting) 
(suggesting that the remedy for a measure effecting an uncompensated taking is compensation 
�alculated on the premise that the measure took a temporary easement lasting from the date of 
its enactment to the date of its judicial i nvalidation) . If the cable companies wish to continue 
these eas�ments indefinitely, moreover, the courts must fix additional compensation. Some of the 
extraordinary complexities created by these requirements are detailed in the latest New York 
Court of Ap al · 
· 
· 
h L TV pe s opm10n m t e oretto saga. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA 
C�:;· ·  58 N_.Y.2d 143, 446 N . E . 2d 428, 459 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1983). 
. As defmed by Professor Ackerman, see B. Ackerman,  Private Property and the Constitu· ho� l l (1977), the function of a "comprehensive view" is to "provide a set of standards by which 
policymakers may determine the proper content of legal rules and evaluate the performance of the legal system as a wh l " Ill · f . o e. ustrahve o the sweeping standards-which may or may not satisfy Professer Ackerm ' "t · h · · . an s en enon-t at are found in the literature are those requmng compensation for all marketplace losses other than those resulting from public regulation of 
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trary to these commentators, I believe that each age must address the 
taking issue anew because perceptions of use-dependency, like those of 
the concept of property itself, are closely bound up with the age's 
overall political and social currents . Stasis cannot be anticipated­
indeed, it would be stifling-if, as Professor Philbrick has advised, 
property has "varied infinitely in character and content from century 
to century and from place to place, "246 and "[ c ]hanging culture causes 
"harmful" land uses, see Dunham, supra note 214;  or for losses imposed when government acts 
in its "entrepreneurial'' capacity, see Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights. 81 Yale 
L.J. 149 (1971). My difficulties with such approaches can only be hinted at here. I am distressed . 
for example, that while these authors revile the Court for the imprecision and unprt•dictabilit,· of 
its takings jurisprudence, they advance prescriptions that promise no im pro,·cment at all .  
Illustrative is Professor Ackerman's use of Professor Michelman·s utilitarian schemt· inrnking the 
concepts of "efficiency gains," "demoralization costs, ·· and "settlement cmts . .. Michelman . .  supra 
note 3, at 1214-18, to which Professor Ackerman adds a further distinction hl'l\\'l'Cll what he 
terms the "Appeal to General Uncertainty" and the ''Appeal to Citizen Oisa ffcction . .. B. Acker­
man, supra, at 44-54. With these verbal tools, he undertakes to con.strnct a series of dl'cisional 
models that, he argues, might usefully be applied by the courts in takings controH·rsics. Sci· id . at 
71-112. I am totally unpersuaded that concepts so abstract. ambiguous. and resistant to 1·111piri­
cal testing as those Professor Ackerman espouses could significantly increase either the preci.sion 
of the Court's present takings jurisprudence or its predictability of result. :\o more plausihlc to 
me is Professor Ackerman's optimism over the institutional capacity or disposition of j ud�t'.s to 
employ such models. Concerns similar to mine, I suspect, account for Professor \fichclman 's 
caveat at the outset of his essay that "[i]t is debatable whether what follows is an t•ssay i n  
constitutional law," Michelman, supra note 3, at  1 166, and for his recommendation that th<' 
judiciary play a diminished role in the formulation and administration of compensation pol in . 
id. at 1171 .  These concerns also figure prominently in reviews of Professor Ackerman's work h,· 
other thoughtful observers of the takings scene. See, e . g . ,  Epstein, The :\ext Generation of Legal 
Scholarship (Book Review), 30 Stan. L. Rev. 635 (1978) (reviewing B. Ackerman. Private 
Property and the Constitution (1977)); Krier & Schwartz, Talking about Takings (Book Re\iew) . 
87 Yale L . J .  1295 (1978) (same) . 
I also admit to the s�picion that, however characterized, these views are byproducts of the 
authors' particular substantive values-environmental protection and the virtues of the market­
place being among today's favorites. Professor Sax's ruminations about the takings clause. for 
example, seem largely to track his notion that "[t]he abandon with which private resource users 
have been permitted to degrade our natural resources may be attributable in large measure to 
our limited conception of property rights," Sax, supra, at 150, just as Professor Dunham's or, 
more shrilly, Professor Siegan's views of the clause reduce es.sentially to efforts to constitutional­
ize their commitment to the largely unfettered workings of the marketplace. See Dunham, supra 
note 214, at 43; B. Siegan, Land Use Without Zoning passim (1972). 
I am also disconcerted by the tendency of these commentators to approach takings jurispru­
dence with expectations of elegance, comprehensiveness, and clarity that are rarely e�countered 
in judicial opinions and scholarly comment evaluating other constitutional interests, particularly 
those protected through open-ended provisions such as the due process and equal protection 
clauses. Why these expectations are appropriate for an institution as protean as property, see text 
accompanying notes 246-47 infra, but not for these other interests, is never explained'. 
246 ��ilbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. Pa. L .  Rev. 691, 691 (1938) . 
In addition to the many examples furnished by Professor Philbrick, see Powell, The Relationship 
Between Property Rights and Civil Rights, 15 Hastings L.J. 135, 140-48 ( 1963) (cataloguing the 
range of fundamental modifications recorded in Anglo-American law since the twelfth centurv . . 
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the law to speak with  new imperatives , in\'igorates some concepts, 
devitalizes and rings to obsolescence others . . .  247 
Because these admonitions are demonstrably sound, I have been 
careful throughout this Article to distinguish the instrumental ques­
tion "How should courts manage litigation under the takings clause?" 
from the ultimate question ·'What is p roperty?" To run the two 
questions together by conditioning a response to the first upon the 
definitive resolution of the second assures the unproductive ambiva­
lence and conflict that pervade current takings commentary. 248 The 
second question appeared when human governance commenced. It 
will disappear, undoubtedly still unresolved, only when human gov­
ernance ends. 
affecting the proprietor's rights to dispose of and ust· property-- thc two "powers" of which 
property "mainly" "consists, · ·  according to Professor Powell ) .  
247 Philbrick, supra note 246, at 696. 
248 Professor Michelman's am bivalence about the relation between the two questions, for 
example, mars his classic defense of this Article's cent ral thesis. tha t fairness is the takings clause's 
overriding goal. See Michelman, supra note 3. His recognition of the questions' separability 
would seem to appear in the essay's introductory caveat that "[i]t  i.� debatable whether what 
follows is an essay in constitutional law, .. id . at 1 1 66.  since "what follows" is largely an 
exploration of the ultimate question of the content of the property concept itself through the 
combined perspectives of political science, economics, eth ics. and other extralegal disciplines, see 
id. at 1 203. Throughout the essay, however, Michelman criticizes the Court's takings opinions 
and the standards employed i n  them for failing to provide a satisfactory re�ponse to this ultimate 
question. See id . at 1183- 1 20 1 .  In running the two questions together, his criticism places beyond 
reach a coherent definition o f  the Court's role in managing takings li tigation. thereby encourag­
ing an unduly pessimistic assessment of how the Court actually has been fulfilling that role. His 
confusion of the two questions also creates a disappointing response to the judicial management 
question: namely, that whatever that management role may be, it should be deemphasized in 
favor of an enlarged legislative role. Id. at 1245-57. I certainly agree that legislatures should 
assume greater responsibility i n  this area and have written extensively over the last decade on the 
topic of incentive zoning to persuade them to do so. See, e.g. , ·  J .  Costonis, Space Adrift: 
Landmark Preservation and the M arketplace (1974) (discussing the transfer of development 
rights, a legislatively-implemented device for compensating landowners for losses resulting from 
land use restrictions) ; Costonis, supra note 68 (same) . But it is unavoidable that under state and 
federal constitutions, takings cases are brought before and m ust be decided by judges. 
Michelman's ambivalence does not appear in the work of Ackerman and other adherents to 
the comprehensive view or u nifying substantive standard approach. See note 245 supra. For 
�hem, 
_
the Cour
.
t's role
.
as manager of the takings clause should be measured by the Court's success 
1� sta�ng and, m particular controversies, implementing, whatever "comprehensive" or substan­
tive view they hold of property. Some of my concerns with this premise are expressed in note 245 
sup�a-_ � preci�el� opposite approach has been adopted by commentators who despair of the 
feas�bibty of lmkmg the judicial role to such ultimate considerations. See Humbach, Book Review, 39 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 793 (reviewing B . Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution 
< 1977>>: Stoebuck, Police Power, supra note 1 ,  at 1073, 1 075-79. These commentators take refuge m the rule-oriented const t' f th k' · · · 1 c . . rue 10n o e ta mgs clause and advocate a posit1v1stic ro e 1or the Court limited to a clo el t t d · · · . . s Y ex ure mterpretat10n of the language of the takings clause, m particular its terms "property" and "taking . "  See note 31 supra. 
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APPENDIX 
"Permanent Physical Occupations" Versus "Temporary 
Invasions": A Distinction Without a Difference 
529 
Elsewhere in this Article I contend that the use of the rule­
oriented distinctions in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV 
Corp. 249 is so anachronistic that the opinion can only be characterized 
as aberrational. This Appendix is designed to substantiate my conten­
tion through a three-phase discussion . First, it sets the analytical stage 
with a discussion of a remarkable nineteenth century New Hampshire 
Supreme Court opinion, Eaton v. B. C. & M. R .  R . , 250 which portrays 
the distinctions i n  relation to, and often in open disagreement with, 
the prevailing views of its time. The Appendix then chronicles the 
Supreme Court's development of the distinctions in the century fol­
lowing Eaton, concluding that, in general, the Court h as come to 
share Eaton's skepticism of the distinctions' supposed conclusive force 
in the takings field, and that in certain key respects it has even 
magnified that skepticism . My claim that Loretto is aberrational is 
addressed directly in the concluding section of this Appendix by expos­
ing the gap that divides these intervening trends from the Court's 
retrograde use of the distinctions in Loretto . 
A. The Distinctions in Eaton 
As in so many cases of the period, the physical invasion in Eaton 
was of the location-contingent, not the use-dependent, variety. It 
featured damages to a farmer's land located along the path of a 
railroad authorized by statute to construct its tracks on determined 
249 102 S. Ct. 3164 ( 1 982); see text accompanying notes 141-204 supra. 
2w 51 N.H. 504 (1872) . The court was interpreting the state constitution, which did not have a 
takings clause identical to that of the federal Constitution, but the difference is immaterial for 
our purposes: "[a]lthough the constitution of this State does not contain, in any one clause, an 
express provision requiring compensation to be made when private property is taken for public 
uses, yet it has been construed by the courts, in view of the spirit and tenor of the whole 
instrument, as prohibiting such taking without compensation . . . .  " Id. at 510- 1 1 .  
The opinion is remarkable not only as a period piece but, as detailed in the text following 
note 282 infra, as a harbinger of the Supreme Court's eventual treatment of the distinctions. 
Written by Justice Jeremiah Smith, later a member of the Harvard Law School faculty, the 
opinion has been widely noted and praised. Professor Corm ack, for example, described the 
lengthy opinion as being "as able as it is long, and, . . .  perhaps the best known and most 
influential of those written by [Justice Smith]," Cormack, supra note 56, at 238; Professor Beale 
lauded it as a "masterly essay on the nature of property . . .  and the meaning of a 'taking' by 
eminent domain . . .  [which] established the law as it is generally held to-day upon an impreg­
nable basis." Beale, Jeremiah Smith, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 1 ,  2 (1921) .  
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rights of way. While building its tracks, the railroad removed a 
natural flood barrier from a p arcel adjacent to the farm, causing 
intermittent flooding of the far m . The railroad's defense against the 
farmer's taking claim evidently was premised on the four distinctions 
that, consistent with the development ethic of the times, were widely 
used to bar or impede recovery against location-contingent interven-
tions. 
The railroad argued that "property" is only corporeal, a thing 
that must be "physically invaded" before it is taken.251 Since the 
excavation that caused the flooding w as done on an adjacent parcel, 
the farm was not directly invaded . 252 The intermittent floods, more­
over, were "temporary," not "permanent" invasions, and hence could 
not constitute a taking because the farmer was not "permanently 
ousted" from his farm . 253 In addition, his conceded losses were not 
compensable as takings, but were merely the "consequential damage" 
of a statutorily authorized project conducted in a non-negligent man­
ner. 254 Finally, while the railroad "destroyed" the farmer's use of the 
flooded portion of the farm, it neither acquired formal fee title to it, 
nor ·'appropriated" it to its own use since its purpose in breaching the 
barrier w as to construct its tracks, not to conduct " 'the [flood] water 
in a given course' on to the plaintiff's land. "255 
In his opinion for the court, Justice Smith employed two stan­
dards to evaluate the preceding distinctions. The first standard was 
the familiar j ust share principle which, in his formulation, provides 
' '[p ]roperty taken for public use from one or more individuals only, 
by right of eminent domain, is taken not as his or their share of an 
apportioned public burthen, but as something distinct from and 
more than his or their share of the p ublic burthens, and therefore 
the justice and necessity of a constitutional provision for compensa­
tion . "  256 
Matched to the j ust share principle was Justice Smith's second deci­
sional criterion: "The real substance of the injury, not its technical 
name in legal phraseology, is the criterion whereby to determine 
whether it falls within the constitutional restriction. "257 
In dismissing the railroad's argu�ent that compensation is due 
only for direct intrusions on corporeal resources, J ustice Smith re-
2" Eaton, 5 1  N . H .  at 511-12. 
252 Id. at 5 13-14. 
2�' Id. at 5 1 1 ,  525. 
2" Id. at 5 10, 513, 519-21. 
'" Id. at 512, 513. 
"'0 Id. at 519 (quoting Booth v. Town of Woodbury, 32 Conn. 1 18, 130 (1864)). 
2" Id. at 526. 
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jected the view that property merits greater protection when con­
ceived of as a physical resource rather than as a relationship between 
an "owner" and a resource, physical or otherw ise. " [A]lthough in 
common parlance [the term is]  frequently applied to a tract of land 
. . .  ," he reasoned, "in its legal signification [it]  'means only the 
rights of the owner in relation to it , '  " and, in particular, "the right 
. . .  to possess, use, enjoy, and dispose of [land] ."25s 
The implications of Smith's proposition are that the resource 
underlying a property relationship m ay be corporeal (land) or noncor­
poreal (a  right t o  use a parcel owned by another) and that public acts 
may effect a taking of either type of property relationship . Govern­
ment's flooding of A's land m ay take a fee or less-than-fee interest i n  
it; its flooding of the adjacen t  parcel may destroy the benefit of an 
easement held by A in that p arcel. 259 A precise examination of the act 
in question is therefore necessary to determine both the quantum of 
the property interest taken by the act and the p arcel or parcels to 
which the property interest p ertains . Although this analysis may seem 
obvious to modern eyes, it w as not when Eaton w as decided . Courts 
then often used the terms "physical" and "invasion" to deny compen­
sation in two circumstances, both present in Eaton : first , when the 
challenged act occurred on a p arcel other than A's parcel (the natural 
barrier cut by the railroad was located on a parcel adj acent to the 
plaintiff's farm) , and second, when the property interest taken fell 
short of a full fee interest ( i ntermittent flooding of a portion of the 
plaintiff's farm was the equivalent of the taking of an affirmative 
easement,  not of a fee) . 260 
Justice Smith also questioned the uncritical manner in which 
contemporary courts employed the direct/consequential damage dis­
tinction. Imprecision in the use of the phrase " 'consequential dam­
age,' " he observed, had " 'introduce[ d] an equivocation which is fatal 
to any hope of a clear settlement. '  "26 1 Its use to deny compensation is 
appropriate, he stressed, only when it connotes losses suffered as a 
result of governmental acts that, h ad they been the acts of a private 
party, would not have given rise to a cause of action between those 
private parties. 262 But if these acts would have done so, "there seems 
no good reason for establishing an arbitrary rule that such damage can 
258 Id. at 511 (quoting Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 433 (1856) ) .  
259 I d .  at 514-15.  
2"0 Id. at 512-15. 
261 Id. at 519. 
262 Id. at 520. 
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in no event a mount to a 'taking of property . '  "263 He curtly rejected 
the development-ethic based argument that "the building of a railroad 
is a work of great public convenience and benefit," responding that 
"(i]f the work is one of great public benefit, 'the public can afford to 
pay for it. '  "264 
Justice Smith's discussion of the direct/consequential damage dis­
tinction also highlights three additional considerations which were 
often overlooked in the last century . First, the concept was used 
principally to deny compensation in situations in which the public 
acts occurred not o n  the claimant's land, but on an adjoining parcel, 
and either denied the claimant the benefit of an easement he held on 
that parcel, such as an easement of access to an adjoining street,265 or 
transferred to government the benefit of an affirmative easement on 
the claimant's own land, such as the right to divert water over the 
plaintiff's land in Eaton. 266 Second, denying compensation in these 
instances is tantamount to holding either that an easement is not 
"property" for constitutional purposes, 267 or that government's obliga­
tions to landowners are measured by a different and lesser standard 
than are those of private parties, 268 or both . The former holding flows 
from the conception of property as a physical thing; the latter, from 
the reluctance of nineteenth century judges to hinder development 
projects by holding government or its delegates liable for private losses 
resulting from these projects . Third, m any courts that viewed the 
concepts of "consequential damage" and "compensable loss" as mutu­
ally exclusive did so only because they "blindly follow[ ed]"269 the 
English practice of the time, which was to deny compensation if the 
public project causing the damage w as authorized by statute and 
conducted in a nonnegligent manner.  This view was "error," Justice 
Smith advised , because the provision of compensation is a matter of 
constitutional right in the United States , not a function of legislative 
discretion as in England.270 
His criticism of the "destruction/ appr opriation" distinction mani­
fests similar impatience with the takings j urisprudence of his day. It 
21" Id. 
'"' Id. at Sl8 (quoting Hinchman v. Paterson Horse R . R . ,  17 N.J. Eq. (2 C . E .  Green) 75. 80 
( 1 864)). 
. 
2"' See Northern Transp. Co. , .. Cit y of Chieago. fJ9 U . S .  635 ( 1 878); note 309 infra. 
""" Eato11. SI N . H .  at 529-3 1 .  
2"' Sec i d .  a t  .5 1 4 - 1 .'5
. 
�"" See id. at .'527. 
�"'' Id. at !5 1 6. 
070 l<l. at 5 1 7 .  
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too had been used to limit compensation practice by requiring injured 
landowners to demonstrate not only that they had lost something 
("destruction") as a result of a governmental act but also that the 
government had gained something ("appropriation") . Applied m ost 
strictly, "appropriation" meant that government either acquired the 
formal fee title to private l and, or its acts effected an " 'exclusive 
appropriation,'  . . .  'a complete ouster,'  [or] an absolute or total 
conversion of property. "27 1 A somewhat less strict but still demanding 
alternative required the p roperty interest lost by the owner to be 
essentially the same as that which the government intended to gain . 212 
Justice Smith rejected the first alternative because it effectively 
rewrote the takings clause to read: "No person shall be divested of the 
formal title to property without compensation, but he may, without 
compensation, be deprived of all that makes the title v aluable ."273 He 
rejected the second alternative as well . The r ailroad company h a d  
invoked it i n  Eaton, arguin g  that i t  h a d  not taken a flowage easement 
on the plaintiff's farm because its purpose in removing the flood 
barrier was to improve the right of way for its tracks, not to conduct 
the flood " 'water in a given course' on to the plaintiffs land . "274 
Whatever the company's intent, Justice Smith replied, its act had 
"ha[ d]  that result,''275 and the company sought "(i]n effect . . .  (to] 
assert a right to discharge water on the plaintiff's land . "276 That right 
is an "easement, ''277 he concluded, and its taking must be compen­
sated . 
The final distinction a ddressed in Eaton was that between "tem­
porary" and "permanent" i nvasions.  Smith rejected the railroad's ar­
gument that intermittent acts of flooding did not constitute a taking 
because they were "tempor a ry" for two reasons . First, it confused the 
duration of the easement as an interest in real property, with the ' , 
duration of the physical acts privileged under the easement, 2
78 
wrongly assuming that intermittent interventions could not give rise 
to easements in real property. That interventions occur episodically, 
he reasoned is not determi native of whether an easement has been ' 
taken; that question depends instead upon whether these episodic 
271 Id. at 5 1 1 .  
272 See text accompanying note 255 supra. 
zn 51 N.H.  at 5 1 1 .  
274 Id. at 513. 
21s Id. 
276 Id. at 514. 
277 Id. 
21s Id. 
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interventions are likely to recur indefinitely. Since the intermittent 
flooding of the plaintiff's farm was likely to recur indefinitely, the 
servitude to which it gave rise was no less "permanent" than if the 
farm had remained under four feet of water after the initial flood. 
Justice Smith concluded that "[a J right of 'occasional flooding' is just 
as much an easement as a right of 'perm anent submerging'; it belongs 
to the class of easements which 'are by their nature interm ittent-that 
is, usable or used only at times . '  "279 
Justice Smith observed that the railroad also incorrectly assumed 
that while continuing- Le. , "permanent"-interventions could qual­
ify as invasions of an owner's real property interest, lesser-Le. , "tem­
porary" -interventions could not. 280 He conceded that interventions 
that were permanent in this sense could take interests in real property. 
But he denied that temporary interventions could never do so . They 
might, he reasoned, provided that they were more substantial than 
single-instance trespasses on land, such as those necessitated by a 
government inspection or boundary survey. Such slight, nonrecurring 
entries, he reasoned, are "technical trespass[ es] , "  imposing "merely 
nominal" dama ges and taking no interest in real property at all . 281 But 
recurring trespasses could take a real property interest in the form of a 
"permanent servitude"282 if their character warranted that conclusion. 
B. E aton's Distinctions in the Supreme Court 
Eaton presaged the dominant trends in the Supreme Court's 
treatment of the rule-oriented distinctions . The Court now recognizes 
that "property" consists of an owner's relationship to a resource, 
physical or otherwise, and that "property" for constitutional purposes 
is essentially the same as "property" under common and statutory law. 
Likewise, it has come to acknowledge that property may be "taken" 
whether it is appropriated or "merely" destroyed. 
These trends h ave not reached stasis by any means. On the 
contrary, the C ourt continues to debate them to the present day. But 
such tugging and pulling is a predictable accompaniment of the 
Court's ongoing reshaping of the takings m osaic discussed in the intro­
duction to this Article. I would venture to suggest that debate ostensi­
bly addressed to an analysis of the distinctions alone is better inter-
279 Id. (quoting J . L .  Goddard, The Law of Easements 125 (1880) ) .  280 Id. at 514-15.  
28 1  Id. at 525. 
282 Id. 
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preted as debate over what should be the ultimate design of that 
mosaic.  
1 . The Property and Consequential Damage Distinctions 
Eaton's conception of property as relation appears in a variety of 
the Court's opinions of which United States v. General Motors 
Corp. 283 is representative. General Motors clarifies that a relationship 
linking a holder to nonphysical resources is no less "property" than one 
linking the holder to physical resources: 2B4 
[i]t is conceivable that [the term "property" in the takings clause], 
was used in its vulgar and u ntech nical sense of the physical thing 
with respect to which the citizen exercises rights recognized by law. 
On the other hand, it may h ave been employed in a more accurate 
sense to denote the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation 
to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it.  In 
point of fact, the construction given the phrase [in the Court's 
interpretation of the takings clause] has been the l atter. . . .  The 
constitutional provision is addressed to every sort of interest the 
citizen may possess. 2ss 
In addition to adopting this more sophisticated concept of prop­
erty, the Court has required compensation for a variety of losses that 
would not have been compensable under a strict nineteenth century 
consequential damage standard. These losses may result from meas­
ures affecting the holder's enjoyment of his fee, benefit of his easement 
appurten ant in a parcel adjoining his fee-held land? and benefit of his 
283 323 U.S.  373 (1945) (governmental taking of a leasehold is compensable under fifth 
amendment takings clause) . 
284 The extent of the shift from property as thing to property as relation is further evidenced by 
the Court's recognition that not only can nonphysical resources be subjects of a taking, but that 
government interference with relations to physical resources will not necessarily be a taking. For 
example, i n  Block v. Hirsh, 256 U . S .  1 35 (192 1 ) ,  the Court cautioned that "[t)he fact that 
tangible property [ i . e . ,  a property relationship founded on a physical resource) is also visible" 
does not mean that it is "exempt from t h e  legislative modifications required from time to time in 
civilized life." Id . at 155. 
285 323 U.S. at 377-78 (emphasis added) (dictum because a leasehold estate can be possessed by 
the lessee, and hence is "corporeal" or "physical") . Consistent with this dictum in General 
Motors, the Court has found fifth amendment "property" in a holder's relationship to such 
nonphysical resources as easements, see, e . g . ,  Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway 
Comm'n, 294 U.S. 6 1 3  (1935) (rights of way for pipe and telephone lines); United States v. Cress, 
243 U.S. 3 1 6  ( 1917) (right to unobstructed water flow) ; United States v. Welch, 217 U.S. 333 
(1910) (right of way across land of others), franchises associated with realty, see Monongahela 
Navgn. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S .  3 1 2  (1893) (franchise to exact tolls) , and mechanics liens 
associated with personalty, see Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S.  40 (1960) (construction liens 
on boats) . 
536 
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW RE VIEW [Vol. 58:465 
easement in gross in another's p arcel . Under the first category, the 
Court has refused to apply the consequential damage standard to 
affirmative encroachments that effectively destroy the holder's enjoy­
ment of his fee286 or that transfer an affirmative easement in that fee 
to government. 281 The Court also appears t? .h.ave r�;ognized ,,
a
. 
fee 
owner's right to be free of nuisance-type achv1hes as property m a  
decision requiring compensation for "special and peculiar" damages 
suffered by a landowner as a result of the operation of a railroad 
nearby. 2s8 Finally, the Court h as suggested that it may be ready to 
view even publicly-imposed negative easements as takings if the re­
strictions essentially destroy the economic value of the holder's fee.289 
Decisions within the second category are exemplified by those holding 
government's destruction of a fee owner's right of way on adjoining 
land compensable; 290 those within the third, by an opinion requiring 
compensation for interference with a utility company's pipeline right 
of way. 291 
286 See United States v.  Lynah, 188 U . S .  445 (1903) (flooding caused by governmentally 
authorized navigation project totally destroyed economic value of private land); Pumpelly v. 
Green Bay Co . ,  80 U . S .  (13 Wall . )  166 (1871)  (same). 
287 See, e .g . ,  Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U . S .  84 (1962) (overflight easement); United 
States v. Causby, 328 U . S .  256 (1946) (same) ; United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 329 (1917) 
(flowage easement). 
288 Richards v.  Washington Terminal C o . ,  233 U . S .  546, 553 (1914) .  One commentator has 
labeled such takings "condemnation by nuisance." See Stoebuck, Condemnation by Nuisance: 
The Airport Cases in Retrospect and Prospect, 7 1  Dick. L. Rev. 207, 208-09 (1967) . 
289 See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v .  City of San Diego, 450 U.S.  62 1 ,  633 (1981) (while the 
Court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the case because the lower courts had not entered final 
judgments on remedies, it stated that "the federal constitutional aspects of (the entitlement to a 
monetary remedy for loss of value because of an open-zoning regulation] are not to be cast aside 
lightly. · · . " ) ;  Agins v.  Tiburon, 447 U . S .  255, 260 (1980) (while the enactment of a zoning 
amendment reducing the permissible density of an affected parcel is not a taking, the application 
of such a law which "denies an owner economically viable use of his land" may be) ; Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U . S .  104, 138 & n.36 (1978) (landmarks law restricting 
modification of building not a taking provided law permits a "reasonable beneficial use of the 
landmark site") ·  Important qualifications respecting this broadly stated view are set forth in text 
accompanying notes 125-26 and note 126 supra. 
290 Unit:d St�tes v. Cress, 243 U . S .  316,  329 (1917) (government flooding destroyed adjacent 
landowner s aff1rmative easement over flooded parcel); United States v .  Welch, 217 U.S. 333, 
339 (1910) (same) . 
29 1 Panl�an�le E. Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 294 U.S.  613 (1935) (government 
o:dered pipehne company to modify placement of its pipes to conform to plans for public 
highway proiect) . 
. 
Pennsy
_
l�ania Coal C o .  v. Mahon, 260 U . S .  393 (1922), the most controversial of the Court's 
taki�gs �ec1s10ns, was a physical invasion rather than a regulatory takings case if viewed as a 
depnvat�o� of the benefit of an easement in gross in another's property. The Court there held 
that a mmmg ban adopted to prevent the collapse of superjacent houses was a taking where prior 
to the enactment of the statute, a mining company had reserved the right to mine coal under the 
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Decisions in these three categories also validate Eaton's insi ht that the "real substance of the injury" is the proper criterion 1or determining whether a physical invasion is compensable . The Court's flooding and overflight cases, for example, scrutinize the actual im­pacts of the challenged public acts to determine if they are substantial enough to c
_
onstitute a taking at all, and, if so, to establish the quan­tum of the mterest taken . When takings of either fee or less-than-fee interests have been found, the injury has been deemed substantial indeed. In Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co . 292 and United States v. 
plaintiffs property or under p u blic property . Some commentators treat the case as a regul atory 
taking by attaching the "regulatory" label to all measures that are negative in form, as the 
mining ban certainly was, and by applying conventional analysis. See, e.g. , F. Bosselman, D. 
Callies & J. Banta, supra note 1,  at 133-36, 238; Stoebuck, Police Power, supra note 1 ,  at 1062-
63. This reasoning, however, ignores that the character of both the property burdened and the 
property taken must be examined to determine whether the government action is a regulatory 
taking or a physical invasion. In true regulatory takings cases, such as Penn Cent. Transp. Co.  v .  
New York City, 438 U . S .  104 (1978) ; Andrus v .  Allard, 444 U.S.  51 (1979), the property 
burdened is the claimant's fee (or its equ ivalent in personalty) and the property taken is a less­
than-fee interest in it, usually a negative easement precluding some spectrum of the burdened 
property's possible uses. The question posed in these cases is whether the value of the residual uses 
that are not prohibited by government restrictions adds up to a ''reasonable beneficial" or 
"economically viable" use of the property burdened. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York 
City, 438 U.S.  104, 138 & n . 36 (1978) (government restrictions ''permit reasonable beneficial use 
of the landmark site"; if restriction operates so that landmark site ceases to be "economically 
viable," burdened property owner may obtain relief) ; cf. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U . S .  5 1 ,  66 
(1979) (government restriction does not necessarily restrict owner's ability "to derive economic 
benefit" from its burdened property) . 
In Pennsylvania Coal, however, the majority of the Court viewed the property bmdened 
and the property taken as the same-that is, either as the company's affirmative casement or, 
perhaps, profit a prendre to mine coal below the homeowner's fee. Justice Brandl·is disa!-!reed, 
denying that the statute effectively thwarted the enjoyment of the company's casl.·men t .  I le 
reasoned that "[f]or aught that appears the value of the coal kept in place by the restnd10'.1 may 
be negligible as compared with the value of the . . .  [coal] which may he extrac·tl·d despite the 
statute." 260 U.S. at 419 (Brandeis, J . ,  dissenting) . Neverthcles.�. the Court conclucll'd t ha t  th<' 
government's mining ban totally  trumped the company's affirmative easenwnt · Sii.(lllfl('alltly · �he 
Court suggested in a later case that Pennsylvania Coal was not a rq�ulatory ta kuq.�s l'aw . . 
st
.
al l'.�!-! 
that "[i)t should be emphasized that in Pennsylva11ia Coal thl' loss of ..  profit opportu
'.llt� v. as 
accompanied by a physical restriction against the removal <�f the coal. Andr'.is �". �!��rd.'. 4�� 
U.S. 51, 66 n.22 (1979) (emphasis added) . Under the anal�:s1s offrml hm'. tlu tit ��tiH. rl ..�tr�c.: 
tion was "physical" in the sense that it extinguished an aff1rmatl\T .. as ... 111t·nt · " lult tll( . 
restr�c 
t. · 1 k' I 'mpinge on a landowner's let· 1 11 tt-res t .  lt'avm� h1111 10ns m true regu atory ta mgs cases mere Y 1 . . 
f · d h f 't . d to use it i n  wavs not pn•tfodt·d hy t lw n·stnchon
. ree to possess 1t to exclu e ot ers rom 1 , an · · 
1 . A dd. · ' 1 f f · · the tcndcncv of co1 1 1 1 n t·11 t a t 1 1rs to t·q11a
t1 ·  r•·J:ll ator� n a 1tlona source o con us1on is · · . . . 't' k < "t . · I "" l' s 1 ()4 C t T . ' J  ( 0 ,. ;\t•\\ or .1 \ ,  ,,,  1 . . . • measures with those diminishing, see Penn en · ransJ · .' · · . ,  . & Fl . . 
( . ; ,. Citv of San 130-31 (1978) h t· 11 eliminatin!-!. see Sau Dit•!-!0 ( .as · 1 < · .  " · · • . ' or, per aps, to a y J d '  t 'n") thl' 1nofi t al> i l i t\· of a privat•· n·sn11rc:t.' . Diego, 450 U.S. 621 ,  653 ( 1 9 8 1 )  (Brennan. . .  1ssen 1 ,... · . 
, · . . . . . . . . . , J t a ·  i ndicatt·d 1 11 I 1 1 1 1 1 1u lh ' .  < . rt t II Ba� Co . .  But physical invasions can produce the same rcsu · s . . 
. . . · 
80 U.S. (13 Wall. )  166, 1 77 ( 1 8 7 1 ) ,  and in Pe11mylva n w  C oal its• I L  
292 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)  1 66 ( 1 87 1 ) .  
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Lynah, 293 the Court declared that takings had occurred because gov­
ernment-authorized floodin g  caused "almost complete destruction of 
the [land's] value" in the first,294 and rendered the land in the second 
an "irreclaimable bog, . . .  deprived of all value. "295 Flooding cases in 
which only easements are taken are governed by the United States v. 
Cress296 standard that "it is the character of the invasion, not the 
amount of damage resulting from it, so long as the damage is substan­
tial, that determines the question whether it is a taking. "297 Overflight 
cases are governed by the s ame standard. The flights in Causby v. 
United States298 caused the "destruction of the use of [the land] as a 
commercial chicken farm , "299 and those in Griggs v. Allegheny 
County300 so injured the l andowners' enjoyment of their homes as 
"eventu ally [to cause] their removal therefrom as undesirable and 
unbearable for residential use. "301 
The Court's unwillingness to invalidate even very substantial 
physical invasions further buttresses the "real substance of the injury" 
standard . These invasions include encroachments on the l andowner's 
right to exclude based upon rental housing, 302 labor relations, 303 and a 
293 188 U . S .  445 (1903) . 
294 Pumpelly, 80 U.S.  (13 Wall . )  at 177. 
295 Lynah, 188 U . S .  at 468-69. 
29a 243 U . S .  316 (1917) .  
297 Id. a t  328 (emphasis added) . 
298 328 U . S .  256 (1946). 
299 Id. at 259. 
300 369 U . S .  84 ( 1962) . 
301 Id. at 87. 
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U . S .  393 (1922), and Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 
U.S.  164 (1979), emphasize that substantial injury has been an element of takings in contexts 
other than governmental overflights or flooding. In Pennsylvania Coal, the Court's finding of a 
taking was predicated largely on Justice Holmes' observation that "to make it commercially 
impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as 
appropriating or destroying it. "  260 U . S .  at 414.  The Court found a taking in Kaiser Aetna in the 
government's attempt to require a developer to allow public access to his marina because it 
interfered significantly with his "investment-backed expectations," 444 U.S. at 175, by threaten­
ing to transform his private marina into a "public aquatic park," id. at 169. 302 Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921) ;  Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 
(1921) .  In these cases, the Court sustained emergency rent control measures that prohibited 
landlords from recovering possession of  the premises occupied by their tenants under expired 
leases as long as the tenants continued to perform their obligations under the leases. Justice 
'."1cKenna 
.
�oted in dissent in Block that the controls "withdraw the dominion of property from 
its owner, 256 U . S .  at 161, and analogized the landlord's right to recover possession to the right 
granted l
.
andowner
.
s under the third amendment to prevent the quartering of troops in their 
houses without their coment, id. at 1 65 .  
303 See <;:en
.
tral Hardware Co. v. NLRB , 407 U . S .  539 (1972) (acknowledging limitations on 
th� owner s nght to exclude uninvited, nonemployee labor organizers); NLRB v. Babcock & 
Wilcox C o . ,  351 U . S .  105 (1956) (same) . 
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miscellany of health, safety, and wartime concerns viewed by the 
Court as falling under the umbrella of public necessity .304 
Additional inroads upon the direct/consequential damage dis­
tinction can be summarized briefly. Consistent with Eaton, the Court 
has viewed the English application of this distinction as inappropriate 
in the United States, expressing its disapproval of  the readiness of 
American courts to follow "[t]he doctrine of the English cases . . .  , 
sometimes with scant regard for distinctions growing out of the consti-
The decisions of the Supreme Court and of lower federal courts evaluating the organization 
rights of both employees and nonemployees on an employer's premises have repeatedly recog­
nized that, improperly exercised, these rights can seriously interfere with the conduct of the 
business in question, whether the premises be a hospital, see NLRB v .  Baptist Hosp. ,  Inc., 442 
U.S. 773, 782-84 (1979); Beth Israel Hosp. v .  NLRB, 437 U.S . 483, 495 (1978), a ship, see NLRB 
v. Cities Serv. Oil Co. , 122 F.2d 149, 1 5 1  (2d Cir. 194 1 ) ,  or a lumber camp, see NLRB v. Lake 
Superior Lumber Corp . ,  167 F.2d 147, 1 5 1 -52 (6th Cir. 1948) . Cf. A gricultural Labor Relations 
Bd. v. Superior Court, 1 6  Cal. 3d 392, 546 P.2d 687, 128 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1976) (administrative 
regulation granting a qualified right of access to agricultural property by farm labor organizers 
upheld) ; State v. Shack, 58 N . J .  297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971) (trespass statute held inapplicable to 
government field worker trying to organize and otherwise aid migrant workers) . 
304 See, e . g. , United States v. Caltex, 344 U . S .  149, 154 (1952) (destruction of oil terminal to 
prevent its use by enemy); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 ( 1 928) (destruction of rust­
infected cedar trees to prevent spread of disease to apple trees) ; Bowditch v. City of Boston, 101 
U.S. 16, 18-19 (1879) (destruction of building to contain conflagration). 
To these cases should be added United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co. ,  229 
U.S. 53 (1913),  a decision whose significance is heightened for this Article's purposes by the 
Court's subsequent decision in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U . S .  165 (1979). One issue in 
Chandler-Dunbar was whether the compensation due to the power company for the federal 
government's acquisition of its fee in the bed of a navigable river should include the fee's value 
for water development purposes. See 229 U . S .  at 68-69. Although the company conceded that 
the government enjoys extensive powers to control the nation's navigable waterways under the 
commerce clause, id. at 62-63, it denied that the government could "exclude the rights of 
riparian owners to construct in the river . . .  such appliances as are necessary to control and use 
them for commercial p urposes" without compensation. Id. at 6 1 .  The Court rejected that 
contention, stating that the company's property was " 'a qualified title, a bare technical title . . .  
subordinate to such use of the submerged lands and of the waters flowing over them as may be 
consistent with or demanded by the public rights of navigation.'  " Id. at 64 (quoting Scranton v.  
Wheeler, 1 79 U.S. 1 4 1 ,  163 (1900)) .  In a passage recognizing that under at least some circum­
stances "permanent physical occupations" are not per se takings, and, indeed, are not takings at 
all, the Court stressed: 
If [Congress') judgment be that structures placed in the river and upon such submerged 
land, are an obstruction or hindrance to the proper use of the river for purposes o f  
navigation, i t  may require their removal and forbid the use of the bed o f  the river b y  the 
owner in any way which in its j udgment is injurious to the dominant right of navigation. 
So, also, it may permit the constr uction and maintenance of t unnels under or bridges over 
the river . . . .  
Id. at 62. 
I find unpersuasive the response suggested in United States v. Willow River Power Co. , 324 
U.S. 499, 510 (1945), that Chandler-Dunbar and similar cases do not controvert the per se rule 
because, as applications of the federal navigation servitude doctrine, they simply reflect that the 
riparian owner has no property right to exclude government in the first place. Whatever else may 
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tutional restrictions upon legislative action under our system .  "305 The 
Court has generally placed government on the same footing as private 
parties regarding liability for private losses caused by public pro­
jects. 306 Finally, it has tended to go behind the distinction to deter­
mine whether a more specific and cogent ground exists for allocating 
the costs of such projects. 307 
I do not deny that the property as thing and consequential dam­
ages concepts retain some vitality today, and that there are contexts in 
which the direct/consequential damage distinction makes sense, as 
Eaton recognized. 308 But a measure of how far the mighty have fallen 
appears in a comparison of the cases reviewed in this section with the 
Court's 1878 decision in Northern Transportation Co. v. City of Chi­
cago309 in which it employed these concepts to deny compensation to a 
be said about that doctrine, it is a creature not of positive law but of an interest analysis in which 
the Court has required the riparian owner's l iberty and economic interests to yield to the public's 
navigation interest. Id. at 506; see authorities cited in note 1 1 1  supra. More to the point, the 
Court's subsequent decision in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U . S .  165 (1979) , demonstrates 
that the riparian owner's right to exclude is by no means effaced by the doctrine, and that 
government's denial of that right can constitute a taking even when the physical intrusion in 
question is not "permanent . "  In Ka�er Aetna, a riparian owner-subdivision developer chal­
lenged a federal order to open its private m arina to the public without compensation. Id. at 69. 
Although the Court conceded that the owner's subjacent land was flowed by the "navigable 
waters of the United States," id. at 1 70-72, it nonetheless held that the government's demand 
that the owner's right to exclude yield to the public's right of access was a taking. 
305 Richards v. Washington Terminal Co.,  233 U.S.  546, 553 (1914) .  The Court noted that 
"while the legislature may legalize what otherwise would be a public nuisance, it may not confer 
immunity from action for private nuisance of such a character as to amount in effect to a taking 
of private property. "  Id. 
306 Illustrative is the Court's declaration in United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947), a 
flooding case, that: "[pJroperty is taken in the constitutional sense when inroads are made upon 
an owner's use o f  it to an extent that, as between private parties, a servitude has been acquired 
either by agreement or in course of time. "  Id . at 748. The government's status as a jural actor 
under the takings clause is discussed at length in, e.g.,  Cormack, supra note 56, at 232-33, 240, 
258-59; Lenhoff, Development of the Concept of Eminent Domain, 42 Colum. L. Rev. 596 
(1942) . 
307 Illustrative is United States v. Welch, 217 U . S .  333 (1910), holding government liable for 
the taking of a landowner's right of way easement over an appurtenant parcel, an injury that 
probably would not have been compensable u nder the nineteenth century consequential damage 
standard. Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes adverted to the Court's loose employment of the 
consequential damage concept in precedents cited by the government but observed that the 
actual "ground of such decisions is that the plaintiffs rights are subject to superior public rights, 
or that he has no private right, and that his damage, though greater in degree than that of the 
rest of the public, is the same in kind. "  Id. at 339. 
308 See text accompanying notes 261-62 supra. 
309 99 U.S. 635 (1878) (city's construction of temporary dam in a river to allow construction of 
a tunnel was not a taking, even though plaintiffs were therebv denied total access to their 
premises) . 
' 
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landowner stranded in his collapsed building because of a nearby 
public project . 
2. "Destruction " vs. "Appropriation " 
The Court also has severely diluted both formulations of the 
appropriation concept noted in the Eaton discussion:310 that govern­
ment must either acquire the formal fee title to property taken or use 
the property lost by the owner before a taking can be found. Even 
prior to Eaton, the Court held that when government performs acts 
on private land that would give rise to a right of action if done by 
private party, there is a taking provided that the interest taken is a fee 
simple absolute. 3 1 1  Its twentieth century opinions go much further . 
One group of cases holds that, depending on the governmental acts in 
question, affirmative easements as well as fee interests may be 
taken. 312 A second group dispenses altogether with the notion of ap­
propriation, conceived in physical invasion terms, b y  recognizing that 
negative restrictions may be takings of a fee or less-than-fee interest in 
land depending upon the extent to and manner in w hich they destroy 
land's economic value.  313 In a p assage that might p rove influential in 
future takings decisions, Justice Brennan stressed that these nontres­
passory measures 
can destroy the use and enjoyment of property in order to promote 
the public good just as effectively as formal condemnation or physi-
cal invasion of property. From the property owner's point of view, 
it may matter little whether his land is condemned or flooded, or 
whether it is restricted by regulation to use in its natural state, if 
the effect in both cases is to deprive him of all beneficial use of it. 3 1 4  
The Court has rejected the view that government must affirma-
tively use the resource destroyed in order to "take" property. Illustra­
tive is United States v .  General Motors Corp. ,315 in w hich the govern­
ment temporarily occupied premises held by tenants under long-term 
leaseholds. Relying upon the affirmative use-by-government premise, 
310 See text accompanying notes 271-77 supra. 
31 1 Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U . S .  ( 1 3  Wall . )  166 (1871) . 
31 2 See, e . g . ,  Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U . S .  84 (1962) (overflight easement) ; United 
States v. Causby, 328 U . S .  256 (1946) (same); United States v. Cress, 243 U . S .  316 (1917) 
(flowage easement) . 
313 See cases cited at note 74 supra. 
314 San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San D iego, 450 U . S .  621 ,  652 (1981) (dissenting 
opinion on dismissal for lack of final judgment) . 
315 323 u.s 373 (1945) . 
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the United States insisted that destruction of fixtures occasioned by the 
tenant's temporary removal from the premises was not a taking be­
cause the government neither intended to nor would benefit from 
these fixtures . 316 In reasoning similar to Eaton's treatment of this 
formulation of the distinction, the Court responded: 
In its primary meaning, the term "taken" would seem to signify 
something more than destruction, for it might well be claimed that 
one does not take what he destroys. But the construction of the 
phrase has not been so narrow. The courts have held that the 
deprivation of the former owner rather than the accretion of a right 
or interest to the sovereign constitutes the taking. Governmental 
action short of acquisition of title or occupancy has been held, if its 
effects are so complete as to deprive the owner of all or most of his 
interest in the subject m atter, to amount to a taking. 317 
Even more antithetical to this formulation, of course, are the Court's 
more recent decisions recognizing that nontrespassory use restrictions 
can effect takings . 318 The uses denied to landowners in these cases can 
scarcely be said to have been appropriated by government for its own 
affirmative use . 
As with the consequential damages concept discussed in the pre­
ceding section, the destruction/ appropriation distinction has not been 
totally discarded by the Court . For example, in United States v. 
Central Eureka Mining Co. ,  3 1 9  although decided thirteen years after 
General Motors, the Court employed the distinction to deny that an 
order shutting down certain gold mines during World War II was a 
taking even though the order in effect destroyed the value of the 
claimant's mines. But two propositions can be advanced without qual­
ification. First, the Court has progressively retreated from the me­
chanical nineteenth century use of the distinction to delineate the 
police and eminent domain powers (the former being said to "destroy" 
property; the latter, to " appropriate" it) . 320 Second, Central Eureka 
and other twentieth century opinions employing the distinction to 
deny compensation in the face of  egregious losses to private land­
owners by governmental acts stand out as the most criticized of the 
Court's takings analyses . 321 
316 Id. at 383-84. 
317 Id. at 378 (footnote omitted) . 
316 See cases cited in note 74 supra. 
319 357 U.S .  155 (1958) . 
320 See, e.g. , Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S .  678 (1 888) · Mugler v Kansas 123 U.S. 623 
(1887). 
, . 
, 
321 For example, Professor Sax dismissed as "preposterous" the Court's use of the destruction/ 
appropriation distinction as the basis for its decision in Central Eureka. Sax, supra note 41, at 48. 
June 1983] THE TAKING ISSUE 543 
3. "Permanent Occupation " vs. "Temporary Invasion " 
In reviewing the Court's treatment of the permanent occupation/ 
temporary invasion distinction, it is useful to comment separately on 
the permanent/temporary and occupation/invasion pairings. Four 
variants of the first pairing can be d etected in the Court's opinions: 
one divides intrusions affecting real property interests from those 
impinging upon other kinds of interests; a second describes the physi­
cal nature of the governmental act; a third delineates the duration of 
the real property interest taken; and a fourth portrays the extent of the 
dominion being exercised by government over private lan d .  
The issue posed in cases employing the first variant is whether 
government's trespassory acts occur with sufficient frequency or with 
the requisite intent to intrude upon a real property interest of the 
claimant. If so, these acts, which m ay involve the entry of  persons or 
objects, are deemed "perm anent . "  
"Permanent" acts constituting a t aking of a real property interest 
have been of two kinds: "continuous" and "intermittent . "  Illustrative 
of the first, which by their nature are limited to entry by objects, is the 
oft-cited permanent flooding of private land . 322 Examples of the sec­
ond, which may entail entry by persons as well as objects, are flooding 
which, although intermittent, is certain to recur over tim e ;  323 firing of 
a single shot over a private resort with the intent to continue doing 
so;324 and entry by the public-at-large into a private m arina. 325 
On the other hand, acts deemed "temporary" under this variant 
do not take a real property interest although they m ay constitute 
tortious invasions or, in Eaton's phrase, "technical trespasses . "  Exam­
ples of temporary intrusions include government's firing of  two shots 
over a private resort without intent to continue the firing;326 its dam­
age to a private bridge pier by blastin g  in conjunction with a naviga­
tion project;327 and the single- or limited-instance entry of its inspec­
tors328 and troops329 in the perform ance of their official duties . 
Under the second variant, a "permanent" trespass is one that is 
continous while a "temporary" trespass is one that occurs within a 
I!! See United States v. Lynah, 1 88 U .S .  445 ( 1 903); Pumpelly v .  Green Bay Co. , 80 U .S .  ( 13  
Wall.) 166 (1871 ) . 
323 Jacobs v. United States, 290 U .S .  13 ( 1933); United States v. Cress, 243 U . S .  316 ( 1917) .  
324 Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v .  United States, 260 U .S .  327 ( 1 922). 
325 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S .  164 ( 1 979). 
326 Peabody v. United States, 231 U .S .  530 ( 1 9 13) . 
327 Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co. v. United States, 260 U.S .  1 25 (1922) . 
328 Montana Co. v. St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. ,  152 U .S .  160 (1894) . 
329 YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S .  85 (1969) . 
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discrete, usually brief, period of time. The permanent deposit of 
water or debris on land330 constitutes permanent trespass; intermittent 
flooding, 331 or single or multiple entries, 332 is considered temporary. 
Although permanent intrusions are more likely to be takings because 
their impact tends to be more pronounced, the permanent/temporary 
categories under this variant do not necessarily correspond with the 
takings/nontakings categories . The Court's precedents do not indicate 
that permanent intrusions will invariably be takings, although those 
that have been so characterized have consistently had substantial 
effects on the claimant's land. 333 
Conversely, temporary trespasses may constitute takings. Illus-
trative is the intrusion i n  United States v .  Cress, 334 in which the Court 
rejected government's defense that it had not taken the claimant's 
land because its flooding of that land was "intermittent" and therefore 
"temporary. "  Precisely tracking Eaton's rejection of an identical de-
. fense, the Court responded that "( t ]here is no difference of kind, but 
only of degree, between a permanent condition of continual overflow 
by back-water and a permanent liability to intermittent but inevita­
bly recurring overflows; and, on principle, the right to compensation 
must arise in the one case as in the other. "335 Trespasses deemed 
"temporary" and held not to be takings have included entry onto 
private land by labor organizers, 336 by persons exercising expression 
rights, 337 and by water when the intermittent flooding was less fre­
quent and less substantial than the flooding in Cress. 338 
The Court has also used the permane;t/temporary distinction to 
describe the duration of the real property interests allegedly taken . If 
all takings were in fee, this third variant would be unnecessary, of 
course, because their duration would be potentially infinite. In fact, 
330 See cases cited in note 322 supra. 
331 See cases cited in note 323 supra. 
332 See, e .g. , PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U . S. 74 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. 
United States, 444 U . S .  164 (1979); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U . S .  507 (1976); Central Hardware 
Co. v .  NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. , 351 U.S. 105 (1956); 
Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States 260 U . S .  327 (1922) 333 s , . ee text accompanying notes 292-301 supra. 
334 243 U.S. 316 (1917) .  
335 Id. a t  328. 
336 See, e.g. , Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U . S .  507 (1976); Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S.  539 (1972); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co . ,  351 U . S. 105 (1956); NLRB v. Cities Serv. Oil C� . ,  122 F.2d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 1941) (statute permitting union officials on board ship to speak with crew is not an interference "within the Fifth Amendment") 
::: Prune�ard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S.  74 ( 1980) .
· 
Sangumetti v. United States, 264 U . S .  146 (1924). 
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the Court has been confronted with claimed takings of property inter­
ests of various durations. I n  addition to fees, these interests have 
included leaseholds of definite or indefinite duration339 and a variety 
of easements. Some easements, like fees, are of potentially infinite 
duration. 340 Others last only as long as the burdened land is devoted to 
a particular use. 341 Still others, as recently suggested by Justice Bren­
nan, 342 may exist until a court determines that the noncompensatory 
measure in question is a takin g  and government opts to terminate the 
measure, compensating the claimant for the taking of a "temporary 
easement" only. 
As with the second variant, invasions labelled "temporary" under 
the third may nevertheless be takings . For example, government may 
condemn a leasehold or temporarily seize an enterprise for national 
security purposes . 343 Moreover ,  trespasses that are "temporary" in the 
third sense, but not found to b e  takings, may interfere substantially 
with the proprietor's economic or dominion interest . Illustrative are 
statutorily authorized rights o f  tenants to remain on the landlords' 
premises after the expiration of their leases344 and of non-employee 
union organizers to enter an employer's workplace . 345 
The final variant arises in cases in which a taking has been found, 
and the issue is whether the real property interest taken is a fee or an 
easement .  The inquiry in these cases is comparable to determining 
whether a private person's adverse use of another's land has ripened 
into one of these interests . The key to both inquiries is the extent of 
dominion exercised by the "non-record" owner. The Court has tended 
to use the label "permanent" for trespasses in which government 
i39 See, e . g . ,  United States v. Peewee Coal Co. , 341 U.S. 1 14 (1951) (coal mine seized 
indefinitely to avert nationwide miners' strike) ; United States v. General Motors Corp . ,  323 U.S.  
373 (1945) (leasehold condemned to permit government agency to occupy warehouse indefi­
nitely) . 
Ho See, e . g . ,  United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U . S .  799 (1950) (flowage 
easement necessitated by operation of dam) ; United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917) (same) . 
HI Despite the variety of Court opinions dealing with use-dependent intrusions of indefinite 
duration, see, e.g. , cases cited in notes 127-29 supra, I have been unable to find any in which the 
Court has applied the labels "temporary" or "permanent" to the intrusions in this third, dura­
tional sense. Accordingly, the Loretto Court's characterization of the intrusion by the cable 
fixtures as "permanent" in this durational sense, see Loretto, 102 S. Ct. at 3178, is original to 
that case, and not one derived from precedent. 
i12 San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City o f  San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 ,  653 (1981) (Brennan, J . ,  
dissenting) . 
H3 See cases cited in note 339 supra. 
H• See Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 
135 (1921). 
Hs See cases cited in note 336 supra. 
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exercises complete or substantially complete dominion over private 
land, and "temporary" for lesser incursions . So employed, the terms 
are synonymous, respectively, with "total" takings (those in which 
government obtains a fee) and "partial" takings (those in which it 
obtains an easement) . 346 
Discussion of the occupation/invasion distinction has been de­
ferred to this point because Loretta's premise that these terms have 
different connotations simply is not substantiated by the Court's prior 
cases . On the contrary, the very precedents cited in Loretto to support 
the premise use the terms interchangeably. 347 The distinction the 
Court was trying to draw, I suspect, was not that between occupa­
tions and invasions as such, but between indefinite occupations or 
invasions by objects ("continuing trespasses by object") and intermit­
tent occupations or invasions by persons. The Court has labelled only 
the former "perm anent" in its inverse condemnation cases. 348 More 
significantly, the trespasses featured most prominently in Loretto as 
illustrating "permanent occupations" were occupations by objects, 349 
while those characterized as "temporary invasions" were occupations 
by persons. 350 
I have been unable to find any precedent by the Court to support 
Loretta's bread box rule that a per se takings rule governs a continuing 
trespass by object that has only a minor effect on the owner's domin­
ion or economic interest in the property. Nor did the Court cite one. 
Neither the flooding351 nor the telegraph cases352 featured as the main-
346 See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U . S .  256, 267-68 (1946); United States v. Cress, 243 
U.S.  316, 327-29 (1917).  
347 Citing, e.g. ,  Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146 ( 1 924) , and United States v.  Cress, 
243 U.S. 316 (1917) , the Loretto majority asserted that "this Court has consistently distinguished 
between flooding cases involving a permanent physical occupation . . .  and cases involving a 
more temporary invasion. "  Loretto, 102 S. Ct. at 3172. In Sanguinetti, however, the Court 
stated that, to be a taking, flooding must "constitute an actual, permanent invasion of the land." 
264 U.S. at 149 (emphasis added) . Similarly, in Cress, it stated: "That overflowing lands by 
permanent back-water is a direct invasion, amounting to a taking, is settled . . . .  " 243 U.S.  at 
327-28 (emphasis added) . 
346 See, e.g. ,  United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S.  445, 469 (1903) (farmland "permanently 
flooded" by government-built darns) ; St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co. , 148 U.S. 92, 99 
(1893) (occupation of public space b y  telegraph poles is "permanent and exclusive"); Pumpelly v. 
Green Bay Co., 80 U . S .  (13 Wall .) 166, 177-78 (1871) (flooding caused by construction of claim 
inflicted "irreparable and permanent" injury to farmland) . 
349 See cases cited in note 348 supra. 
350 Included were PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins , 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (trespass of 
shopping center by political petitioners) , and Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S . 164 (1979) 
(trespass of private marina by general public) . 
351 See United States v. Cress, 243 U.S.  316 (1917); United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S . 445 
(1903); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co. , 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (187 1 ) . 
352 See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R. , 195 U . S .  540 (1904); St. Louis v. 
Western Union Tel. Co. , 148 U.S. 92 (1893) . 
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stay of Loretta's per se rule are factually on point . Rather, they 
support Eaton's "real substance of the injury" standard . The flooding 
cases consistently stress the severity of the trespass by object, 353 
whether the interest found to have been taken is a fee or an easement, 
"continuous" or otherwise. Of the telegraph cases cited, only the 
Court's 1892 opinion in St. Louis v .  Western Union Telegraph Co. 354 
is pertinent, but it too must be categorized with the flooding cases as 
an example of a trespass by object significantly interfering with the 
land invaded or occupied. 355 
353 See text accompanying notes 292-97 supra. 
m 148 U.S. 92 (1893) . 
The other opinion cited, Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania R . R. , 195 U.S. 540 
(1904), is inapposite because the telegraph company conceded that the authorization it had 
received from the federal government to locate its poles along the railroad's right of way derived 
from the government's eminent domain power. Id.  at 559. 
355 The issue in St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co. ,  195 U.S. 540 (1904), was whether an 
1866 federal statute authorizing telegraph companies to construct their poles and lines on the 
"post roads of the United States" precluded tiie city of St. Louis from charging the defendant an 
annual rental fee for telegraph poles and lines installed on the city's streets . While the facts of 
Western Union are similar to those of Loretto, they differ in one crucial regard since Western 
Union's intrusion was in no sense "minor ."  Competition among diverse users for street space is a 
recurring and serious problem for municipal administrators. See Cooper & Costonis, Space Over 
Streets (unpublished report prepared for the Rockefeller Brothers Fund 1977) (on file at the New 
York University Law Review) . Using streets as a means of public transit is sometimes incompati­
ble with using them as locations for telegraph lines and other bulky objects or projections such as 
kiosks, awnings, and trash receptacles. Id. Therefore, courts generally, and the Supreme Court 
in Western Union specifically, have stressed that a city "has the full control of its streets, and in 
this respect represents the public in relation thereto."  Western Union, 148 U . S .  at 100. The 
Court devoted numerous passages in its opinion to the problem of incompatibility, including one 
observing that 
the use made by the telegraph company is, in  respect to so much of the space as it occupies 
with its poles, permanent and exclusive . It as effectually and permanently dispossesses the 
general public as if it had destroyed that amount of ground. Whatever benefit the public 
may receive in the way of transportation of messages, that space is, so far as respects its 
actual use for purposes of a highway and personal travel, wholly lost to the public . . . .  By 
sufficient multiplication of telegraph and telephone companies the whole space of the 
highway might be occupied, and that which was designed for general use for purposes of 
travel entirely appropriated to the separate use of companies and for the transportation of 
messages . . . .  To that extent it is a use different in kind and extent from that enjoyed by 
the general public. 
Id. at 99. Read in context, therefore, the Court in Western Union did not label the telegraph 
company's intrusion as "permanent" and "exclusive" to demonstrate that a minor intrusion is a 
per se taking, as the Court supposed in Loretto, see 102 S. Ct. at 3172-73, but to show that the 
intrusion in question was anything but "minor ."  
The encroachment upon the "negligible, unoccupied space," see Jones Report, supra note 
141, at 207, devoted to cable equipment atop Manhattan apartment buildings is scarcely 
comparable. Not only is diversion of that space to cable uses fully compatible with the function­
ing of the structure below as an apartment building, but it also enhances the building's attrac­
tiveness to prospective tenants who wish to subscribe to a cable television service. Moreover, the 
landlord who bars or hinders cable installations does not bear a relation to his tenants compara­
ble to that between a city and its "general public," because she acts in contravention, rather than 
in support of the tenants' legislatively declared interests. See text accompanying note 141 supra. 
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C. E aton 's Distinctions in Loretto 
In view of the Court's treatment of Eaton's nineteenth century 
distinctions prior to Loretto, its use of them in Loretto leads to two 
conclusions. First, the distinctions do not warrant Loretta's per se rule 
because none of them justifies that strict rule. Second, theirs should be 
the admittedly influential, but nonetheless subordinate role of assist­
ing the Court to fix the government's burden in overcoming the 
takings presumption . Their use in defense of the narrow per se rule 
might be warranted if the Court's categorical opposition to "perma­
nent physical occupations" were supported by more than its intuitive 
sense that "a physical intrusion by government [is] a property restric­
tion of an unusually serious character. "356 However appealing that 
sentiment may be, to base a per se rule on it alone ignores the Court's 
numerous approvals of intrusions under circumstances no less grave 
than those presented in Loretto. 357 B ut it would be going too far to 
deny the importance of the distinctions altogether . Undoubtedly gov­
ernment's burden in overcoming the takings presumption triggered by 
section 828 should be demanding. The intrusion it authorizes is 
overtly "physical, "  directly impinges on the claimant's land, appropri­
ates a recognized real property interest to the specific use of govern­
m ent's delegates, is of indefinite duration, and, by virtue of these 
factors, threatens the owner's dominion and economic interests in its 
property. In combin ation,  moreover, these factors certainly magnify 
the concerns voiced by Professor Michelman over the "stark spectacle 
of an alien, uninvited presence in one's territory. "358 
Turning to the distinctions themselves, we may consider the 
appropriation/ destruction and direct/ consequential damages pairings 
together because Loretto' s treatment of each of them suffers from the 
same fault. The Court seems to reason that because a taking is more 
readily found when a measure appropriates rather than destroys prop-
Although distinguishable from Loretto on this basis, W estem Union does support Loretto in 
a more significant respect .  Its statement offered in defense of its holding that compensation was 
due the city that "it matters not for what that exclusive appropriation is taken," 148 U.S. at 101. 
is a direct analogue to Loretto's assertion that a permanent physical occupation is a taking 
"without regard to the public interests that it may serve," Loretto, 102 S. Ct. at 3171. Behind 
both propositions lies the premise that due process considerations have no role to play in takings 
analysis . That question is addressed in text accompanying notes 187-94 supra. 
356 102 S. Ct. at 317 1 .  
357 See text accompanying notes 302-04 supra. 
356 Michelman, supra note 3, at 1228 (footnote omitted) ; see text accompanying notes 199·200 
supra. 
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erty, or d
.
irectly �ather than consequentially injures it, a taking must 
be found i
.
n such instances. But as established in the preceding section, 
the Court s precedents demonstrate the contrary. Despite the saliency 
of appropriation i n  those cases, the C ourt either found no taking3s9 or, 
if it did, considered additional  factors in reaching its conclusion. 360 
These precedents also counter the Court's direct/consequential dam­
ages reasoning. The injuries a ddressed in these precedents resulted 
from direct invasions of the claimant's land, not as consequences of 
governmental activity elsewhere. 
The Court's m anipulation of these pairings is objectionable on 
broader grounds as well . Paradoxically, its regression to nineteenth 
century formalism could undermine its evident solicitude for property 
rights by revitalizing ill-considered precedents that deny property 
owners compensation on the spurious ground that, however grievous 
or unfairly imposed , the injuries suffered resulted from a government­
al act that merely "destroyed" the claimants' property rights, 361 or 
injured them only "consequentially . "362 The regression is exacerbated 
by its gratuitousness because on Loretta's facts, the Court had no 
occasion to speak to the legal e ffects of  destruction or of consequential 
damages . Section 828 clearly did appropriate the cable-occupied 
space, and, equally clearly, the landlord's fee was the situs of the 
injury section 828 inflicted . 
The Court's tilt towards a conception of property as thing rather 
than as relation also permeates Loretto. The Court equated the prop­
erty burdened by section 828 solely with the cable-occupied space 
rather than with the landlord's entire fee package of land and build-
359 See, e. g . ,  PruneYard Shopping Center v. United States, 447 U . S .  74 ( 1 980) (no taking 
where state required shopping center to permit distribution of political pamphlets and petitions 
on its premises);  Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S .  539 (1972)  (no taking where statute 
authorizes union organizers to distribute literature on company property) ; Marcus Brown Hold­
ing Co. v. Feldman, 256 U . S .  170 (1921) ( no taking when, in response to a housing crisis, statute 
authorizes tenants to remain in possession of leased premises after expiration of lease) ; Block v. 
Hirsh, 256 U . S .  135 ( 192 1 )  (same) . 
360 See, e .g . ,  Hudgens v .  NLRB, 424 U.S .  507 (1976) (proper accommodation between 
workers' statutory right to picket and private property rights depends on nature and strength of 
the respective rights in each case) ; Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S.  84 (1962) (emphasis on 
county's failure to fulfill its duty to acquire easements in land and air space sufficient to permit 
operation of airport); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. , 351 U.S. 105 ( 1956) (employer could ban 
nonemployee distribution of union literature on its property if union organizers could reach 
employees by reasonable efforts through other channels of communication). 
3•n See United States v.  Central Eureka Mining Co. , 357 U.S.  155 ( 1958) (no taking where 
government required nonessential gold m ines to cease operations during wartime). 
362 See Northern Transp. Co. v. City of Chicago, 99 U.S .  635 (1878) (no taking even where 
city's construction of temporary dam in a river denied plaintiffs access to their premises because 
no entry was made upon their property) . 
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ing, 363 thus equating the property taken with the property burde�ed. 
Doing so enabled the Court to assert that section 828 authonzed 
Teleprompter to exercise "complete dominion" over Mrs. Loretto's 
"property. "364 Furthermore, the Court's "qualitative" distinction be­
tween trespasses by object and by person is irrelevant if property is 
viewed as a relation and not as a thing. Either type of trespass 
threatens to take property by denying its owner the right to exclude. A 
taking, if found, derives from the elimination of this right from the 
relation of owner to resource, not from the nature of the trespass . But 
Loretto's per se rule is based on the nature of the trespass and not on 
the elimination of the right. 365 
363 See text accompanying notes 170- 72 supra. 
36• Loretto, 102 S. Ct. at 3176. 
365 The Court acknowledged that trespasses by persons are not governed by the per se rule, a 
position it could hardly avoid in view of its prior decisions in such cases as Prune Yard and Kaiser 
Aetna. The § 828 intrusion is a per se taking, it reasoned, because it authorized a non-owner to 
place its thing, cable equipment, upon the owner's thing, space atop her apartment building. In 
the Court's words: 
[A]n owner suffers a special kind of injury when a stranger directly invades and occupies 
the owner's property . . . .  [P]roperty law has long protected an owner's expectation that 
he will be relatively undisturbed at least in the possession of his property. To require, as 
well, that the owner permit another to exercise complete dominion literally adds insult to 
injury. 
Loretto, 102 S. Ct. at 3 1 76 (emphasis in original). The Court's regression to a nineteenth century 
predisposition to view "invasions" of "physical" resources as takings also caused it to turn two of 
its modern precedents, Andrus v. Allard, 444 U . S .  51 (1979), and United States v. General 
Motors Corp . ,  323 U.S.  373 ( 1 945), on their heads. Following the lead of Penn Cent. Transp. 
Co. v. New York City, 438 U . S .  104 (1978), discussed in note 171 supra, Andrus asserted that the 
severity of a fractional encroachment upon a privately-owned resource-"the destruction of one 
'strand' of the bundle" -should be evaluated against the measure's impact on the rights associ­
ated with the property burdened, that is, on the resource as a whole. See 444 U . S .  at 65-66. But 
in a passage that purports to "borrow" Andrus' "bundle/strand metaphor," the Court insisted 
that § 828 "chops through the bundle [of the landlord's property rights], taking a slice of every 
strand," Loretto, 102 S. Ct. at 3176, an argument that makes sense only if these rights are the 
sole rights the landlord holds in her burdened property. But Andrus teaches that these rights 
encompass her rights to her entire fee package of land and building, not merely those in the 
property taken, the cable-occupied space alone. Cf. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.  
393 (1922), discussed in note 291 supra. With similar imprecision, the Court seized upon General 
Motors' statement that among the rights in property are those "to possess , use and dispose of it," 
323 U . S .  at 378 (quoted in Loretto, 102 S. Ct. at 31 76), but ignored the preceding phrase which 
stated that property connotes "the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical 
thing," General Motors, 323 U . S .  at 378, and that only in a "vulgar and untechnical sense" is 
property merely a physical thing, id. at 377. Contrary to the intent of the entire passage, the 
Loretto Court treated property as a thing rather than as a relation. See text accompanying notes 
170-72 supra. Whether or not a decision against § 828 would have been warranted under Andrus 
and General Motors, the decision certainly would not have been predicated upon a per se rule, 
nor would it have called into question these two doctrinal pillars of the Court's modern takings 
jurisprudence. 
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The section 828 intrusio n  may be labelled "permanent" under 
two of the permanent/temporary distinction's four variants-the one 
distinguishing intrusions that encroach upon a real property interest 
from those that do not, 366 and the one describing the intrusion's physi­
cal nature. 367 The intrusion is p ermanent under both variants because, 
respectively, section 828 grants the cable company an affirmative 
easement in the landlord's fee, and the intrusion it authorizes is the 
continuing presence of cable equipment on that fee. The intrusion is 
"temporary," however, under the other two variants that connote 
duration368 and scope of dominion. 369 Like the intrusions in Prune­
Yard and other "temporary invasion" cases, it lasts only as long as the 
burdened land is devoted to the use targeted by the measure imposing 
the burden. Similarly, it authorizes cable companies to occupy only 
minimal space on the landlord's  fee, not to exercise dominion over the 
entire fee. 
From the perspective of precedent, the characterization of the 
section 828 intrusion as ''perm anent" under the first two variants does 
not establish that it is a taking, per se or otherwise. As to the first 
variant, it does not follow that because section 828 would take a real 
property interest in the nature of an affirmative easement if it were a 
taking, it therefore is a taking because the resource upon which it 
encroaches is real property. Missing from that reasoning, of course, is 
a step explaining why section 828's intrusion is a taking while count­
less other intrusions upon real property are not. 370 As to the second 
variant, reasoning that premises the legal consequence of a taking 
upon the physical fact of an intrusion's "permanence" alone is equally 
fallacious . Earlier discussion of the flooding37 1 and telegraph cases372 
establishes that permanent intrusions-Le. , continuing trespasses b y  
object-must significantly encroach upon a claimant's dominion or 
economic interest in order to constitute a taking. The Loretto Court's 
refusal to adhere to Eaton's "real substance of the injury" standard is 
in opposition to the tenor, if not the actual content, of its prior case 
law, and therefore requires a justification. Such a justification is never 
advanced. 
366 See text accompanying notes 322-29 supra. 
367 See text accompanying notes 330-38 supra. 
366 See text accompanying notes 339-45 supra. 
369 See text accompanying note 346 supra. 
370 See cases cited in notes 359-60 supra .  
371 See text accompanying notes 292-97, 330-38 supra. 
372 See note 355 and accompanying text supra. 
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The Court faltered in its use of the Eaton distinctions in Loretto 
because it began and ended its analysis at the wrong end of the 
problem . Viewed in the least flattering way, the opinion manipulated 
a set of increasingly dubious conceptions to achieve a predetermined 
result. The more defensible course would have been to look to the 
distinctions only for such assistance as they might provide in defining 
a context for an intelligible assessment of the variables which ought to 
have determined Loretta's outcome. 
